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Liquidity risk represents a vacuum of rigour in the otherwise well-researched
area of risk management. In both practice and theory most of finance is
silent regarding its scope and effect. This is principally due to a lack of
consensus regarding its definition and measurement. Current liquidity risk
measures differ fairly widely in both respects. This thesis attempts at ad-
dressing this by consolidating and examining the principle liquidity risk
measures used in financial literature.
The goal is threefold: distil a clear definition for liquidity risk, mould organic
groupings between the measures based on similarities of purpose and assess
them in terms of both accuracy and practicality.
The result of the investigation shows that liquidity risk is composed of an
array of inter-related aspects, all of which are important to its effect. Liquid-
ity has endemic effects which must be managed. While current approaches
to its management exist, none of them capture the full extent of liquid-
ity risk. Standard liquidity measures only capture a specific aspect of the
risk and while they do seem to provide information on market-wide liquidity,
they lack predictive power. Contrastingly while the more complex Liquidity-
Value-at-Risk models aim at modelling the totality of liquidity risk, with the
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“Portfolios are marked-to-market at the middle of the bid-offer spread and
many hedge funds use models that incorporate this assumption. In late Au-
gust, there was only one realistic value for the portfolio: the bid price. Amid
such major sell-offs only the first seller obtains a reasonable price for its
security, the rest lose a fortune having to pay a liquidity premium” – Meri-
wether’s Meltdown [14]
Liquidity risk loosely refers to the risk that an investor faces in not realizing
the expected proceeds upon liquidation. It differs from standard market-
related risk of loss in that it is meant to refer solely to losses borne off
liquidation.
Generally these losses stem from an array of factors including, aggregate
market conditions, investor preferences, macro-economic events and, even
the manner in which an investor trades. The risk is multi-faceted and driven
by the complex factors that define the flow of information in a market and
determine how prices are set. It is inherent to every trade executed and
crucially determines the optimal stability and efficiency of markets and the
financial system as a whole.
Liquidity is pivotal to the normal functioning of a financial system. Its grow-
ing importance, particularly in the increasingly integrated global market,
has been highlighted by the series of high-profile firm failures and economic
distresses which have been initiated by liquidity risk mismanagement and
model failure. The 1987 stock market crash, the Dec 1997 run on the Thai
Baht, the Oct 1998 Long-Term Capital Management bankruptcy 1 and Rus-











sian default and the more recent recession-generating financial collapse, all
have as their root a liquidity crises with endemic effects.
Despite the grave importance of these events for the world economy, none of
them have spurred on the release of regulation to prevent their recurrence.
Moreover, more specific research into liquidity-risk management techniques
has only recently been undertaken as studies in risk have preferred to focus
on Value-at-Risk. Prudence has in some sense been undermined by severe
model dependency and the pretence that all risks are captured in Value-at-
Risk and other ad-hoc risk measures.
In effect liquidity-risk has largely been forgotten in the pursuit of partially
forecasting market-related risk. This is possibly due to the confusion sur-
rounding what precisely constitutes the risk and the fact that proper and
robust mathematical treatments of it, although they exist, have not yet
gained traction due to uncertainty regarding their efficacy.
The goal of this thesis is to add to the literature regarding liquidity risk by
surveying the current approaches to its management. The aim is to distil
a complete and thorough definition of market-related liquidity risk so as to
clearly and objectively assess to what extent the current stock of liquidity
risk measures capture the totality of liquidity risk.
Unlike previous approaches which have concentrated merely on a theoretical
discussion, this thesis focuses on the measures’ ability to accurately quantify
the totality of liquidity risk. In this respect, the various measures and models
are assessed with both a theoretical critique and empirical tests. Such tests
occur within the realities of the price-formation process and are devised to
determine how accurately the models hint at realized liquidity risk.
The overall objective of this dual approach is to arrive at a comprehensive
representation of market-related liquidity risk and the measures used to
monitor it. This is achieved in several steps.
Chapter 2 lays the bedrock of the theoretical analysis by defining the multi-
ple aspects of liquidity risk and deriving as complete a definition as possible.
Chapter 3 then showcases the importance of liquidity in market-risk and dis-
cusses how standard risk measures like Value-at-Risk (VaR) fail to account
for it.
Chapter 4 uses the results of Chapter 2 and critiques the liquidity-risk ap-
proaches put forth in the literature: beginning with the standard market
measures, which seem to proxy for one aspect of liquidity risk, and end-











gamut of liquidity risk. The chapter analyses each of the measures/models
within the context of the definition and assigns them to groups according to
organic similarities in the information they present.
Chapter 5, finally, presents the results of an empirical study into the ac-
curacy of the risk measures and the similarities between them. Since some
of the liquidity metrics are observable market variables (the so-called mea-
sures) which do not provide objective forecasts, they are assessed differently
to the models, which are rigorously backtested.
The measures are assessed on the basis of their sensitivity to periods of
known market-wide illiquidity with the help of long-term data. This tests
whether the liquidity measures provide information on realized liquidity at
all.
Next the measures are subjected to a correlation and principle component
analysis (PCA) in order to assess empirically whether different measures
provide different insights into liquidity risk. This determines to what extent
the theoretical groupings of the measures are actually real.
Models, like the liquidity Value-at-Risk (L-VaR) models, which provide ob-
jectively verifiable forecasts are analysed more deeply. Unlike previous stud-
ies these models are implemented and carefully backtested in order to verify
their accuracy. They are also subjected to a sensitivity and trend analysis.
The focus is on highlighting the behaviour of the measures/models and as-
sessing how well they perform at implementing their theoretical framework
in the face of realized liquidity concerns.
The results of the analysis show that liquidity risk is composed of a variety
of complex aspects, all of which contribute to the variability in the expected
proceeds from liquidation. While each of the standard liquidity risk mea-
sures provide information on different aspects of liquidity risk, generally they
are not exhaustive and many important aspects pertaining to liquidity risk
are ignored. This may contribute to the measures’ poor ability in predicting
changes in liquidity.
Although the integrated L-VaR models are more comprehensive and aim at
integrating all of the different aspects of liquidity risk into a single frame-
work, they are not generally more accurate in forecasting portfolio losses
than standard VaR models. Indeed in many cases some of the more sophis-
ticated models, perform worse than models which tend to focus on only a
single aspect.











way which does not leave the model unduly dependant on any single aspect
and which offers a fair reflection of a market-participant’s likely loss with
liquidity risks.
Although some of the less integrated models are more accurate than stan-
dard VaR techniques, the fact that they ignore certain important aspects
of liquidity risk, implies that in order to properly manage liquidity risk, a












Towards a Definition of
Liquidity Risk
Risk is commonly understood as measurable uncertainty surrounding future
outcomes. Unlike uncertainty alone, which is merely the inability to forecast
the way events play out, risk can be modelled and quantified. Market risk
measurement, in particular, is concerned with the measurement of uncertain
financial market outcomes and liquidity risk with measurable uncertainty
relating to liquidity-driven events.
Precisely which events characterise liquidity risk is, however, the source of
much contention and only recently has more rigour been applied in defining
them. This seems odd given that liquidity is widely accepted as an important
determinant of market risk [39] and that general risk modelling techniques
are well-established in the market.
The principle reason for the delay in applying known risk modelling tech-
niques to liquidity risk is that there is no consensus as to what constitutes
it. There has been, until recently, only a general understanding that mar-
ket liquidity is related to the market micro-structure and the price forma-
tion process. Moreover although advances in market micro-structure theory
have meant that the role of liquidity risk and how it arises has become bet-
ter understood. There is still a lack of a sound theoretical development of
liquidity-related market risk.
Most attempts at defining and modelling liquidity risk have been markedly
incoherent and have centred around intuitive, some times ad hoc approaches











that liquidity is actually generally well understood [39]. Indeed there is,
at least, anecdotal evidence that the press, investors and policy makers can
identify an illiquid asset [39]. This has, quite possibly, led to the complacent
belief that liquidity risk necessitated no further research. Frustratingly there
have also been few regulatory incentives to precipitate greater research.
The lack of regulatory incentives has arisen for the same reason that stan-
dard market risk models like Value at Risk (VaR) did not exist prior to
the Basel Accord – lack of regulatory pressure to account for it. Goodhart
[47] points out that in the 1980s there were attempts to extend Basel to
account for liquidity risk but this was abandoned after a lack of consensus
regarding definitions. In the face of the accord’s requirement that “banks
only take reasonable steps to maintain appropriate systems for the man-
agement of prudential risk” and few general liquidity guidelines, financial
institutions tended to be highly capitalized with very illiquid assets which
provided greater returns.
Thus although the accord had taken great steps to prevent a systematic
capitalization crises, it failed in that it misjudged the importance of a clear
and final definition of liquidity risk. In effect, it can be argued that the
Basel Accord’s omission may have engendered the perverse incentives and
unchecked risk-taking that gave rise to the most recent economic debacle.
Notions like this have propelled greater recent interest into liquidity risk and
its measurement. Unfortunately while literature regarding liquidity risk ex-
ists, such work seems broad and scattered with no comprehensive guiding
framework. Such an uncoordinated body of theory constrains and fragments
future research. The importance of a review of existing approaches and defi-
nitions, as attempted in this thesis, to unify and test cannot be understated.
The results of the review show that overall, the literature tends to define
liquidity risk within the context of its intuitive aspects, its role in transaction
costs and its general market-related characteristics like depth and breadth.
All of these are inextricable from the process which drives them.
As noted by Loebnitz [65], in order to better understand these different
aspects it is thus necessary to understand the price formation process or
“the process by which investors’ latent demands are ultimately translated











2.1 The Price Formation Process
Liquidity risk exists exactly as a consequence of market frictions and the
failure of the law of one price. These frictions arise because of the charac-
teristics of the price formation process and market architecture. Liquidity
is intimately related to market structures and processes and these must be
understood before the risk can be understood.
Typically markets take one of 4 forms: dealer emphasis trading mechanisms
(DLR), pure electronic order book (LOB), hybrid mechanisms (HYB) and
periodic call mechanisms [65].
In DLR markets, market-makers or dealers (also known as Specialists) are
obliged to maintain order flow by always being prepared to bid or offer quotes
on any trade quantity. They may set their quotes according to their discre-
tion but must manage a quote for every order placed before them. Dealers
trade on their own accounts and thus take ownership of any inventory they
build up through trade. In this way they manage to provide immediacy even
if natural traders do not exist on the other side of a trade.
LOB markets do not have traders and all orders are matched electronically
according to rules of precedence [65]. Those orders which cannot be matched
immediately are accumulated on a central order book which all traders can
access until they are matched later in the day. The JSE, as discussed in
Chapter 5 in more detail, is an LOB market with opening and closing call
auctions.
Call markets consolidate orders over a period of time which are then executed
at a price that maximises volume. The NYSE is such a market that starts
trading with an opening call auction [65].
HYB markets use a combination of LOB and DLR mechanisms to facilitate
order flow. The majority of stock markets in the world are HYB. Thus the
LSE, NYSE, NASDAQ, etc. are all HYB markets [65].
All trades entered into any of these markets go through 4 distinct processes:
information gathering, order routing, execution and clearing and settlement.
Order routing and execution are probably the most important aspects of any
trade.
Order routing is the process by which an investor places an order with his
broker and then the broker, depending on the characteristics of the place-











meaning that they must find the best time and price, and filling the order
from internal inventories. Many orders also have execution conditions mean-
ing that investors can dictate provisos for their placement in the market.
Trades can be market orders, which means they will be met at the best
available market price or limit orders wherein the investor specifies a price
limit after which the order will not be met. Conditions include fill-or-kill
or time constraints involving when an order should be met. Generally limit
orders are carried on the book for a day and if not met then killed.
Irrespective of their attendant conditions, orders are always entered and
then matched according to rules of precedence. Generally priority is given
first to price and then to time of placement but in some exchanges larger
orders which come later may have priority over the smaller and older orders
[65]. This pertains to the execution process.
Beyond the above intricacies, markets also place restrictions on trades.
These include trading halts, collars, margin requirements, exposure limits
and minimum tick sizes. Moreover as Morris et al [68] note, during times
of extreme turbulence, markets actually shut down. These restrictions and
events render prices in-discrete as jumps only occur in multiples of the tick
size, after trade halts or once some benchmark level has been regained.
Price moves in the market are thus significantly affected by the frictions
which beset them. They are a consequence of subjective expectations which
propagate the signed order flow that crystallizes as demand and supply.
These are a function of the market architecture in which they take form.
Since demand and supply are merely the combination of all the buy or-
ders and all the sell orders at a particular point in time. They are thus
inextricable from the price formation process.
Given this there seems little sense in making assumptions of lack of friction
in risk modelling. One must properly account for the costs of trade which
arise because of illiquidity and market friction. Ignoring them, as seen later,
in the high-profile debacles of Amaranth and LTCM, can lead to grave error
and underestimation of risk.
2.2 Intuitive definitions
The most basic attempts at defining the liquidity-related costs of trade are











the liquidity of an asset to its ease of convertibility into cash.
Intuitive definitions seem to hint at both speed of conversion and associated
costs [39]. These definitions hold cash as the benchmark liquid asset with
all other assets measured against it. Many papers thus regard liquidity risk
as the risk of “being unable to liquidate a position in a timely manner and
at a reasonable price” [69]. The implication then is that for assets held to
maturity, liquidity risk must be insignificant [16].
Under the above characterization, a perfectly liquid asset must be one which
can be easily exchanged in infinite volumes and at zero cost. The notion of
exchange, however, immediately conveys the idea of market-related risk and
undermines the role of cash as the benchmark liquid asset, as cash bears no
market-risk. Any definition of liquidity must necessarily recognise the fact
that it primarily stems from market-related activities and micro-structures.
The difficulty then in using a cash-based definition of liquidity is that firstly,
cash does not convey any idea of the normal costs associated with trade. In
addition market-related aspects are masked and often confused with other
related, but less directly significant aspects like liquidity of the economy and
the firm.
Economy-wide liquidity relates to broad notions of credit extension, mone-
tary momentum and money supply issues [42]. These are indicative of the
ease with which cash is made available and are the preserve of the monetary
policy authorities whose goal is to ensure monetary stability in the interests
of economic growth. Firm-wide liquidity, operates at the micro-economy
and relates to issues of operational stability and debt. A firm is considered
liquid if it can pay its liabilities as they fall due. Firm-wide liquidity is thus
associated with asset and liability matching and other internal issues.
Contrastingly market-wide or asset liquidity is externally driven by financial
market events and the market-wide appetite for an asset. It is the major
source of risk in the modern financial system and, as seen by recent credit-
market events (and shown later in Chapter 3), crucially drives firm-liquidity
and economy-wide liquidity.
Although this thesis focuses on market-related liquidity risk, as discussed in
Chapter 3, all of the above facets of liquidity risk are important and related
to the stability in market liquidity, particularly during periods of crises.
They are, however, not central to the definition of liquidity risk.
The realization that cash has no market risk in and of itself and is merely a











on liquidation value and the risks which make this lower than expected.
These definitions focus on liquidity risk as “the danger a market participant
faces in not being able to immediately liquidate a position at a price close
to the current market price” [44]. They focus on the costs associated with
this immediacy.
2.3 Transaction Cost-Based Liquidity Risk
The most significant aspect of market-related liquidity, are the transaction
costs which are attached to trading in an environment with friction. Both
Lybek et al [66] and Angelidis et al [10], and many other papers, distin-
guish between implicit and explicit transaction costs and cite them as the
transaction cost-based aspect of liquidity risk. These are the events which
characterize liquidity risk.
Explicit transaction costs relate to order processing costs, taxes like Mar-
ketable Securities Tax (MST) in South Africa and brokerage and other costs
incurred to trade a security. These costs are usually associated with the com-
munication and initiation of a trade and are largely certain prior to the trade
[65]. They do not add markedly to overall liquidity risk.
Implicit transaction costs, however, do influence trade uncertainty and heighten
market risk. The literature includes any events which tend to reduce the
expected proceeds from liquidation under this banner. These include: the
bid-ask spread, price risk, opportunity costs and price impacts [65], all of
which induce uncertain effects on the value under liquidation.
2.3.1 The Bid-Ask Spread
The Bid-Ask spread refers to the difference between the Bid and Ask price
available in the market at any given instant. The spread changes continu-
ously throughout a trading day in so far as available bids and offers change.
The Bid price for an asset is the highest price that any buyer who is currently
quoted in the market is willing to pay and the Ask or Offer price is the lowest
amount that any seller is willing to commit for that asset. Generally the
Bid is almost always lower than the Ask due to arbitrage whitening, thus











As noted, in much of the literature the Bid-Ask Spread does constitute a
transaction cost in that if an investor buys at the Ask then he may only be
able to sell again at the lower Bid. If for example the Bid were $30 and the
Ask $35, one would expect to lose $5 or more on every such trade 1. This is
a paper loss and exists immediately at the time of purchase – it is not split
half at the time of purchase and half at the time of re-sale.
The spread is a cost to all trades, but can be mitigated by purchasing at
the ask or higher and being patient until another buyer arrives to meet that
ask at a better bid. In this regard the spread rewards the patient investor
who is willing to bear the risks of the market moving against them during
the period between buy and sell and of their orders not being met as other
orders with priority get filled first.
Generally the width of the Bid-Ask spread and the reason for its change
can be attributed to divergences in Supply and Demand. Higher Bids mean
relatively higher demand and a falling spread, similarly for sinking supply
and falling Ask prices. The Bid-Ask spread is then intimately related to
liquidity – it gives an indication, in so far as it captures deviations in demand
and supply, of the expected costs if a position were liquidated. The lower
the demand and the higher the spread, the greater these costs (as one would
now buy at the much higher Ask and could only sell at the much lower Bid),
similarly with higher supply. This point is made somewhat more clearly in
the context of a Dealer market, with a fixed market-maker, than in an Order
market where it is said that the “patient” investor makes the market.
In an order-driven market the spread is driven primarily by the behaviour of
the market-maker or dealer, their quotes and the prices they post. Dealers
are tasked with maintaining order flow in an order market and must trade
continuously, sometimes from their own account. They face significant risks
in that they can never be certain to whom they can sell or from whom
they buy, nor at what price to trade. Despite this they must trade, as they
only make profit by encouraging trade, either by way of pricing aggressively
compared to other dealers or by developing relationships with their clients
[65].
By trading continuously, dealers inherently face two concerns: inventory
accumulation and the risk of trading against informed traders. These are
the two principle reasons given by the micro-structure literature for the
existence of the spread.












The literature argues that the spread seeks to compensate the market-maker
for accumulating inventory and thus bearing more market risk than other
traders to facilitate trade. They must maintain some level of inventory even
if the market is expected to fall. Usually, however, dealers set inventory
targets and set their prices to meet these targets. Thus like any shop-keeper
they raise bids to build inventory and lower asks to diminish it. Effectively
then the BA spread is determined by dealers’ inventory concerns and a
premium for inventory-related risk [65].
Beyond this the spread may also exist to compensate dealers for losses due
to informed trading and asymmetric information. If dealers feel that order
flow is one-sided, then they may suspect that the trading is informed. They
may then change their prices to protect themselves and moderate the flow
[65].
Research into the spread initially began as a signpost into transaction costs
and progressed into research into its determinants and the reason for its
existence. In one of the earliest studies on the existence of the spread,
Stigler [77] defines the spread as the “cost of consummating a transaction”
which he hypothesises as half the spread plus any commissions. This was
later extended by Demsetz [35] who defined transaction costs as the “cost of
exchanging ownership titles” which was further narrowed down to include
only the spread and any brokerage fees. The spread was thus thought to be
the primary cost associated with liquidity.
Indeed Ting et al [78] argue that much of the later work on the spread was
based on the notion that it is proportional to the mark-up paid by investors
for immediacy. In line with this Glosten and Harris [46], decompose the
spread into order-processing costs and costs due to adverse selection from
informed trading. Bervas [74] points out that the spread captures order-
processing costs, the volatility of accumulated order flows and the degree of
informational asymmetry. It is essentially a premium paid for liquidity.
Irrespective of the reason for the spread’s existence, the literature seems
to agree that higher spread volatility increases the uncertainty around ex-
pected liquidation proceeds and increases liquidity risks. While the spread
is certainly no longer believed to be the sole cause of liquidity risk, it is
widely accepted that a higher absolute spread raises transaction costs and,












The act of trading and thus liquidation induces an additional uncertainty
and possible cost in the form of price risk. It is the risk that the market
will move in the opposite direction to that expected when the trade was
first initiated. This risk arises solely as a consequence of the market-related
moves between order processing and execution.
Price Risk is illustrated in Figure 2.1 where during the time interval  be-
tween order placement and final execution, the trader is vulnerable to the
totality of market-movements.
Figure 2.1: Price Risk [65].
Loebnitz [65] argues, quite reasonably, that traders expect to trade at the
last transacted price or better but never worse, or else they would postpone
their trading – supposing that they can defer this. Since there are penalties
for expecting to buy or sell at a very different price from the last, price risk
induces an uncertain future cost (or profit) in that expectations are usually
not met [75]. This risk is necessarily smaller the more quickly a trade can be
closed. Accordingly larger, more complicated trades which may take longer
to consummate, immediately incur risks of higher liquidation costs.
Indeed all traders face a choice as to how fast their order is filled. In order
to make an informed trading decision, traders must make a reasonable ex-
pectation of where the market will move prior to processing a trade. The
accuracy of this estimation separates the good traders from the bad.
Upon initial inspection it may seem that any trader can reduce their price











this induces additional costs in the form of price impacts whereby the act of
trading itself effectively moves the market away from the trader and realizes
the price risk. This is especially critical for large orders which capture the
bulk of the volume traded on a specific day.
Traders thus face a choice between trading immediately and minimizing
price risk or trading in smaller amounts over time with lower price impact
costs but higher price risk. Figure 2.2 below illustrates the increase in price
risk as the time to fill an order varies. The positive correlation is striking.
Figure 2.2: Price Risk over Time [65].
In general the decision relating to the timing and the progression of a trade
is especially significant in volatile markets where price moves can be large
and difficult to call. As discussed later this is a feature of markets that
compounds liquidity risk during times of crises.
2.3.3 Opportunity Costs
The third implicit transaction-cost related to liquidity are the unverifiable
but ever-present opportunity costs attached to trading. These costs are
never known prior to initiating the trade [65].
Although Loebnitz [65] mentions this cost, they only go so far as to argue
that it cannot be reasonably measured and that it is completely uncertain.
They do not actually discuss what opportunity costs exist during liquida-
tion but restrict themselves to a discussion of the Perold Shortfall measure.
This measures the opportunity cost as the weighted amount by which some
benchmark has changed during the period of trade. In this formulation price














(ni −mie)(pie − pib) (2.1)
ni → number of shares of the ith security in the benchmark
mi
e → number of shares of the ith security held at the end of
the order execution
pi
e → price of ith security held at the end of execution
pi
b → price of ith security at beginning of execution
N → number of securities in the benchmark
In general opportunity costs are attached to every action. In relation to
liquidity risk they arise in that every trader always faces the opportunity
cost that liquidation should not be effected and that the position should be
held in the market to benefit from capital gains. They also arise in relation
to the speed of liquidation – slower liquidation induces greater opportunity
costs from price risk [74].
The bulk of opportunity costs seem to arise from the trade-off between price
risk and price impacts in liquidation. Total liquidity costs lie somewhere be-
tween the execution cost, which falls with time, and opportunity cost, which
rises [69]. This is shown in Figure 2.3 with the cost lying somewhere be-
tween the “variability of execution cost and the opportunity cost of waiting
to trade later” [69].
The cost remains difficult to capture and describe and is largely ignored in
the literature [69].
2.3.4 Price-Impact Costs
A fact which a large number of market risk models ignore, but which is
gaining greater prominence, is that the act of trading itself induces a liquidity
cost, commonly referred to as the price impact of a trade.
In one of the first explicit models of this factor, Bangia, Diebold and Schuer-
mann [14] argue that liquidity risk can be decomposed into an endogenous
component, related directly to the size and manner of trade, and an exoge-
nous component that is linked to market-wide conditions of liquidity. Both











The exogenous component refers to transaction costs as captured by the
volume, Bid-Ask spread, etc. while the endogenous component relates to
trades which effectively move the spread and induce price impacts.
As noted in Bangia et al [14], Loebnitz [65] and Hisata et al [49], any trader
who enters the market with a position that is larger than the quoted size
available, can only fill the order by moving down the order book and accept-
ing poorer prices or trading outside the quoted spread. The alternative is
to partially fill the order at prices within the spread and fill the rest outside
the spread or to kill the order and wait for larger quote sizes. Bangia et al
[14] clearly represent this scenario in Figure 2.4.
As shown once the trade size is outside the quoted depth or available size,
prices become increasingly prohibitive. Indeed the price at which to liquidate
decreases at an increasing rate.
Loebnitz [65] argue that the size of the price impact depends on the bench-
mark from which one computes it. They point out that the literature dis-
tinguishes between pre and post-trade price impacts.
Pre-trade price impacts refer to the “adverse deviation of the actual trans-
action price from a benchmark price”. In this regard the benchmark price
could be what the paper refers to as the “base price”, that is the price of
the asset had there been no price impact [65].
They illustrate the pre-trade impact rather clearly with an example of a











trader who wants to trade an order of 600 000 units in 3 equal splits over a
period of a few hours. The trading is indicated below in Figure 2.5.
In the example they give, a trader decides to buy at 09:45 when the Ask
is $25.4. As the order takes time to fill and as the market learns of its
size some front-running occurs and Asks rise in anticipation of a desperate
Figure 2.4: Price Impacts [69].











buyer. The Ask continually rises so that by the time the order is closed, the
average cost of the transaction is $25.725, which is a 1.27% premium to the
base price of $25.40. In this case, relative to the base price there is a price
impact.
As noted in Loebnitz [65], if there were no liquidity costs, all transaction
costs would occur at the base price and there would be no price impacts. In
this case, assuming that the base price rises over time and does not fall – it
could just as easily have fallen over a day – then it would be most optimal to
institute a block trade at $25.40. Interestingly, using arbitrage arguments,
Çetin, Jarrow et al [23] rigorously prove this by assuming a stochastic supply
curve that is increasing in size. Block trades are most optimal if there are
no liquidity costs.
Loebnitz [65] define the post-trade price impact as the price impact which
occurs when the actual transaction price occurs within the spread or even
at the Bid or Ask. When this occurs and there is a price impact after
the trade then there is a post-trade impact. Generally the post-trade im-
pact is less practically important to traders than the pre-trade impact as
the latter describes expectations and real costs. The post-trade impact is
only marginally interesting when transaction data is unavailable [65]. The
argument below distinguishes between the two price impacts.
Let to be now and t1 be an instant later when the bid/ask price has changed.
Then the post and pre-trade price impacts are given by:
Post-Trade impact = S1/S0 − 1 (2.2)
Pre-Trade impact = S̃ − S0 (2.3)
S0 → mid-price at time t0 just prior to the trade
S1 → earliest mid-price after the trade at t1
S̃ → the actual transaction price
In the definition of the pre-trade price impact the mid-price is used as the
reference price. The mid-price is the most common benchmark price, but
alternative benchmark prices, V, can be used. These would result in very











impact one would need to determine the base price. This is the price which
would have been quoted had the trade for which we are calculating the price
impact not been transacted.
Identifying the base price away from the transaction price in this way, al-
lows one to separate out “normal” market-price movements – that is price
risk – away from liquidity-induced movements and allows for more accurate
estimation of the liquidity transaction costs. Attempts have been made in
the literature to do just this: Chan and Lakonishok [25] and Patel [71] with
the use of a correction term. These attempts usually take the form of a
regression model (like that in Equation 2.4) which proxies the base price
movement by the movement in some aggregate market index.
Pre-Trade impact = (S̃ − V )− (M̃ −M0) (2.4)
M̃ → index price at time of execution
M0 → index price just prior to execution
 → the slope of the regression line
Naturally such methods are prone to much estimation error and are neces-
sarily difficult. The question is whether such a separation is possible or even
desirable. Loebnitz [65] argues that such a separation necessarily requires an
understanding of what drives the base price and how it changes. This would
help apportion price movements to price risk and liquidity risk respectively.
As discussed in Section 2.1, the manner in which prices form implies that
price movements are determined primarily by aggregate order flow. Aggre-
gate order flow drives the base price movement and the single order size
relative to this aggregate flow, determines the trade price-impact. Separat-
ing out price risk from the price impact then amounts to separating out
the effect of a single order on prices from that of the host of orders going
through the market. The sheer scope of such a filtration makes the task
almost impossible.
Moreover from a risk perspective, while it may be useful to isolate the price
impact risk induced, which the trader can ostensibly control, from that of
price risk, such a separation is unnecessary. In general traders are interested
in aggregate risk not the decomposition thereof. This is especially true as












Given the difficulty of a complete separation, the majority of liquidity risk
models, building on the work of Bangia et al [14], subsume the base price
movement into the price impact by decomposing the price impact into an
endogenous component and an exogenous component which includes price
risk.
The exogenous component reflects variables that change the base price: ag-
gregate order flow, dealers’ behaviour, information flows, dealers’ invento-
ries, etc. It is common to the market and is usually attributable to shocks
that impair expectation formation [60] and spread behaviour [44]. The en-
dogenous component, however, reflects trade-unique characteristics like the
traders’ identity (directors’ dealings carry more information in the market
than an unknown trader for example) and the order size [65]. The size of
the order relative to the norm of the market is especially important [66].
Generally the size of the price impact would depend on whether it is dom-
inated by endogenous or exogenous factors. Indeed much of the literature
argues that price impacts have a temporary aspect which is attached to the
endogenous component and a permanent one that is driven by exogenous,
market-wide factors which are sensitive to the volume traded. Holthausen,
Leftwich, and Mayers [50], Hisata and Yamai [49], Almgren and Chriss [7]
and many others argue in favour of such an incidence and a wide array of pa-
pers have documented this effect in equity, forex, bond and futures markets
[49].
Figure 2.6: Temporary vs Permanent Price Impacts [49].
The literature attributes the temporary impact to inventory control effects,
price discreteness (prices are not infinitely divisible but have minimum tick
sizes), price-order pressure, order fragmentation and price smoothing. The
permanent impact is attached to asymmetric information and informed trad-
ing. Although both of these can be attributed to endogenous and exogenous











Market 1 2 3 4
Bid Price Thin & Shallow Thin & Deep Broad & Shallow Broad & Deep
$50 100 100 500 500
$49 200 200 500 500
$48 0 300 0 700
$47 0 300 0 900
$46 0 300 0 1500
Table 2.1: Depth vs Breadth
size and more indicative of market risk, they are dependant on the volume
traded relative to what the market is trading at the time of trade. Even
though the two notions are not the same, the literature merely models the
price risk together with the permanent price impact.
Modelling price-impacts is thus not a trivial exercise and the literature has
found a number of characteristics which must be accounted for in their
modelling.
Firstly, buyer-initiated price impacts tend to be larger than seller-initiated
ones [50]. Moreover, for many markets there exist serial return dependen-
cies as the permanent, information-based impact tends to be lagged and
distributed over time [65]. Price impacts also seem to become more severe,
the larger the trade size is in excess of some threshold. This is possibly be-
cause larger orders are suspected of carrying more private information [65].
This becomes particularly evident in times of crises when price impacts tend
to spike and makes accounting for liquidity risk fairly complex.
2.4 Other Aspects of Liquidity Risk
Liquidity is further complicated by the fact that it is not completely defined
by transaction costs alone. While the above transaction costs capture the
bulk of liquidity risk, liquidity is characterised by a few other factors which
impact on the market as a whole. Although their effects, in the end, become
evident as liquidity-induced transaction costs, they are tied more generally
to economy-wide and market-wide effects.
Beginning with Kyle in 1985 [59] (and even earlier with Black in 1971 [19])
liquidity has been associated with notions that impact on the elasticity of
demand and supply. These characteristics like depth, tightness, resilience,
breadth and immediacy all feature prominently in market practitioners’ de-












The number of shares available for trade at a particular price defines depth
[75]. In Table 2.1 the values OA’ and OA define depth [74]. The more Offers
there are at a particular price the greater the depth. This is negatively
impacted on by higher transaction costs [66].
Breadth refers to the number of orders available and their size. A market
like Markets 3 and 4 in Table 2.1 are broad as they will induce smaller price
impacts for larger orders [66]. The distinction between breadth and depth is
more easily understood from Table 2.1, where it is easily seen that Market
4 is far more liquid than any of the others.
Market 4, may have breadth and depth and yet lack Resiliency, however. Re-
siliency loosely refers to how easily a market can absorb shocks and rapidly
revert to “efficient pricing” [74]. In the face of a shock where prices change
rapidly, a less resilient market will stay illiquid for longer. Lybek et al [66]
refer to this as the tendency of markets in which “new orders flow quickly
to correct order imbalances which tend to move prices away from what is
warranted by fundamentals”.
Much of the literature also makes mention of Immediacy and Tightness,
intuitively arguing that a liquid market should have low costs to turn a











trade around (Tightness) and should promote quick entry and exit of trade
(Immediacy) [74]. These characteristics vary directly with the number of
willing buyers and sellers in the market at any time [66].
All of the above aspects of liquidity seem to allude to ideas of elasticity of
demand and supply. Indeed it seems natural to consider market liquidity
from the perspective of elasticity, as the more elastic a market’s demand
or supply, the lower the price impacts of trade. Indeed many of the earlier
papers: Grossman and Miller [48] and Kamara [57] argue that liquidity risk
only arises as a consequence of downward-sloping demand curves which is
guaranteed so long as there is asymmetric information between buyers and
sellers (for example in the classic lemon’s problem where the more an asset
is sold, the more suspicious the market becomes of it and the lower the
bids) [16]. Thus the idea of elasticity is fairly solidly entrenched and has
propagated the later ideas around depth, breadth, etc.
Elasticity of demand and supply captures the common notion of liquidity:
a market is liquid if it has a wide diversity of market participants with
heterogeneous expectations and trading behaviours [65]. This accounts for
its wide appeal and common use. It is merely one aspect of the many that
characterises market liquidity.
Many may argue, however, that a discussion of these additional aspects
of liquidity seems redundant given that in the end all of their effects are
captured by transaction costs, whether implicit or explicit. The precise and
clear exposition allowed by the transaction cost model seems to capture all
that is important.
The principle objections given to the use of concepts like breadth, depth,
etc. is that they overlap and that the data used to measure them do not
correspond neatly to one particular dimension (for instance volume traded
which commonly measures breadth is also indicative of market depth) [66].
This complicates accurate definition and measurement. Loebnitz [65] for
example points out that by “defining [liquidity] as the totality of the above,
one cannot separate out one aspect from others”. However they also concede
that there seems to be no escaping the multi-dimensionality of liquidity.
Overall the other aspects convey important descriptive information. Not
only are they important from a historical perspective, they act as descriptive
tools for the liquidity of a market in aggregate. They help shift the focus
of liquidity risk from the effect of a specific trade in a market to its general
features.











parties to assess broad notions of liquidity and modify their decisions based
on them. For example knowing that a market lacks breadth, can prepare
traders for the higher price impact costs (relative to other markets) which
are likely in that market without forcing them to first calculate the price
impacts attached to a particular trade.
In short the additional notions, although they can be subsumed into the
transaction cost basis, add richness to the inherent multi-dimensionality of
liquidity. Measures which proxy for these aspects should thus not necessarily
be abandoned in the face of integrated models. They provide useful general
information.
2.5 Liquidity under Stress
The many-faceted nature of liquidity is compounded by the fact that liquid-
ity tends to behave differently during market crashes and periods of stress.
If a perfectly liquid market is one in which an asset can be bought and
sold immediately at a price close to the last traded price [75] then liquidity
during a crash is the antithesis of this.
Market liquidity “depends solely on the number of participants and their
willingness to trade . . . [which] in turn depends on investors’ expectations of
price developments, the information available and their risk aversion” [74].
The fact that this is cumulative in nature means that the size of the investor
base – the market breadth and depth – greatly influences it [74]. Liquidity
is extremely fragile.
Indeed even with a broad investor base, the collective market psyche and
heterogeneous valuations and expectations that drive market equilibria can
be subject to severe dislocations which rapidly impair expectation formation
and drives liquidity away. Liquidity is thus “paradoxical in nature” [74] as
an asset or market is never liquid in aggregate but only for the individual.
Keynes noted that “. . . the fact that each investor flatters himself that his
commitment is liquid (though this cannot be true for all investors collec-
tively) calms his nerves and makes him much more willing to run a risk”
[66]. In this regard liquidity is extremely susceptible to the “irrational ghosts
and spirits” which Keynes held to drive markets during crises.
In fact there seems to exist a self-perpetuating cycle between market crises











can precipitate a bank run, the whisper of illiquidity can force participants
to exit en masse and precipitate a market collapse [74].
Fernandez [42] points out that rising substitutability and concentration of
financial instruments has led to an increased concentration of liquidity in
a few heavily-traded instruments and greater risks of liquidity crises. This
threat is compounded by the rising similarity in risk trading systems, in-
vestment horizons, and risk preferences which has led to greater integration
and increased correlations between asset classes and geographical regions.
Increases in technology and the resultant greater homogeneity in expecta-
tions due to greater access to similar information have also played a pivotal
role. In some ways then reduced transparency can actually improve liquidity
[42].
Persaud [65] largely agrees that greater consolidation is contributing greatly
to increased liquidity risk. He argues that a collapse in information costs and
rising risk model similarity, driven by uniform regulatory requirements like
Basel II (the growing focus on VaR is a good example of this uniformity of
mind) is driving this by reducing the diversity in markets. Reduced diversity
in turn fosters greater positive-feedback trading and irrational price declines.
Unlike standard, gradual periods of price declines, linked to economic slow
downs and the incorporation of new information, market crises which are
linked to liquidity risk show more rapid declines, greater one-sided order
flow and greater volatility. They seem largely irrational as prices decline
uniformly across asset classes and order flow is initiated largely by sellers.
Indeed the price decline is rapid principally because of the lack of counter
parties. Liquidity-related crises do not have people with contrasting views
stepping in at the other side of a trade to alleviate the price pressure. This
is the reason for the more co-ordinated decline.
As a result during a market crises price impacts tend to become unusually
large and the cost of trading large positions in a short period spikes [79].
Moreover heightened market volatility means that traders cannot readily
exit their positions at reasonable prices. This results in panic selling where
positions are exited at any price merely to cut losses. The fact that a single
large player’s endogenous risk can impact on all other players [60] leads to a
convergence of falling asset prices and falling liquidity that effectively freezes
markets and drives prices far from fundamental valuations.
Severe illiquidity is at base level the result of a co-ordinated decline in confi-
dence and risk appetite driven by rising similarity in expectations. In times











that of the market as a whole. This is where the concepts of economy-wide
and firm liquidity start interacting with market liquidity.
In times of crises, exogenous risk compromises a more significant component
of liquidity risk and spread volatility, etc. becomes more crucial. This is
when broad, descriptive measures like breadth, etc. become particularly
useful as models which function well during normal periods fail [79].
A strong case thus exists for notions and models of liquidity risk that change
during times of stress – something which almost none of the models presented
in the literature address. This is problematic as model failure is endemic
during market crises because standard parameter estimation mostly ignores
rare events. It is thus even more crucial to be aware of liquidity risk during
such periods.
2.6 Conclusive Definition
Given the understanding that liquidity is a multi-dimensional characteristic
of markets the task remains to distil a tractable and complete definition of
liquidity risk.
In arriving at such a definition one must, as stated, bear in mind that
liquidity has many different, inter-related aspects: firm-wide, economy-wide,
market-wide and asset liquidity. Choosing at which level to focus attention
and (as we have discussed with market crises) when this attention must
shift from asset to encompass the market and even the economy as a whole
is a model-based consideration. Deciding whether to use a pure transaction-
cost based definition versus more general aspects like elasticity, breadth and
depth is also an aspect of model design.
All models must, however, teeter precariously between absolute realism and
completeness, simplicity and tractability. This is the inherent tension that
besets modelling and is probably the reason that most liquidity-risk models
tend to focus only on the transaction-cost aspect.
As shown in the model discussion and overview, focusing solely on liquidity-
induced transaction costs provides a clean and clear framework from which
to tackle liquidity-related problems. While, at times, difficult to implement,












Elasticity definitions of liquidity risk for instance suffer from an inherent
problem in that they necessarily exclude many liquidity-induced transaction
costs like brokerage and quantifiable market impacts. Defining liquidity risk
as the risk that market elasticity will move in a prejudicial manner seems
largely nebulous. Elasticity is descriptive and does not capture the totality of
liquidity. The same holds true for all the other aspects like depth, resiliency,
etc.
Descriptive definitions do not capture the necessary “bottom-line” informa-
tion of what amount is actually at risk of being lost (for instance like VaR)
nor are they particularly tractable to mathematical modelling. Aspects like
depth, etc. overlap and are thus difficult to isolate mathematically in a
model.
Transaction-costs, however, have been shown to be much more amenable to
modelling. As a consequence most liquidity-risk models, either implicitly
or explicitly define liquidity risk as: the expected price concession required
to convert an asset to cash immediately [65]. Indeed Loebnitz [65] prefers
a more exact definition: “Market liquidity is the discounted expected price
concession required for an immediate transformation of an asset into cash
. . . under a specific trading strategy”. This expressed in Formula 2.5.
For a given trading strategy k and total order size Q, the ex-






qi → order size traded at time ti
TPi(qi)→ transaction price of trade i at time ti
V0 → benchmark price at time 0
Q→ total position size Q =
∑
i qi
N → time horizon for the order execution
r → the relevant discount rate
Certainly while laudably precise, the definition also has drawbacks that stem
from its narrowness. Although Loebnitz [65] claim that it is objective, the
dependence of the definition on a specific trading strategy, means that it is
really subjective. Any measure of liquidity based solely on this definition
would not be particularly helpful in decision-making as it would necessitate











to any single strategy being adopted. The definition does not help one
identify such an optimal trading strategy.
Related to this, the definition does not provide general market information.
It is unclear ex ante how a market would be considered to be more liquid
relative to another. It seems again one would need to either consider all
possible trading strategies or the optimal one, which is not always realizable
in practise. The definition then does not lend itself easily to the different
notions of liquidity: economy, firm and single position.
The Loebnitz [65] definition while precise and ideal for a single position,
unduly constrains the definition of liquidity risk to unexpected transaction
costs relative to some undefined benchmark. It ignores the changes brought
about by a change of focus to the broader market and, significantly, does
not explicitly account for market crises. This neglect is ironic given the fact
that the paper concedes that the multi-dimensionality of liquidity cannot be
escaped. They even agree that the ideal definition would capture all aspects
of liquidity.
While it seems true that these different aspects tend to confuse ideas and
hinder mathematical modelling in the area, a definition should not be so
narrow so as to miss out on broad descriptive information which would be
especially important in times of stress. The “other aspects” of liquidity risk
provide crucial information relating to the size and scope of liquidity-induced
transaction costs, as all of these costs are influenced by them. Any model
must incorporate them in order to balance completeness with tractability.
In the interests of a complete and mathematically amenable model of liquid-
ity, it seems most reasonable to define liquidity risk as: The risk of future
loss in value faced by a market participant due to unforeseen changes in the
expected liquidation value of an asset.
In this way the focus is changed from the size of expected price concessions to
the variability thereof. Moreover whether the liquidation value is measured
in cash based on a specific trading strategy or on any other instrument
proceeding from any strategy, the risk of loss in “end value”, once all trade
has ended, is captured.
The definition includes all associated transaction costs like price impacts,
the bid-ask spread, etc. and can be extended to characterise market-wide
liquidity events and market crises in so far as these impact on the unforeseen
changes in liquidation value. Unlike the previous definition an asset held to











value and whether this is realized or not via a deferred or immediate trading
strategy is immaterial.
Any confusion relating to which events characterise liquidity risk is resolved
by the above definition as all events, like transaction costs, etc. which add to
the variability in an asset’s liquidation value necessarily add to that asset’s
liquidity risk. Assessing liquidity risk in this context merely amounts to
applying standard risk modelling techniques to account for the variability














The above exposition of liquidity risk has shown that the common, intuitive
definitions which were previously used to ch racterise it were inadequate.
Liquidity is complex and requires careful analysis of its separate components
before arriving at a holistic and practicable definition. There is as much
difficulty involved in arriving at a tractable definition of liquidity risk as
there is in modelling it accurately.
It is this inherent difficulty that requires some motivation of why liquidity
risk should even be considered for modelling. There is little sense in mod-
elling merely for the sake of it. As shall be discussed there are many, pressing
reasons for accurate and workable liquidity risk models and measures. Not
only are these models needed to capture liquidity-induced transaction costs,
which can be significant, but liquidity must be accounted for to maintain
model accuracy in the face of liquidity-induced systemic crises; the extent
of which is usually underestimated by current risk systems.
The importance of liquidity is addressed in this Chapter from 3 angles: the
size and significance of liquidity transaction costs, the effects of a systemic
liquidity-induced crises and the need for more accurate models to account
for such events. Two case studies: LTCM and Amaranth, which were both











3.1 The Magnitude of Transaction Costs
Liquidity-induced transaction costs can be large and costly to ignore within
a decision-making risk context. A number of empirical researchers have
examined the size and significance of these costs and nearly all agree that
the costs are large.
Domowitz et al [37], for example, examined the costs of institutional equity
trades at a country level. By seperaing costs into implicit and explicit com-
ponents they find that total costs account on average for 71 basis points
across 42 countries. Roughly the explicit costs accounted for 2/3rd of this.
Implicit costs were, however, measured relative to a benchmark and are thus
only an estimate. Despite this the results are compelling: out of every 100c
traded, on average 0.71c is lost to liquidation costs. On a R1m trade then,
one can expect to lose R7100, during a calm market interval. When markets
are volatile this could triple, moreover, as shown in Figure 3.1, this cost de-
pends crucially on the order size relative to the volume traded on that day.
During a particularly illiquid day a small order could easily capture more
than 25% of the market volume and the liquidity costs could be as much as
1.68% of the value traded.
Figure 3.1: Price Impact Costs [65].
Liquidity costs also impact on other risk issues and induce knock-on costs.
In the case of dynamic hedging for example, it is well known that as a
result of market frictions not all assets can be perfectly hedged. Thus many
assets are only approximately hedged and open to price exposure. François-











underestimate market risk by as much as 25-30%. They note that liquidity-
related costs can be as high as the costs involved in adverse market price
movements. This is particularly true of volatile markets in times of crises.
3.2 Liquidity, Solvency and Systematic Crises
During times of crises, liquidity price impacts rise dramatically and the inter-
relationship between price risk and liquidity risk changes. This has been
indicative of the major market crises of the 21st Century where illiquidity
risks in a few large players has brought them close to insolvency and then
spread out across the markets.
The perplexing link between a firm’s solvency and the market liquidity of its
assets, coupled with systemic crises across asset classes has prompted many
researchers to take liquidity risk far more seriously. The IMF has argued
that market illiquidity is the single most important factor that has triggered
the preponderance of market crashes across many markets [60]. Liquidity is
thus crucial for the prevention of financial meltdown.
Among the papers which have struggled with clarifying the link between
solvency, economic crises and market liquidity, Acharya et al [1] provides
the most extensive and understandable analysis. They examine the dual
role of the modern financial intermediary as a provider of capital and as
an investor of capital and the inherent conflict in times of crises that this
engenders. This is particularly true of firms whose primary source of profit is
directly market-related: brokerage firms, specialists, trading desks at large
banks and hedge funds.
Like all other firms, such entities face funding liquidity risk or firm liquid-
ity risk, being the risk that internal firm cash shortfalls cannot be funded
timeously. Unlike other firms, however, the risk of such cash shortfalls in
these institutions is also market-related and significantly driven by market
prices. Mark-to-market cash needs, collateral obligations, hair cuts, etc. are
all subject to market risk.
All trade requires capital and in institutions which trade as their main ac-
tivity of business; this capital is either borrowed from cash flush entities like
banks in the form of leverage or from privately-raised equity capital. Trad-
ing firms take this capital and invest it in a range of opportunities which
they hope will earn them profits high enough to cover the cost of borrowing.











Generally the borrowed capital will be in the form of direct borrowing, which
lies on the entity’s balance sheet, but as has become more common, can be in
the form of leverage trades, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), bonds,
haircuts or underwriting, all of which incur a cost. Mostly this cost, as in the
case of futures, some derivatives or other assets which are marked-to-market,
require cash flows which vary directly with the value of the investment made.
In these trades cash flow needs are market-related.
Given the preponderance of these type of marked-to-market assets many
financial institutions are increasingly finding that not only is their revenue
market-related but so are their cash flow needs and expenses. This becomes
particularly problematic in times of stress and provides the crucial link be-
tween market-wide illiquidity, firm solvency and systematic economic crises.
During times of severe price pressure and market dislocation, irrespective of
the cause, the majority of asset prices fall as the market reacts to news and
risk aversion rises. Falling asset prices reduce firm profits and asset values
and bring a firm closer to its collateral and capital requirements. This is
especially true for banks and leverage institutions like hedge funds. Banks
must keep a fixed portion of their assets in cash, thus falling asset values
automatically require them to reduce their asset exposure and shore up cash
to meet regulatory requirements. Hedge funds face a rising cost of capital
and mark-to-market calls (especially if they are on the wrong-side of a trade
and the market is falling).
Faced with profit pressure and pressing cash flow needs, these institutions
are forced to cut their positions and engage in fire sales. They effectively
sell into a downward market to meet their individual cash needs. However
as order flow becomes more one-sided [68] during crises, these institutions
need to make larger price concessions in order to trade. The illiquidity of the
market, propelled by a temporary shift in market-wide expectations, then
propagates a market fall. In this way a feedback loop is created between an
individual firm’s cash flow needs, market prices and market illiquidity.
Although institutions can raise cash from other sources, the rising risk aver-
sion associated with a market crash means that different cash avenues close.
During normal periods an institution can use subordinated debt, undrawn
credit lines, or, if lucky, retained earnings to fund their cash needs. However,
during large external shocks, debt becomes more expensive and collateral
requirements more stringent. Institutions are thus forced to sell their assets
at deep discounts [1].
Acharya et al [1] thus conclude that large downward shocks in asset prices











more pressing. Moreover they argue that if a single firm is large enough to
have exposure to many and varied trades and is then quickly and unexpect-
edly faced with insolvency due to a market decline, the consequent knock-on
counter-party effect as a consequence of bad debts to other firms can pre-
cipitate a frighteningly large economic crises. Counter-party risk spreads
the insolvency around. In the words of Buffet “It’s not just whom you sleep
with, but also whom they are sleeping with”.
In line with this Shah et al [74] argues that the link between market liquidity
and firm solvency has been propagated, especially in the most recent crises,
by rising transferability of risks between counter-parties and concentration
in trading. Economies have increasingly relied on the market for allocating
risks through the economy. The marketability of structured products like
securitized units, etc. for example relies on the assumption that the market
will find a suitable counter-party for their risks. The sudden disappearance
of a counter-party has meant that the risks attached to an asset are carried
over many times throughout the economy.
Liquidity is thus far more intimately related to systematic economic crises
than previously believed. This has been borne out by almost every major
market crises of the past century: May 1970 - Penn Central Commercial
Paper crises, Nov 1973 - Middle-Eastern Oil crises, Oct 1987 – Stock Market
crash, August 1990 - Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, April and Dec 1997 - Asian
Crises and June - Oct 1998 - the Russian default and collapse of LTCM. The
most recent events of Aug 2008, culminating in the collapse of Bear Sterns,
is the paragon of these examples.
The correlation between negative asset returns and illiquidity is unmistak-
able. Indeed Acharya et al [1] show that the innovations in liquidity (being
the error term in an auto-regression of some liquidity proxy) are highly
episodic, generally small but prone to sharp, dramatic upward spikes which
are closely associated with systematic crises.
Evidence of this dramatic knock-on effect has prompted Acharya to divide
markets into 2 regimes: a normal regime and an illiquidity regime. The nor-
mal regime is characterized by relative stability and correlations that reflect
pricing fundamentals. The illiquidity regime is, however, characterised by
rising asset and cross-market correlations caused by homogeneity in expec-
tations and fear-based trading. In an illiquidity regime, returns reflect the
rising cost of capital and not expected future profits [1].
Understanding how liquidity changes over time and in response to certain
events can thus help market players avoid taking on silent risks which may











price stability, it is crucial that liquidity be accurately monitored. Indeed
the IMF states that markets need to be liquid to improve their efficiency,
maintain macro-economic stability and allocation of resources. Markets that
are illiquid do not transfer risks efficiently and loose transparency [66]. Liq-
uid markets are also amenable to policy intervention and control as they
respond more quickly to regulatory changes.
Although by now the case for accurate accounting of liquidity in all risk
measures should be quite comprehensive, the ideas relating to the relation-
ship between funding liquidity and economic crises are best illustrated with
a case study.
3.3 Liquidity Crises Case Studies LTCM and Ama-
ranth Advisors
“With market and credit risk, you could lose a fortune. With [funding]
liquidity risk, you could lose the bank!” [1]
3.3.1 Long-Term Capital Management
Many individuals were surprised by the collapse of LTCM and the mounting
evidence that severe market illiquidity seemed to be the cause of the firm’s
demise.
Long-Term Capital Management was founded by John Meriwether, a spe-
cialist trader who left his previous employment at Salomon Brothers to start
his own hedge fund. The fund specialised in high-yield and relative value
convergence trades, taking advantage of the mis-pricing between assets and
using leverage to gear up small profits.
The firm used a great deal of leverage to place effectively the same mis-
pricing trade across assets, countries and markets. All of the trades were
large bets on yield convergence and engendered spectacular success.
By December 1997 the fund had over $5bn in equity and employed a host of
renowned academics, some of whom were Nobel laureates, to find mispric-
ing with carefully primed models. Such was the firm’s reputation that its
balance sheet stood at $125bn of assets, despite a gearing ratio in excess of











Much of the financing consisted primarily of repos and bank debt and many
of its lenders, having faith in the firm’s reputation, provided funds at close
to zero haircuts and with no preliminary risk assessments. The firm, itself,
was surprisingly solvent with secured debt of $900m and 3 year lock ups on
investor equity.
Despite this its positions were huge. LTCM had exposure to nearly 2.4% of
the global swap market of $29trn and even though many of these trades were
offsetting making net exposure low, gross exposure remained staggeringly
high. The firm failed to realise that during times of crises when markets
become very volatile it is gross exposure that matters. During times of
distress markets generally break historical offsetting correlations and each
leg of a net trade effectively becomes directional.
Given this, in June 1998 a downturn in mortgage-backed securities led to
a loss of 16% of capital. Later the Russian default and run on the Ruble,
caused the firm to lose $550m on 21 August 1998. By the end of that month,
failing to cut back on its exposure, the firm had lost 52% of capital and its
gearing stood at 55:1.
Although the firm felt that it could ride out these losses and was securing
more capital, by September 1998 it faced a margin call on a Treasury-bond
future that ironically led Bear Sterns, its prime broker at the time, to call
for increased collateral. The firm thus faced a squeeze in funding risk and
liquidity risk.
As markets fell, firm reserves fell. In the face of mounting margin calls the
firm had to sell its huge exposures into volatile markets. The price impacts
of these trades led to a greater price spiral and the firm lost more.
Since the counter-parties to LTCM’s trades had required so little collateral,
default would cripple many large organizations. The lack of capitalization
in the fund meant that a firm liquidation would require the unwinding of
billions of dollars of trades and render many large institutions vulnerable.
The potential aggregate loss was so large that on 23 September, the US
Federal Reserve stepped in and organized a bail out.
According to Jorion [56] LTCM failed primarily because it failed to manage
its funding risk in the face of rising market illiquidity. The firm misunder-
stood liquidity risk and believed that its large exposures were easy to cut,











3.3.2 Amaranth Advisors LLC
In September 2006, Amaranth Advisors, a Greenwich-based $9bn hedge fund
went bankrupt in 3 days, losing close to half its capital on natural gas futures
[27].
Even though the firm produced quite advanced VaR reports with sensitivity
and concentration numbers which were monitored daily, none of these were
effectively enforced. The fund had no concentration and no stop limits. As
a consequence the fund became dominated by one trade: short summer and
long winter gas contracts.
Although the trade was highly successful and was implemented by highly
successful traders, it was generally not realized that trade exposures were
simply too high. Indeed in response to a loss of $696m on 7 September the
firm decided to double up.
Trading sentiment rather than detailed rationale seemed to drive decisions
at the firm. The managers attributed the fund’s failure to a series of unpre-
dictable events [27]. However, NYMEX officials repeatedly asked the firm
to curtail its exposure. The firm responded to these threats by shorting
additional contracts to reduce their net exposure. Once again they failed to
realise that net exposure is not the driver of risk.
Chincarini [27] re-calculated the Value at Risk of the firm based on their
actual positions and find that for an unleveraged position of $10.22bn, the
predicted VaR loss was $391bn. However had these positions been held to
end September the actual realized loss would have been $629.97bn. The
paper also finds that Amaranth’s positions averaged 253 days of daily trade
and were in some cases 100 times the daily trade.
The firm thus faced immense liquidity risk, which explains the loss beyond
that predicted by VaR. While the loss estimated by VaR was huge enough to
necessitate caution, the firm’s managers did not heed this as they remained
leveraged at around 523 times.
In aggregate Chincarini [27] distils 3 lessons from the Amaranth failure:
liquidity risk is real and should be accounted for by both exchanges and
firms, regulators must push for a more meaningful measure of liquidity as













Both the LTCM and the Amaranth disasters clearly highlight the need for
greater model accuracy in risk measures and modelling. It seems evident
that currently used, classical risk models lack some important component of
market-related loss, which makes them underestimate true loss.
Risk models, like the Black-Scholes-Merton model, VaR and many others,
based on classical market theory are all underpinned by the assumption
of no frictions. They assume that all traders are price takers, can trade
an unlimited amount immediately at zero cost or risk and face no trade
restrictions [65]. In this environment the law of one price will always hold
and it is fairly easy to build risk models based on normality and the weak
law of large numbers.
The reality, however, is that these assumptions are extremely poor approxi-
mations of the true market price formation process discussed in Section 2.1.
As a consequence, many of these models fail, particularly in times of market
crises.
A few papers have tried to quantify the magnitude of this underestima-
tion. Duffie et al [40] for example examine the effect of Bid-Ask spreads
on the commonly used 99% VaR, Expected Tail Loss (ETL) and Default
Probability (DP) of a specific portfolio. It seems to be the first, rigorous
mathematical test of the effec s of liquidity risk on risk measures.
Duffie et al [40] begin by assuming that a firm, facing capital adequacy
restraints, holds 3 assets: a liquid asset S1, an illiquid asset S2 and cash.
Both S1 and S2 follow independent Geometric Brownian Motions (GBMs)
through time, both of which represent the mid-price of these assets. They
also model each asset’s relative mid-to-bid price by X1 and X2 so that the
bid price for each asset is Si(1−Xi).
Next they model the firm’s liquidation behaviour through time. They as-
sume that the firm folds i,t units of each asset at time t so that the initial
firm asset value is given by A0. Assuming liabilities then of L0, the firm’s
initial capital is K0 = A0−L0. The firm trades an amount of i,t each time
period to ensure that the capital adequacy ratio of Kt ≥ crAt, for some
fixed ratio cr of initial capital, is maintained. The proceeds of each trade
are set off against the firm’s liabilities which grow by r each period. The
model details are shown below.




















where r is a constant rate of risk-free lending, 1 and 2 are the expected
return for each asset,  is the instantaneous correlation between the assets
and B1, B2, . . . are independent standard Brownian motions. Let now Xi,t
be the relative mid-to-bid spread of asset i at time t then the bid price of

















where i denotes the relative bid-ask spread and i the correlation of the
mid-price increment and the change in the spread of asset i.
Now given this, suppose that the firm begins with i,0 units of each asset so
that the firm value at time t0 is A0:
A0 = 0,0S0,0 + 1,0S1,0 + 2,0S2,0 (3.6)
Furthermore, as noted, the firm has liabilities of L0 so that its initial capital
is K0 = A0 − L0. Based on the capital adequacy condition this must be
maintained so that:
Kt = At − Lt ≥ crAt (3.7)
Now i,t denotes the units traded of the itℎ asset at the end of each period
t so that i,t+1 = i,t − i,t. If the firm uses the proceeds from each sale to
furnish its liabilities then the amount of liabilities after each trade must be
Lt+1 = e
r(Lt − 0,tS0,t − 1,t(1−X1,t)S1,t − 2,t(1−X2,t)S2,t) (3.8)
Duffie et al assumes that the firm liquidates cash first then the liquid as-
set and lastly the illiquid asset, thus i,t is determined according to the












Spread (liquid/illiquid asset) No Spread 0.1%/0.5% 0.2%/1% 0.5%/2.5%
Constant Spreads 6.204 6.407 6.614 7.344
Variable Spreads, 1 = 2 = 0 6.204 6.398 6.595 7.380
Variable Spreads, 1 = 2 = −0.5 6.204 6.434 6.672 7.659
Variable Spreads, 1 = 2 = −0.8 6.204 6.459 6.736 7.850
b. ETL
Spread (liquid/illiquid asset) No Spread 0.1%/0.5% 0.2%/1% 0.5%/2.5%
Constant Spreads 6.635 6.825 7.030 7.740
Variable Spreads, 1 = 2 = 0 6.635 6.827 7.036 7.796
Variable Spreads, 1 = 2 = −0.5 6.635 6.868 7.125 8.087
Variable Spreads, 1 = 2 = −0.8 6.635 6.895 7.186 8.273
c. Insolvency Probability (in%)
Spread (liquid/illiquid asset) No Spread 0.1%/0.5% 0.2%/1% 0.5%/2.5%
Constant Spreads 0 0 0 0
Variable Spreads, 1 = 2 = 0 0 0 0 0
Variable Spreads, 1 = 2 = −0.5 0 0 0 0.090
Variable Spreads, 1 = 2 = −0.8 0 0 0 0.020
Table 3.1: Duffie Test Results
[40]
Now given this framework, Duffie et al [40] define their risk measures on the
distribution of capital losses and gains over the entire period of trade. Thus
if trade starts at time t0 and continues to t = 10 then the risk measures
capture the distribution of K10 −K0 over the period.
Starting with arbitrary base level values for the parameter set they conduct
25 000, 10-day simulations to arrive at a distribution of K1−K0. They then
study cases based on assump ions of the mid-to-bid spread: 1. constant
spread, 2. random spreads that are uncorrelated (governed by i) with
returns, 3. random spreads that are negatively correlated with returns and
4. random spreads with positive correlations. The results of testing the risk
measures for these different assumptions are presented in Table 3.1.
As shown Duffie et al find that the higher the initial spread and thus the
higher the illiquidity, the greater the Value-at-Risk, ETL and Insolvency
Probability. Clearly illiquidity, as proxied by the Bid-Ask spread, is a risk.
This becomes more marked when [40] allow for non-normality of mid-prices
and model returns with a jump diffusion process. To the extent then that
returns become more non-normal during times of stress, the effects of illiq-
uidity also become more onerous.
In general Duffie et al conclude that risk models seem insensitive to the
degree of illiquidity but do respond to it as an increase in risk. While they
acknowledge that price impacts are ignored in their study, they argue that
the effect of liquidity on market risk must be dramatic as the spread (which is











of total liquidity risk and yet negatively impacts the risk measures.
In a related study, Çetin et al [24] derive an alternate Fundamental Theorem
of Finance and a new framework for arbitrage pricing in the face of liquidity-
related costs. Using an extremely rigorous, mathematical foundation they
show that in an economy where information flow is modelled by a filtered
probability space that informs a single trader, not all instruments can be
perfectly hedged. In this case even if the trader is a price taker with respect
to an external stochastic supply curve (modelled by a GBM), the trader’s
hedging costs escalate to such an extent that hedging is impossible.
Importantly Çetin et al show that in such an economy not all self-financing
trading strategies are unique and the market can now only be approximately
complete. This means that contingent claims can only be hedged eventually,
not exactly at their expiry. They even derive alternate Black-Scholes option
valuations to deal with illiquidity. The implication that standard Black-
Scholes fails when there is liquidity risk is significant.
Even in the context of portfolio optimization, liquidity risk and costs have
important impacts. Lo et al [64] show that incorporating liquidity risk
into a Markowitz efficient frontier can dramatically alter the efficient set
of portfolios from which a potential investor would wish to choose. The
potential for significant loss is thus severe.
Models which thus ignore liquidity risks and assume frictionless markets are
both inaccurate and potentially costly. This is especially true for widely-
used models. In such models errors can be compounded across the market
and lie dormant until a fatal blow-up event reveals their inadequacies. This
is the case with both LTCM and Amaranth where a single measure, VaR
was heavily relied upon.
3.5 Problems with Value-at-Risk
“If we ask the question: ‘Can we be 98% confident that no more than the
Value at Risk number would be lost in liquidating the position?’ The answer
must be ‘No’. To see why, consider what this VAR measure implies . . . The
following sequence of events is implied: at time t it is decided to liquidate the
position; during the next 24 hours nothing is done . . . after 24 hours of inac-
tion the position is liquidated at prices which are drawn from a distribution











The widespread faith in Value-at-Risk and the risks inherent therein, neces-
sitates a more detailed investigation into its workings and whether liquidity
is adequately treated in VaR.
Although the goal of this thesis is not to undertake a wide testing of VaR
models, its prominence and the fact that many of the approaches to liquidity
risk build on the VaR technique make it necessary to be familiar with the
significant VaR methodologies.
Initially developed and marketed by JP Morgan’s RiskMetricsTM group in
1994, Value-at-Risk became common-place in financial institutions following
the Basel Accord of 1988. This accord set general standards among G10
central banks for the capital requirements of commercial banks and explicitly
allowed them to measure their capital needs with the use of a statistical
model like VaR [20].
Ostensibly, the reason for the support of VaR by the Basel Task Team was
that the risk measure is relatively easy to calculate, communicable and easy
for stakeholders to understand. Indeed the basic concepts that underlie VaR
and how these relate to market risk are surprisingly elegant.
VaR is most widely defined as that smallest critical value of a return distri-
bution such that the probability of finding a smaller return is no more than
some pre-specified probability. The exact mathematical definition for some
probability space is given below.
Let  be some pre-specified probability level and V a random variable in
some probability space with measure ℙ.
Then the Value-at-Risk of V given , V aR(V, ) is:
V aR(V, ) = inf{ : ℙ(V ≤ −) ≤ } (3.9)
Now it is well-known that for any random variable V in a probability space
with measure ℙ, the probability that it lies less than some real value  is
given by its cumulative probability density function, FV . Thus one can
arrive at the simplification:
V aR(V, ) = inf{ : ℙ(V ≤ −) ≤ }
= inf{ : FV (−) ≤ }











Although the true cumulative density of the random variable is hardly ever
known precisely, it can be modelled by an empirical distribution with ran-
dom sampling or with a pre-specified distribution that fits the properties of
the data. In this way the search for VaR can be translated into the parlance
of statistical distributions and reduced to finding a density for V.
In finance V is notably the return or profit/loss on an asset. Thus the
problem of evaluating VaR becomes one of adequately modelling the return
distribution of an asset. This task is more complex than it seems and in
reaching for a sensible model, a variety of different VaR calculation tech-
niques have been proposed, namely: 1. Parametric modelling, 2. Kernel
Estimators, 3. Monte Carlo simulation, 4. Historical Simulations and 5.
Extreme-Value theory adjustments.
3.5.1 Parametric Modelling
The first VaR models were based on a pre-specified parametric model of the
return distribution. Notably the earliest forms assumed that returns fol-
lowed a multi-variate normal distribution with constant mean and variance.
In this setting the VaR of any portfolio of n risky assets reduces to:
V aR(, V ) = −
√
(W ′ΣW ) (3.11)
W → is the vector of portfolio weights for the n risky assets
→ is the  critical value for the assumed normal distribution
Σ→ denotes the variance-covariance matrix of asset returns
In the case of a single asset, the portfolio VaR at time t becomes: V aR(, V )t =
Vte
(t−t).
Initial attempts at making the estimation of portfolio VaR more accurate
centred on changing the estimation procedure for Σ with the use of GARCH
and EWMA models. This was done in the hopes that more accurate and dy-
namic estimators of volatility would better account for the empirical return
distribution’s skewness and kurtosis and thus make VaR more viable.
EWMA or GARCH regimes calculate VaR by updating the parametric equa-











i,T of the ith asset in the portfolio at time T and its correlation to the jth
asset, i,j,T , is modelled by updating the estimator to the VaR each time
VaR is calculated.
For the EWMA model, denoted here by E,  and  are updated as follows:





E[ ̂i,j,T ] =
T−1∑
t=T−m











Here  ∈ [0, 1] is a constant that determines how responsive the volatility
estimator is to the most recent observation, Ri,t. Ri,t denotes the ith asset’s
return on day t from the end of day t-1 to the end of day t, with mean R̄i.
m denotes the number of days’ of past observations used in the estimate
[73].
Under a GARCH regime, the moving estimate of  changes as shown below
and a moving m-day correlation structure is used to estimate Σ completely
[53].





VL denotes the long-run variance weighted by a constant  such that  +
+  = 1
Research into these models has shown that they perform poorly in predicting
actual large scale loss and that the differences between EWMA and GARCH
are minimal. Bredin and Hyde [5] show that EWMA models tend to be more
conservative than GARCH but that GARCH is slightly more accurate in











the clustering of volatility around events and thus responds more quickly to
new events.
The benefits of the GARCH and EWMA models lie in their ability to provide
continually updating volatility estimates that place greater weight on more
recent data and allows for more speedy adjustment to new information.
The drawbacks are, however, that the methods tend to perform worse when
anomalous events occur which are not accounted for in the sample data
set [32]. The models are constrained by the information contained in the
data set and thus under-estimate absolute probable loss in that they do not
account for extreme events. This is especially true of exotic instruments
where estimation error is higher. They also fail to completely account for
the skewness of the return distribution and provide for more volatile VaR
estimates as the volatility input is updated more regularly [32].
In order to account for this, other models which use alternate distributional
forms like the Student-t distribution have been used [32]. These parametric
forms have been proven to improve accuracy [10]. However they still tend
to under-estimate risk and are prone to estimation error.
3.5.2 Historical Simulation
In an attempt to bypass the es imation error inherent in parametric models,
Historical Simulation was introduced. This methodology is easy to imple-
ment and requires few assumptions. It is based on the idea that past returns
are indicative of likely future returns.
With historical simulation, a period of returns is randomly selected and used
to form an empirical distribution of returns. VaR is then computed from
this distribution with the use of a percentile function.
Generally the methodology has more drawbacks than benefits. Firstly a
sampling problem exists if an asset has too short a history to form a decent
distribution. Results would be biased in this case. Problems also occur if
the time period from which the data sample is drawn contains too few or too
many extreme events - in this case risk would be under or over-estimated.
In addition, the historical distribution is always discrete with events less
concentrated than under a parametric model. Using a percentile function











data points seem to be “missing” [32]. VaR estimates thus tend to remain
unchanged for a long period of time.
VaR estimates are also heavily dependant on the window chosen for the data
[34]. Generally longer sampling windows can lead to more stable estimates
but if the data upon which the historical simulation is based contains a
high value, low probability event then all VaR estimates based on it will be
biased upwards [52]. Historical simulation provides no way of controlling for
normal events while accounting for extreme market moves.
3.5.3 Kernel Estimators
In order to correct for the data discreteness problem posed by Historical Sim-
ulation, researchers have proposed the use of a Kernel Estimator to smooth
the empirical return distribution with a pre-specified functional form. In this
way the benefits of both historical simulation and parametric distributions
can be combined.
A Kernel Estimator is simply a non-parametric methodology for estimating
the density of a random variable. It provides a technique whereby the spaces
between data points in an empirical distribution can be interpolated with a
kernel and a bandwidth factor [52]. The Kernel estimator for any cumulative
density can be derived easily by following the argument below [52].
Let FX(x) be the cumulative density function of a variate X then f(x) =
F ′X(x) is the first derivative and probability density function of FX
Now the empirical estimator of FX based on some data set {x1, x2, . . . xn}







where 1Xi is an indicator function such that
1{Xi≤x} =
{
0 if Xi > x
1 if Xi ≤ x







































where K(u) = 1{∣u∣≤ 1
2
} [52].
The above is the general form of the kernel estimator with function K, the
kernel, and bandwidth ℎ ≥ 0. Generally there are a number of forms which
K can assume but the form has little effect on the accuracy of the estimator
[52]. There are also a number of different ways in which to estimate h.
The outcome of the smoothing is depicted in Figure 3.2 below where the
solid line represents the smoothed Kernel distribution. Clearly the modelling
technique allows for significantly better modelling of the tails of distributions
than provided by Historical simulation or simple parametric forms [32].
Figure 3.2: Smoothing with Kernel Estimators [52].
As shown, however, the fit of the Kernel estimator seems to improve at
the tails of the distribution but performs poorly in the interior. Kernel











form. It is for this reason that Huang [52] propose a model that applies
Kernel estimation only to the tails of distributions as opposed to its entirety.
This has the added benefit that the tail is modelled accurately without
changing the interior of the distribution.
3.5.4 Monte Carlo Estimation
VaR has also been calculated by simulating returns from some return-generating
process and applying the VaR methodology to the resultant simulated dis-
tribution of returns.
Generally the methodology is based on the assumption that returns follow
a geometric Brownian motion and are log-normal. Jump-diffusion processes
and many other processes have, however, also been used to make the esti-
mation of tail behaviour more accurate.
Monte Carlo simulations can be time-consuming especially for a large port-
folio of complex instruments where computing time can be large. However,
in many cases, the profit/loss on an instrument (like a Barrier option) can
only be known with the help of a simulation. In these cases Monte Carlo
simulation is the only way to compute a realistic VaR number.
3.5.5 Extreme-Value Theory Adjustments
Although financial asset returns are most commonly modelled with the use
of a normal or log-normal distribution, it is a well-known fact that returns
are actually non-normal, skewed and fat-tailed [45]. As a consequence VaR
estimates based on normal, thin-tailed distributions tend to severely under-
estimate true maximal loss.
Typically returns, especially if viewed at high frequencies, exhibit significant
volatility clustering with extreme events, which are not easily captured by
Value-at-Risk based on the standard distributions [32]. Actual return distri-
butions usually cannot be described by their moments as many higher-order
moments are infinite. They need to be described by quantiles [45].
In order to correct for this, researchers have developed Extreme-Value the-
ory (EVT) measures and adjustments to help VaR more accurately account











widespread market crises are not underestimated and users of VaR get a
better idea of potential maximum loss.
Extreme value theory is based on the notion that values of a random vari-
able above some specified threshold follow a generalized Pareto distribution
provided that certain conditions are met. This provides an efficient way to
obtain information on the tails of a distribution from the empirical distri-
bution of the variate.
The underling basics of EVT are discussed below. It in no way encompasses
all the EVT models but merely highlights the basic characteristics of most
of these models.
If a random variable X follows a generalized Pareto distribution then
FX(x) = ℙ(X ≤ x) = G,X (x) =
{
1− (1 + x )
− if  <∞
e
− x
 if  =∞
where  ∈ (0,∞] is the tail index of the distribution [45].
Now under mild conditions on the distribution function of X, one can find
a positive (u) such that
lim
u→∞






where limu→∞ (u) =
1
 . If moreover U is high enough and one puts Y =
(X−U)+, the excesses above a threshold, then the distribution of Y is given
by
ℙ(X < U + y ∣ X > u) = FY (U + y)− FY (U)
1− FY (u)
, y > 0 (3.19)
and this follows a generalized Pareto distribution G,Y (y) [52].
The above result can be used to derive a model of the entire distribution of
some random variable X such that the interior values are derived from the
empirical distribution and the tails from a fitted Pareto distribution. The
details of this process, called the Peaks over Thresholds method is shown
below [45].
Given a random variable X with unknown distribution FX(x), the peaks
over thresholds method can be applied to model FX(x) more accurately.
Since FX(x) = FX(u) + FX(x ∣ X > u)(1 − FX(u)) if x > u for any u,











1. Fix a threshold level u
2. Select Y1, Y2, . . . Yk, the positive values of (X1−u)+, (X2−u)+, . . . (Xn−
u)+ for a data sample of size n for X
3. By the previous result then Yi ∼ G,Y
4. If one now fits G and estimates  and  by Maximum Likelihood then





i=1 1{Xi≤x} for x ≤ u
ˆFX(u) + (1− ˆFX(u))G,Y (x− u) else
The only problem with the above distribution estimator is locating a suitably
high value for u. A value for u can be found by using the Hill estimator or
by plotting the empirical shortfall for different u and selecting the smallest
value such that the shortfall does not change.






(Xi − u)+ (3.20)
where k(u) is the number of observations that exceed u from the empirical
estimation sample.
By plotting s(u) against u one can determine the smallest u which seems
reasonable.
Alternatively one can use the Hill Estimator to find u: If X1,n ≥ X2,n ≥
. . . Xn,n are the order statistics of X.
Then if one fixes a threshold u with k(u) as above then the Hill estimator,












then the best choice of u is that value that yields a constant and stable
estimate of .
While the above does not encompass all the EVT models, it touches most
of their characteristics. Generally EVT models provide more accurate and
stable VaR estimates than other models. Not only are the predictions more











events, the EVT estimate performs considerably better [32]. EVT thus does
what it sets out to do, capture extreme events. These benefits, however,
comes at the price of ease of application.
Similar to historical simulation, EVT only captures extreme events if the
initial data set includes rare events. A lengthy data set is better. Indeed
Danielsson et al [32] advocate the use of at least 7 years of daily data.
Moreover the estimation procedure is fairly complex and difficult to explain
to stakeholders.
EVT VaR generally outperforms standard methods as it provides more re-
liable estimates of true market loss. Danielsson et al [32] contend that this
true because the volatility clustering and distributional assumptions used
to make classical VaR more accurate becomes of little use during extreme
market events as returns become more random.
3.5.6 Comparing the Methodologies
The natural question which arises from discussing the array of VaR method-
ologies is how the different estimation procedures compare. Fortunately this
is a topic which a number of papers have investigated with the assistance of
back-testing.
The majority of VaR models are tested by estimating the model on a set of
data and then applying it to a separate data set and evaluating the predicted
outcomes versus the actual outcomes. This is back-testing. In VaR, back-
testing is achieved by counting the number of times a portfolio’s actual
market loss (over a post-fit data set) exceeds that predicted by VaR. If the
VaR estimate is breached too many times relative to the stated probability
then the model is poor and underestimates risk. If the VaR losses are hardly
ever breached then the model is also poor as it is too onerous. An accurate
x% VaR should only be exceeded by the realized loss 1 − x% of the time.
This is hardly ever the case however.
VaR is extremely model dependant and different methodologies provide for
extremely divergent estimates of loss. The measure is also highly data de-
pendant and different data sets can impact on it heavily. VaR is not ro-
bust. Indeed Beder [15] has found, through a survey of financial institutions
using VaR, that there are radically different methodologies of estimation.
Moreover there are also great discrepancies in results for different methods











less portfolio holding only US Treasury Bills and the discrepancies widen in
comparing the results of different methodologies.
In comparing Monte Carlo, historical simulation and variance-covariance
VaR measures, De Raaji et al [34] find extreme variability across method-
ologies. These differences were in the order of 25% to 59% but sometimes
approached 200%. They find that the variance-covariance and historical
simulation techniques are weaker at lower probability levels, involving the
tails than at higher levels. This is indicative of the poor accounting for
extremes inherent to these models. Interestingly a Monte Carlo simulation
based on mixed distributions with a fat-tail adjustment produced the most
accurate results. The paper concludes that it would be highly misleading
to compare VaR numbers from 2 different entities without regard to their
methods of calculation.
Using a similar procedure but this time comparing models to an EVT sam-
pling procedure, Danielsson et al [32] find that a VaR based on a mixed
distribution with tails modelled by a Pareto distribution and the interior
modelled by a historical simulation, performs better than standard variance-
covariance VaR at high probabilities and seems to estimate risk fairly.
Huang [52] conduct a wider study comparing variance-covariance, historical
simulation, Monte Carlo simulation and a kernel estimator used on tail dis-
tributions. They find that their revised Kernel methodology with only tails
modelled by a kernel estimator performs remarkably better than the other
models. Unfortunately the result is not compared to the EVT adjustment
for tails thus one cannot infer which of the 2 methods are more accurate.
The Kernel estimator does, however, require far less data and computation
than the EVT procedure.
In spite of the onerous data requirements, EVT models with a Pareto dis-
tribution for the tails offer more useful estimates than other methods. This
is true for a number of reasons. Firstly by concentrating on the tails, such
EVT tail modelling overcomes the problem inherent to historical simulation
of an upwardly biased interior distribution. In this way both extreme and
normal events can be accommodated. Moreover unlike the discrete historical
simulation distributions, EVT tail-based modelling tends to provide more
stable, low variance estimates of VaR which are based on the firmer statisti-
cal foundations of extreme value theory. These estimates also provide more
prudent and reasonable estimates of worst-case loss [45].
In aggregate although EVT models are laudable, even EVT VaR has a high











VaR is not a coherent measure and, more importantly, in any of the above
forms, it ignores market-related liquidity risk.
3.5.7 VaR and Liquidity-Related Risk
As implied in the opening quote of this chapter and as stated by Hisata et al
[49], “conventional VaR assumes immediacy, no price impacts and no fric-
tion”. VaR is meant to be a “statistical measure that allows one to capture
the amount of losses likely to be recorded from a market movement . . . ”
[44]. By ignoring price impacts, transaction costs and other frictions, VaR
clearly underestimates the losses likely to be faced by a market participant.
It underestimates true risk.
Conventional VaR (based as it is on a pre-specified distribution) assumes
that market losses follow a specific distribution and that these losses are
realized by liquidating at the mid-price or close-price of the day. It also
assumes that a participant’s entire portfolio is sold in one large block with
no price impact at the date of trade.
As argued earlier none of these assumptions hold true. In one particular day
a trader may face any number of prices at which to liquidate. Moreover as
traders usually stagger their trades, the sale of one large block usually occurs
in many different pieces at many different realized prices. VaR assumes
that the portfolio is frozen over the holding period [56] and thus ignores
all the losses borne of trading: the opportunity costs of waiting to trade
and the price-impact cost of actually trading. In fact VaR even ignores
brokerage and other fixed costs. It is for this reason that the validity of
VaR is questioned, particularly in large organizations with many different
trading desks, positions and instruments [17].
VaR does offer a simple ad hoc technique for accounting for liquidity risk in
the form of adjusting the holding period over which returns are calculated.
By changing the returns used in the return distribution from say a 1-day re-
turn to a 1-month return, liquidity is somewhat accounted. This is reflected
in the fact that the 1 month VaR is higher than the 1 day VaR. There are
problems with this methodology, however.
Firstly such a holding period adjustment tends to be arbitrary and still
ignores many liquidity-related costs [20]. In addition such a “scaling adjust-
ment” worsens with the jump intensity of returns and the confidence level











independently distributed normal variates [36]. The majority of papers that
mention the scaling adjustment disapprove of it.
Bangia et al [14] for instance heavily criticise the methodology and ar-
gue that given the rising expansion of investments into illiquid regions, the
need for a liquidity risk adjustment to VaR becomes increasingly necessary.
François-Heude et al [44] concur and point out that the adjustment is highly
subjective. In addition Shamroukh [76] argues that the scaling adjustment
precludes the existence of securities in a portfolio with different times to
maturity. The technique is an inadequate adjustment for VaR.
The pressing importance of liquidity in market-related risk, coupled - as we
have seen with Amaranth and LTCM where classical VaR was widely applied
to no effect - with the inaccuracies which can result from blind belief in VaR,
makes it necessary to find an alternate measure of total risk.
The widespread popularity and intuitive sense that makes VaR commonplace
means that such a measure should take its roots from the standard VaR
framework but should include accuracy adjustments for liquidity risk.
However, merely because a methodology is popular and widely used does
not imply that it is the best measure for the job at hand. In this respect
liquidity-adjusted VaR, may not be the most accurate liquidity risk measure
in existence and the full gamut of available measures should be tested and
explored.
3.6 The Elements of a Good Liquidity Measure
and Model
The search for a “best-case” liquidity-risk measure necessitates a clear and
focused discussion around what constitutes “best-case” and what defines a
good model or measure of liquidity risk. Although in modelling, perfect
accuracy is always the ideal, this is rarely achieved and a number of other
criteria must be considered to find the ideal model.
In this regard, Loebnitz [65] argues that two of the most important criteria
characterising a good measure are “internal consistency” and “measurabil-
ity”.
Internal consistency refers to the inter-relationships of the model to other











of a model does not contradict its endogenous details, assumptions and
implications. A good, internally consistent model should appear as a unified
body of work with scope for additions but not substantive changes.
In doing this, however, a model should also remain measurable in that it
conveys useful and interpretable information upon which users can base
objective decisions. A measurable model is thus accurate. Moreover the
extent of the accuracy can be tested and assessed.
A good measure should not only be descriptive but should also accurately
indicate the cost of not heeding the information it conveys. Measures like
Value-at-risk and Expected-Tail-loss are particularly good at this as they
provide bottom-line, value information which the user can quickly interpret
and understand. Models like this allow a user to respond quickly to new
information so as to limit their loss. They also allow the user to judge when
they are incorrect - for example if the estimated loss is to high or too low
for the accepted level of risk.
The risk, of course, in defining a model in this way is that it may be too
simplified. As discussed, while VaR is extremely measurable and succinct, it
also underestimates true market-related risk. A measure must balance the
need to be interpretable and easy to implement and the need for accuracy.
In particular a liquidity risk measure should capture the multiple facets of
liquidity and yet remain compact. This is made somewhat difficult by the
breadth of characteristics that define liquidity.
Fernandez [42] argues that while a good liquidity measure must capture
many disparate issues, this task is complicated by the sheer volume of data
needed to provide accuracy and meaning to such a broad issue. Data con-
straints are a problem with liquidity measurement as generally high fre-
quency trade data is required, specifically for the modelling of the price
impacts which define it [28]. In this way many liquidity models may be
extremely accurate (in that they use all available data) but intractable as
the data cannot be sourced.
Many papers have thus pointed out that finding a single useful measure of
liquidity could be impossible [28]. The favoured recourse is to use a wide
range of measures, each of which reflects different aspects of liquidity [8]. In
this way all aspects can be monitored and traded off one another to make the
most objective decisions. The dilemma, however, lies in finding a method
with which to differentiate between models so as to isolate that subset of
most optimal measures.











model. From the above, it can be concluded that an ideal model of liquidity
risk should possess the following qualities:
1. It should be measurable and should directly capture the cost of liqui-
dating in a market at a specific time
2. It should represent the market consensus of liquidity over time and
across asset classes [43] and should be practicable in all asset classes
3. It should be internally consistent with certain stylized facts and theory
regarding market liquidity risk
4. It should be accurate in that the information it presents should be a
fair reflection of reality
Items 2 and 3 above allude to the discussion in Chapter 2 as to what consti-
tutes liquidity risk. The need to directly capture the costs of liquidation and
certain stylized facts pertaining to market liquidity implies that models and
measures of liquidity risk should, at the maximal level, incorporate some of
the following:
1. Explicit transaction costs – while these do not add to the uncertainty
relating to the liquidation value of a holding, they do reduce the ex-
pected proceeds and should be incorporated.
2. Bid-Ask Spread volatility – as stated, higher spread volatility increases
the uncertainty in the expected proceeds from liquidation.
3. Absolute level of the Bid-Ask Spread – other things equal, a higher
spread is suggestive of higher trading costs and greater variability in
the expected value-under-liquidation.
4. Price-Liquidity risk trade-off – measures must account for the fact
that the longer the time,  , between trades, the greater the price risk
borne by the trader, while shorter  may induce larger price-impacts.
Models thus need some form of  -penalty function that is increasing
in the order size. Modelling this trade-off also helps model the bulk of
the opportunity costs associated with trading.
5. Price-impacts – certainly models should account for price-impacts,
both endogenous and exogenous and, if possible, temporary and per-
manent impacts. A good model would capture the stated empirical
evidence that buyer-initiated impacts are larger than seller-initiated











6. Market crises – the rising price-impacts, greater volatility and greater
importance of exogenous risk during times of stress should be mod-
elled. Models should also not ignore the fact that during times of
stress, the correlation between asset returns and price-impacts be-
comes increasingly negative.
7. Other Aspects – the ideal model would incorporate all aspects of liq-
uidity, particularly in times of stress in order to model relative risk
behaviour. The other aspects like depth and breadth, determine the
level of risk endemic to a market. The model should thus be able to
be broadly descriptive as well.
As can be seen the requirements of the “ideal case” are onerous and, given
the data constraints that over-shadow all liquidity-risk modelling, seem al-
most impossible to attain. Luckily, however, much of this difficulty can
be overcome with the use of carefully-chosen liquidity measures instead of
merely one model. By relying on many measures, the pressure placed on
a single measure to account for all aspects of liquidity and to do so with
easy-to-find data is alleviated. All of this is done while more information is
conveyed.
The proposed use of many measures, of course, necessitates that each mea-
sure/model be assessed with regards to accuracy, tractability and complete-
ness. These details and the methodologies applied to compare the models












The Gamut of Liquidity Risk
Measures and Models
The search for an accurate account of liquidity risk has gained increased
momentum of late with the literature addressing the subject from a number
of different perspectives. Research has largely centred on the pricing and
importance of liquidity risk variables in asset returns, determining if liquidity
variables have a systematic and a unique risk component and assessing to
what degree different measures capture different information. All of this has
culminated in the more detailed and functional L-VaR models.
Although the L-VaR models represent a promising step towards a complete
and tractable model of liquidity risk, much of the literature has ignored the
role which the Measures can play in hinting at liquidity risk. Research into
the measures has focused more on whether they proxy for liquidity risk at
all and, if they do, what components of liquidity risk they seem to capture.
Very little work has been done in terms of how the Measures dovetail with
the definition of liquidity risk.
The goal of this section is to present the major liquidity risk measures pro-
posed in the literature together with a short account of the research perti-
nent to them. Unlike the asset pricing research, the focus is on assessing
how well different measures perform in the management of liquidity risk,
not on determining if they co-vary with asset returns. Much of the detailed
asset pricing work is thus ignored in favour of a discussion of the measures
themselves – whether there is a basis for them as a liquidity measure and
what component of liquidity risk they seem to capture. The focus is on











the definition put forth in Chapter 2.
Overall the literature has focused on the following broad groups of liquidity
measures:
1. Spread-based measures




The principle spread-based measures are the: Bid-ask spread, effective spread
and relative effective spread.
Bid-Ask Spreadt = At −Bt (4.1)









Bt → Bid price
At → Ask price
Pt → Transaction price
The motivation for using these spread measures and, in particular the Bid-











trade [43]. As discussed earlier in Section 2.3.1, the spread exists because
of asymmetric information, inventory control costs and other consequences
of market friction. It captures the cost of processing orders, the size and
volatility of accumulated order flows [75] and is the most basic cost associ-
ated with trading [9]. At least spuriously, it seems to be the most obvious
candidate as a measure of liquidity risk and commonly appears as the first
choice liquidity-risk variable. The literature has, however, raised some mis-
givings with regard to its use in risk management.
Firstly the B/A spread cannot be used in an OTC market or any market
where there are few bids and asks or where these are unrecorded. Moreover
the cost it captures becomes proportionately smaller in times of stress when
liquidity risk becomes a more significant component of market-related risk
and is dominated by price impacts [79]. It is not a relevant measure in times
of stress [42].
The spread is also only relevant for trades which occur at the bid and ask
- trades that occur outside the spread face larger costs and those occurring
within it face smaller costs. It is also made ineffective by the minimum tick
sizes imposed. These make the spread discrete and limit the information it
conveys [26].
In order to provide a measure with a surer footing than the spread, re-
searchers have justified the use of the effective and relative effective spreads.
In a frictionless universe the spread would be zero as the bid and ask prices
converge to one another. Thus only one price would rule at a specific time
and the best proxy for it, given the convergence, would be the mid-price.
The mid-price represents the ideal price of an asset; that is the price which
would rule had markets been frictionless. Given this, the effective spread and
relative effective spread capture the price effectively “paid” due to frictions.
Unfortunately, although widely used, the effective spread has its own flaws.
Firstly the mid-price in no way measures the intrinsic value of a security,
thus it cannot propose to accurately capture the cost due to liquidity [78].
As discussed earlier, liquidity costs involve price impacts, the spread and
many other components.
The measure also fails during times of stress. During a particularly illiquid
period, for example, the trade-price may suddenly fall as trade becomes
more one-sided and sellers flood the market. If transactions then only occur
sporadically Mt could still remain high from older asks, meaning that Pt
could become close to Mt, thereby falsely implying that markets are liquid











and is relevant only for short periods at a time. As shown later, this poses
problems for liquidity models which derive their estimates from it.
Overall spread-based measures merely serve as a rough gauge of only one
aspect of liquidity [43]. They are prone to extreme volatility both intra-
day and over longer time periods (the noisier a measure, the less stable its
information signal) as they are easily moved by large outlier trades [75]. The
measures only represent a portion of the total likely loss in trading.
Indeed research in other markets seems to indicate that they only capture
market depth 1 and ignore other aspects of liquidity risk [43]. This one-
sidedness may seem like an additional shortcoming, however, the persistence
with which spread-based measures are quoted in liquidity literature and the
continued evidence that they are priced in asset returns, correlated with
other measures and indicative of illiquidity ([43], [29], [9], [72]) seem to indi-
cate that they are the best measures of depth available. All other measures
seem to focus on other aspects of liquidity.
The idea that different measures capture different aspects of liquidity has
support among the literature with Aitken and Comerton-Forde [4] showing
just this. A case can thus be made for the continued use of spread-based
measures in normal times when depth is more indicative of illiquidity, cou-
pled with supporting price-impact measures for times of stress. The measure
cannot be used in isolation to manage liquidity risk.
4.2 Trading-Activity-Based Measures
Chollete [29] argues that liquidity measures can be bisected into trade-based
measures and order-based measures. Trade-based measures reflect “consum-
mated liquidity” or executed order information while, order-based measures
capture information on orders prior to their execution. Spread-based mea-
sures are trade-based, while trading-activity measures like Volume traded,
turnover, quote size, trade size, number of quotes, order imbalances, trade
frequency, etc. are order-based.
Unlike the spread-based measures there seems to be no theoretical basis for
the use of trading-activity measures other than the fact that they proxy
1A market with depth has large volumes available at many different prices. The spread
will thus be tight as the market-maker faces little costs in reversing a position to which
he has committed himself. In effect the market-maker will face a lower opportunity cost











for market breadth [31]. They do not capture the costs attributable to
liquidation but serve as an indicator of the potential for liquidating large
orders. Provided the market has depth as well, a trader of a large position
can be reasonably sure of a trade. If the market lacks depth, of course, such
trade may occur at poor prices but at least the order can be filled.
While the literature cites a large number of trading-activity measures, the
most commonly-used ones are listed below:
Volume Traded — usually the average of the total number of shares/bonds,
etc traded over a specified period. Upper [79] argues that it is a poor
proxy for liquidity as it is sensitive to the period over which it is calcu-
lated. Generally traders prefer to trade unevenly over extended time
periods, thus if volume is only measured over a day, it would underes-
timate true breadth. They argue that one should use volume together
with the B/A-spread as quite reasonably, “higher spreads seem less
troubling if volumes also rose when they occurred”. Fleming [43] and
many other papers also point out that the measure proxies for market
volatility. It is thus a rough measure and could be high merely because
new information is impacting on prices not because of higher liquidity.
Quote Size — the quantity explicitly bid or offered at the bid or offer price,
usually an average over some period and cited differently for bids and
offers [43]
Trade Size — the quantity actually traded at the bid or offer prices
Turnover — commonly used for shares but can be used for bonds. It
is the volume traded in the share divided by the number of shares
outstanding [58]. Lee at al [62] question the role of turnover as a
proxy for liquidity. They argue that high turnover stocks are usually
glamour stocks, while low turnover stocks are usually poor performers -
thus turnover proxies for asset performance. Amihud and Mendelssohn
[26], however, contend that in a frictionless economy investors would
re-balance their portfolios all the time and turnovers would be high
thus lower turnovers are indicative of market friction and illiquidity.
Hu [51] examines turnover on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over 17 years
and finds strong evidence that higher turnover is associated with lower
expected returns.
Trade Frequency — the number of trades initiated and executed over a












Order Imbalances — the number of buy orders less the total sell orders
over a particular period [30]. This measure conveys more informa-
tion than the preceding ones as it gives an indication of the direction
of price pressure. Chordia et al [30] indeed find strong evidence of
contemporaneous association between returns and order imbalances.
Each measure has its own pitfalls and strengths. However, overall volume
and share turnover seem to be the predominant measures with the others
earning less significant results in asset pricing tests [29].
Keene et al [58] for instance undertake an analysis whereby stocks are ranked
and sorted on the basis of their market capitalization, their book-to-market
value ratio and liquidity variables. They form 54 portfolios by dividing
stocks on the NYSE into 3 book-value/market-value trisects, 2 size bisects,
3 liquidity trisects (with liquidity proxied by volume traded, share turnover,
and others) and 3 momentum bisects. They additionally compute the re-
turns on a portfolio based on the intersection of 2 size and 2 liquidity vari-
ables, thereby creating factor-mimicking portfolios for each of liquidity, size
and book/market value. By regressing the returns of the liquidity port-
folios against each of the size, momentum and book/market value factor-
mimicking returns they arrive at a residual term that captures, in their
opinion, returns only due to liquidity risk and not to the other variables. In
this way they isolate the effect of liquidity and can judge if it is priced. In
aggregate they find that volume and share turnover show the most robust
pricing effects.
Fleming [43] finds similarly by regressing a stock’s 5-minute price change
against its trading frequency, trading volume and other measures. They
infer that trading volume impacts on returns more strongly than the other
measures. They also find that trade volume is more correlated to other
measures of liquidity than for instance trade size or quote size. From this and
many other studies, one can conclude that the other measures are somewhat
less indicative of liquidity risk.
Generally the trading-activity measures capture different information to the
spread-based measures. This is the rationale behind the trade-based vs
order-based differential noted earlier. Although the exact scope and strength
of the distinction between the measures is not known and should be re-













Price-impact measures represent the first move in liquidity-research towards
directly computing the cost associated with liquidation. They have a sound
theoretical backing in that they proxy for the endogenous risk that is exten-
sively cited in market micro-structure literature.
Possibly the first price-impact measure is Kyle’s lambda. Developed by Kyle
[59], the measure is defined as the slope of the regression line that relates
transaction price changes to the net trade sizes which are associated with it.
The motivation behind the measure is Kyle’s argument that “spreads are
an increasing function of the probability of facing an informed trader” [72].
Since market-makers cannot distinguish between informed and uninformed
trade, they set prices as an increasing function of the net order imbalance.
Unlike preceding measures, its computation requires high-frequency intra-
day data which may be difficult to obtain. The measure cannot distinguish
between liquidity-related price impacts and the effect of new information on
asset price changes. Volume as a measure of activity problematically ignores
these subtleties.
Related to the Kyle Lambda is the Pastor & Stambaugh measure of return-
reversal. In their 2003 paper, Pastor & Stambaugh argue that liquidity must
feature strongly in asset pricing returns. They point out that illiquid stocks
carry additional risk over and above market risk, thus the rational investor
must expect a premium for holding them as an incentive. Although they
concede that liquidity has many dimensions, they introduce the measure, ,
to test their hypothesis regarding the temporary price impacts accompany-
ing order flow [70].
i,t in 4.5 is the Pastor & Stambaugh measure of volume-related return
reversal for stock i in month t, calculated as the ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression coefficient of the equation.
rei,d+1,t = i,t + i,tri,d,t + i,tsgn(r
e
i,d,t)Vi,d,t + ei,d+1,t (4.5)
For d = 1, . . . , D
ri,d,t → return on the ith stock on day d in month t
rei,d,t = ri,d,t − rm,d,t, the excess return of the stock over that of
the market index m











The thinking behind the measure is that order flow, as proxied by the prod-
uct of volume and signed excess return, should be accompanied by a return
that is partially reversed in the future (in this case d+1). Thus price changes
accompanying large volumes reverse when liquidity is low because market-
makers tend to require higher expected returns in order to accommodate
traders [26]. Pastor & Stambaugh (P&S) argue that the “greater the ex-
pected return reversal for a given dollar volume”, that is to say the greater
the , the lower a stock’s liquidity. They expect  to be negative most of
the time and larger in absolute value for stock’s which are more illiquid.
The major drawbacks of the P&S measure is that if there is asymmetric
information between market-makers and traders then the volume-return re-
versal relationship is weakened by informed trading. In this case the volume
contains new information that impacts on prices permanently and which is
not reversed. Lee & Swaminathan [63] provide strong evidence that in this
case the estimate of the return-reversal effect could be under-estimated by
the regression specification [70].
Porter [72] also contend that other issues may at times undermine the use
of dollar volume in the above regression equation. They argue that depend-
ing on the number of shares outstanding, the differences in free-float and
investors trading behaviour, a given volume figure can have very different
impacts on a share’s return. Thus one may estimate a similar  number for
different stocks, when in actual fact the state of liquidity between them is
rather different. They argue that the use of Dollar Volume/Market Capital-
isation more accurately controls for these differences.
Despite these problems the measure has been subjected to much investiga-
tion in the asset pricing literature. Without going into the details of their
methodology, Pastor [70] and many other papers have found that their mea-
sure is priced across securities, exhibits sharp declines which co-ordinate
with known market declines and exhibits commonality across stocks. Porter
[72] finds the same results and notes that the P&S measure shows high
correlations with other measures of price-impact.
One of these additional price-impact measures is the Amihud illiquidity ra-
tio. According to Acharya et al [3], a stock is illiquid and thus has a high
value for the ratio if its daily return for a give volume is high. Amihud [8]
shows that the measure is positively related to the costs of selling and the
price impact of a stock. The measure captures the change in an asset’s price
in response to order flow. It is highly correlated to the Kyle’s lambda and
has been found to be the “best available price-impact proxy constructed



















Rit,d → return of the ith stock on day d in month t
V it,d → volume of stock on day d in month t
Dit → the number of observations attached to the ith stock in
month t
Acharya et al [3] calculate the innovations associated to the measure and find
that spikes in this time series correspond to well-known illiquidity events.
The innovation series’ correlation to the innovations of the P&S measure is
also quite high. Moreover the measure is significantly priced.
The most notable objection to the Amihud illiquidity ratio is that it only
approximates the price impact; it does not actually measure the cost of
trading. However, the same can be said of all the other measures - at best
they merely proxy for the true cost associated with illiquidity, with different
measures capturing different aspects of the cost.
In particular, all of the price-impact measures seem to capture some aspect
of market resiliency. As discussed earlier, resiliency refers to how easily a
market absorbs shocks induced by large order flow. Price impacts attempt
at measuring exactly this as they capture the cost associated with large
order flows. In doing so, of course, they ignore depth and breadth.
4.4 Assessing the Measures
The above discussion focuses on introducing the literature’s most widely-
used measures in organic groupings that reflect different aspects of liquidity.
Measures cited within a grouping are expected to, at least theoretically,
specialise in capturing a single aspect of liquidity risk.
If measures in different groups only capture a particular aspect of liquidity
that is independent of other aspects than correlations between measures
which do not share a group should be low. Moreover a PCA undertaken on
these measures should clearly reveal independent factors/components which











a PCA were undertaken on say 5 measures with 3 from a specific grouping
and 2 from another, the PCA is expected to reveal at least 2 factors with
high loadings on at least one group. In this way the correlation analysis and
the PCA should support the theoretically findings.
The empirical research, however, finds only mixed support for the theoretical
differences in the measures. In some tests measures from different groupings
have been found to be correlated in surprising ways and a PCA has only
revealed weak support for the existence of independent sources of variation
that relates neatly to the above theoretical split. Although the time series
plots of the measures and their innovations show surprising co-ordination
with periods of illiquidity, this only reveals that the measures similarly cap-
ture variations in general liquidity. It is silent on whether the measures hold
different information.
Fleming [43] tries to discover whether certain measures of liquidity in the
US Treasury Bill market capture different aspects of liquidity. Using trading
volume, trading frequency, bid-ask spreads, quote sizes, a price-impact mea-
sure that is similar to Kyle’s lambda and trade sizes as proxies for liquidity,
Fleming firstly plots the time series of the measures and examines how well
they capture declines in general liquidity as in Figure 4.1 below. He finds
that largely all the measures show similar declines and form similar trends.
Figure 4.1: Time Series plots of Volume [43].
Secondly he undertakes a correlation analysis whose results are revealing.











other measures (which is understandable given that the rest are mostly
trading-activity measures), except for the price impact measure with a 0.73
correlation. This is surprising given that price-impact measures are meant to
capture resiliency while the spread proxies for depth. In general, however, all
of the measures have high correlations with the lambda measure. This may
reflect the fact that weakness in depth, breadth and resiliency in a market
leads directly to higher costs of execution in the form of higher price impacts.
If this is true then a positive relationship is expected between price impacts
and the other measures which are increasing in illiquidity. Fleming’s results
largely reflect this as his price-impact measure is only negatively related to
the trade size and quote size. He offers no explanation for this.
The results of a PCA undertaken on the same measures finds that 3 compo-
nents explain 87% of the combined variation in the measures. He interprets
the first component as capturing variation in liquidity that is negatively re-
lated to trading activity, while the second and third components capture
variation that is positively related to the same. Both measures show very
weak correlations to the bid-ask spread which seem to indicate that the bid-
ask spread does indeed capture different information to the trading activity
variables. Fleming [43] uses this, incorrectly, to conclude in favour of only
using the bid-ask spread as a measure of liquidity. He argues that given
its high correlation to the price-impact measure and easy accessibility, the
measure is ideal. Of course, in saying this, he ignores the suggestion con-
veyed by his results that the spread captures a different aspect of liquidity
and must be supported by other measures.
In a very similar study Chollete et al [29] investigate, with a correlation
analysis and a PCA, whether the monthly number of trades, monthly trading
volume, average trade size, the Amihud illiquidity ratio, average quoted
spread, average relative spread, average effective spread, intra-day and daily
return volatility contain information on different aspects of liquidity.
Chollete et al [29] provide a diverse set of correlation results. They find, as
expected that the spread measures are all highly correlated, but exhibit low
correlations with all the other measures. They do, however, display a mod-
erate correlation to volatility. Their results show clear separations between
trade-activity measures, spread measures and the price-impact measure, as
represented by the Illiquidity ratio which is not significantly correlated to
any other measure. Interestingly bid volume and ask volume display weak
correlations to all the other measures as well. This may imply 2 things:
either they capture a different aspect of liquidity or that they do not proxy
well for liquidity at all. The first contention seems more reasonable given











The factor analysis undertaken by Chollete et al [29] extract 3 factors, which
explain 51%, 30% and 19% of the variation in the measures respectively. In
order to determine if the factors convey general liquidity information they
plot each factor over time. In aggregate, as with the measures, the factors do
reflect periods of general illiquidity. In order to determine if different factors
convey different information, Chollete et al [29] examine the factor loadings
on each variable. They conclude that “there is differential information in
the different liquidity variables”. In particular they interpret Factor 1 as
a price-impact measure that captures resiliency as it loads highly on the
illiquidity ratio and return volatility. Factor 2, they infer, must be related
to trading activity as it loads on breadth and depth variables, while Factor
3, they call a depth measure.
Compellingly, Chollete et al [29] find in their asset-pricing tests that Factor
1 only attracts a significant risk premium if Factor 2 is included. Although
they do not mention it, this can be interpreted as evidence in favour of the
earlier contention that price-impacts are largely driven by depth, breadth
and immediacy. It supports the finding in Fleming [43] that price-impacts
are correlated with all the measures they use.
Porter [72] provides a different methodology for testing the correlations be-
tween measures. Using the Pastor & Stambaugh return-reversal measure,
the illiquidity ratio and the bid-ask spread, they compute a time series of
innovations for each of these variables. They then subject the innovation se-
ries to a correlation analysis. They argue that since the innovations capture
the additional information impacting a particular measure at a specific time,
then if the variables measure the same “feature of aggregate liquidity then
we would expect the innovations to be correlated”. This methodology helps
overcome the problem of spurious correlations which is generally found in
non-stationary series. Indeed most of the measures suffer from this problem
([29] and [3]).
Overall, Porter [72] finds contradictory results to the other papers. They
find that all the innovations are significantly positively correlated, all show
negative spikes at the same dates, all carry a significant risk premium of
between 2-5% pa and all of them look surprisingly similar when plotted.
Porter [72] neglects to mention that an innovation series captures new in-
formation impacting on a measure. Thus if new information impacts on all
the measures in the same way (which is expected since this how markets
process news) but different aspects of liquidity only become recognizable
with a cumulative effect (which is also reasonable as liquidity changes via a
cumulative trading process) then one would expect high correlations in the











In an attempt at finding a pervasively-priced liquidity factor, Chen [26]
conducts a PCA on 7 scaled, aggregate liquidity proxies and finds similarly
low correlations to Porter [72]. These correlations, however, fall in line with
the previous findings and with those in Eckbo et al [41].
Chen [26] compares, among others, the bid-ask spread, stock turnover, the
illiquidity ratio and the return-reversal measure for all NYSE and AMEX
common stocks by averaging the measures across all the stocks in his sample
for each month and then de-trending his series. The de-trending is effected
by multiplying the series by w1wt , where wt is the 24-month preceding average
of the measure and w1 is the measure value at a fixed date in the past. Chen
[26] undertakes the de-trending to avoid spurious results, as Eckbo et al [41]
find a positive trend in the market-wide measures that is reflective of the
growing liquidity of all markets. It is only relevant when one is conducting
a market-wide analysis of liquidity.
Overall the correlations in the scaled-aggregate measures are low, except for
the illiquidity ratio and the return-reversal pair which have a correlation of
0.82. This is somewhat expected as the measures fall into 3 classes: spread-
based measures, trade-activity measures and 2 price-impact measures. The
PCA extracts only 3 components which are not as open to interpretation as
the results of the factor analysis in Chollete et al [29].
In general, while there is some support for the idea that different measures
capture different aspects of liquidity, the results are by no means overwhelm-
ingly in favour of this hypothesis. The problems surrounding spurious corre-
lations complicate the search for a complete set of liquidity risk management
tools. This is compounded by the fact that the results of the PCA and fac-
tor analysis (other than those conducted by Chollete et al) are unclear and
the correlations, when they do indicate differences in the measures, seem to
do so very marginally. High correlations between the measures persist and
may continue to do so until a better methodology to compare the measures
is established.
One of the ways to address at least part of the problem is to test the time
series for auto-correlation and accordingly difference them until one finds
a non-stationary series. Correlations can then be based on this differenced
series without the worry of spurious results. Although difficult to interpret
economically, correlations on differenced series have the benefit of highlight-
ing stable and robust patterns between time series. Moreover unlike the
error term in an innovation series as used in Porter [72], they do not capture
“new” information but retain the signal of the initial level variable set.











necessarily support the idea that different measures objectively capture dif-
ferent information. The high correlations between measures and inconclu-
sive PCA results may still be attributable to the fact that there is strong
evidence of commonality in liquidity.
If liquidity, like market returns are driven by aggregate market-wide liquidity
then, in so far as different measures capture this aggregate co-variation, they
will be correlated and any factor extracted from a PCA or a factor analysis
will load heavily on all the measures.
The literature regards commonality in liquidity as a well-established fact.
For example Acharya et al [2] find that the quoted spread, depth and effec-
tive spreads all co-move with market-wide and industry-wide liquidity. This
commonality remains even after controlling for volatility and volume. Us-
ing a regression of individual liquidity measures against their market-wide
counterpart, they find ample evidence of commonality. Acharya et al [2]
argue that commonality in liquidity should exist because of commonality
in trading activity. They point out that trading activity generally shows
a market-wide response to general price swings which are realized in trade
volume. Since dealer quotes are, in turn, heavily influenced by volume,
changes in prices induce changes in a wide range of liquidity measures as
they become more influenced by the prevailing trading climate. This to-
gether with herding behaviour among the large institutional traders results
in commonality.
In implementing their famous liquidity Capital Asset-Pricing Model (CAPM)
Acharya et al [3] also find compelling evidence of commonality. Indeed the
basis of their model is that the required rate of return on a security is
increasingly related to the covariance of individual illiquidity with market-
wide illiquidity, decreasing in the covariance of security return and market
illiquidity and decreasing in the covariance between security illiquidity and
the market return. Commonality then seems to impact on standard asset-
pricing and risk in a number of significant ways. Lee [61] for example even
finds evidence in favour of commonality at the global level.
The preponderance of commonality in liquidity casts doubts on the abil-
ity of standard correlation analysis and even PCA (but less so with this
methodology which only extracts unique variance) to differentiate between
measures. While it seems that the different measures undoubtedly capture
different aspects of liquidity, a better methodology, one that specifically
controls for commonality, is needed to confirm this. As it stands the litera-
ture uses far too many measures with no consensus regarding any of them.
Such a methodology would provide firm evidence that liquidity can only be











In the absence of a clear methodological framework for the testing of the
measures, a theoretical discussion within the context of the definition of
liquidity risk and the requirements in Section 3.6 can assist in discriminating
between the array of measures. This is presented in Section 4.6 where the
measures are critically compared to the integrated Liquidity-VaR models.
4.5 Liquidity-VaR Models
Although it seems increasingly clear that liquidity can only be measured
with a wide-range of measures, the first prize will always be a completely
integrated risk measure that captures all aspects relating to liquidity risk.
In searching for this, the literature has made a number of concerted efforts
at developing integrated Liquidity-VaR models.
Liquidity-VaR models represent the first attempt at integrating the complete
definition of liquidity risk into a workable VaR framework. As discussed
earlier, although different measures are important in that they highlight
some of the different aspects of liquidity, they do so in a fragmented and
uncoordinated manner. No single measure provides a coherent description
of market-wide and trade-specific liquidation costs as represented by all the
different aspects. It is the goal of L-VaR models to correct this.
Over time the literature has presented a number of different L-VaR model
innovations, each showcasing a different integration and understanding of
liquidity risk with different underlying assumptions. While the array of
models seems diverse, the significant models can be broadly separated into
3 classes:
1. Spread-Adjustment Models — these models try to correct stan-
dard VaR by incorporating liquidity-related costs as proxied by the
bid-ask spread and its variability. Most of these models use a para-
metric VaR framework to adjust for the spread.
2. Parametric Adjustment Models — models in this class adjust the
standard inputs to a parametric VaR, like Σ and , for liquidity-related
transaction costs.
3. Optimal Liquidation Strategy Models — these models are the
most cohesive and robust, they model the liquidation schedule of a












1. The Bangia, Diebold et al Model, 1998 [14]
The Bangia model is loosely based on an earlier model by Jarrow & Subra-
manian. It is the first L-VaR model that accounts for spread-related risks
and transaction costs. The model is easy to implement and is premised on
the idea that liquidity risk can be separated from price risk.
Although, in their paper, Bangia et al [14] address the importance of both
endogenous and exogenous liquidity risk, they choose to focus solely on
exogenous risk as captured in the spread. They argue that since the spread
can be easily accounted for with readily available data, doing so maintains
their model’s simplicity and ease-of-use while providing sufficient accuracy.
Specifically Bangia et al [14] point out that the spread is sufficiently im-
portant to all market players to warrant proper specification. While they
concede that price impacts become increasingly important when trade occurs
outside the quoted depth, they point out that the loss in accuracy brought
about by ignoring this makes up for the onerous data gathering needed to
model it properly.
The Model
Let rt = ln(
Pt
Pt−1
) = ln(Pt) − ln(Pt−1) be the 1-day logarithmic return of
an asset.
If now rt ∼ N(, ) is Gaussian then it can be shown that V ar(99%, Pt) =
Pte
(t−2.33t).
If it is, without loss of generality, assumed that t ≈ 0 (which is possible as
one can always adjust the return distribution so that this is true) then:
P − V aR = Pt(1− e−2.33t) (4.7)
is the 99% worst expected loss on the portfolio. t here can be estimated
by GARCH or an EWMA regime as noted earlier. In South Africa Pt is
usually the close price on day t but may also be the mid-price, depending
on the pricing convention.
Bangia et al echo the discussion on Extreme Value theory in Section 3.5











general market conditions and liquidity risk. They hold that incorporating
a liquidity adjustment into the above VaR would help capture these tail
events. They thus define the exogenous cost of liquidity (COL) such that
COL = 12Pt(S̄ + ̄) where S̄ is the average relative spread (as defined
earlier) and ̄ is some multiple of the spread volatility so that one covers
99% of the spread distribution. 2
Since the distribution of the spread S is generally far from normal (see
Figure 4.2), Bangia et al point out that one cannot rely on distributional
assumptions to estimate . They find that  ranges from 2 to 4.5 and that
the greater the departure from normality the higher its value. Generally,
however, the use of Excel’s critical value function applied to the empirical
distribution works as a good estimate of .
In order to arrive at their L-VaR model, Bangia et al make the important
assumption that extreme events in returns occur concurrently to extreme
events in the spread. They thus assume perfect correlation between S and r
and in “. . . calculating the liquidity-risk adjusted VaR . . . incorporate both
a 99th percentile movement in the underlying and in the spread”. This is
shown in the Figure 4.3.
With this assumption they arrive at the following estimate of L-VaR with a
correction factor for fat tails:
L− V aR = Pt[1− exp(t − t)] +
1
2
Pt(S̄ + ̃̃) (4.8)
Pt → mid or close price
t → expected log return of P
S̄ → average relative spread
→ qth percentile of log return distribution
 → correction factor for fat tails
t → standard deviation of the log return
̃→ qth percentile of relative spread distribution
̃ → standard deviation of relative spread distribution
The fat tail adjustment, , is based on the Student t-distribution. Bangia
et al point out that for large samples the t-distribution converges to the
normal curve and for any t-distribution:


























→ a constant that depends on the tail probability
→ kurtosis of the empirical distribution
Given this, Bangia et al [14] estimate  by regressing estimates of the stan-
dard parametric VaR from equation 4.8 against historical simulation VaR
estimates for the same empirical series. They get for the 99% VaR,  ≈ 0.4.
They argue that such a regression against historical VaR estimates accounts
for the non-normality and other pitfalls of parametric VaR without requiring
a much larger data set. They point out that the model can be enhanced by
using time-varying kurtosis and other dynamic estimates.
The model can also be extended as a portfolio VaR by either computing the
correlation structure of the spreads, which may prove difficult, or by com-
puting a portfolio weighted-average spread b sed on market-price weighted
bids and asks and then applying their methodology to this weighted spread.
Model Implementation
Bangia et al implement their model on FOREX markets using the Yen/$
and the Thai Baht/$ as test assets over May 97. During this period the Baht
went from being pegged against the Dollar to a free-float currency. They
calculate L-VaR both pre and post the crises and currency de-pegging.











Since their model encapsulates liquidity risk under COL, one can easily
compute the additional risk due to liquidity by finding COL/L-VaR as a
percentage. Bangia et al do this and find that prior to the East Asian crises
liquidity risk accounts for 1.5% and 16% respectively for the Yen and the
Baht. This changes to 1% and 5% post-crises. Bangia et al argue that this
change reflects the fact that the floating rate and the heavy trading in the
currency after the crises led to much of the spread risk being realized in the
return. Prior to the de-pegging the spread accounted for more risk as this
was the only way in which the market could express sentiment.
Unlike many of the other models which follow, Bangia et al backtest their
model. They, however, only discuss the number of violations exhibited by
their model and ignore the time trend of their VaR methodology. They
also do not conduct any of the standard statistical tests associated with
backtesting as discussed later in Section 5.2.2.
Overall they find that the number of VaR violations decrease once liquidity
risk is brought into the VaR but that the difference in violations is smallest
for portfolios consisting of US Bonds and G7 Currencies. This is expected
as these portfolios tend to be highly liquid.
Le Saout [60] is one of the few papers to analyse the Bangia VaR. They
implement the model on the Paris Stock Exchange. They get a value of
0.039 for  and estimate the proportion of L-VaR accounted for by liquidity.
Interestingly they find that some illiquid stocks with small market capital-
izations have as much as 34.96% of their L-VaR accounted for as liquidity
risk.
In order to test this relationship between liquidity risk and market capital-
ization more thoroughly, Le Saout [60] regress COL for each stock against
its market capitalization. Their regression model has an R2 of 13.9% and
indicates a strong negative correlation.
Critique
Most papers which reflect on the Bangia model, while finding the model
easy to implement, generally question its underlying assumptions.
Le Saout [60] for example finds that extreme events in spreads and in returns
are not well coordinated. The Bangia model thus underestimates risk. They
also question the fact that the model ignores endogenous liquidity risk and
propose a similar model based on the Average-Weighted Spread (AWS) in











VaR attributable to liquidity rises from 3.8% to 20.9%. This is compelling
evidence for the importance of price impacts.
While this method seems more accurate, calculating the AWS (see Adden-
dum A) is relatively difficult, as it relies on order book information based on
the normal market size (NMS)3, which is not readily available at any decent
frequencies in most exchanges.
Loebnitz [65], however, agrees with the concept underlying their argument
and point out that the neglect of price impacts is unrealistic and that the as-
sumption of a perfect correlation between spreads and returns could severely
understate true risk, especially in times of stress.
They highlight a “structural inconsistency” in the Bangia model. As it
stands, the model calculates the value after liquidation at the end of the
forecast horizon and assumes a block sale at Pt. This forecast is then sub-
jected to the spread adjustment by adding COL to the standard VaR metric.
Quite correctly, Loebnitz [65] contend that the liquidation value based on
spread volatility should be modelled first and then a forecast applied to this
spread-adjusted liquidation value. In this way the model is more consistent
with the price formation process as it captures the effect of the spread on
liquidation value not on the forecast value.
Loebnitz [65] thus propose an adjusted model which they, unfortunately, do
not test.




t−t(S̄ + ̃̃) (4.10)
Overall, however, much of the literature refers to the Bangia et al model
as a benchmark model. They point out that it incorporates a quick and
easy adjustment to standard VaR that models at least part of liquidity risk.
Indeed Loebnitz [65] argue that the model can be easily implemented in any
market, like Bond markets, Swap markets, etc. where the spread accounts
for a greater proportion of liquidity risk than do price impacts.
3The NMS of an asset is defined differently in different exchanges, but usually represents
the minimum number of securities at which the market-maker must quote firm bids and











2. Ohsawa and Muranaga, 1998 [69]
Around the same time that Bangia et al published their spread-adjustment
model, Ohsawa & Muranaga published a very similar adjustment for Monte
Carlo VaR.
Muranaga et al [69] hypothesise 3 different price simulations that account
for different liquidity risk elements. The 1st process accounts for intra-day
price movements, the 2nd for intra-day variability in the spread and the 3rd
for market price impacts.
The Model
1. Intra-day Price Movements
Assuming that the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) of an asset fol-
lows a log-normal stochastic process, then one can model the expected exe-






t) + Hb (4.11)
PEx → expected execution price at end of holding period
P 0VWAP → VWAP on the risk evaluation day
VWAP → observed historical VWAP volatility
H → standard error of daily price standardized by VWAP dis-
tribution
a,b → standard, independent, normal variates
t→ the holding period in days
2. Spread Volatility



























P 0M → mid-price on risk evaluation day
M → standard deviation of mid-price
→ standard, independent, normal variate
u→ standard, independent, uniform variate
f → empirical probability density function of the bid-ask spread,
based on a historical simulation of bid and ask prices over the
last year
2. Market Price Impacts
Muranaga et al [69] construct a price simulation which attempts at account-
ing for price impacts as well. Let  denote the market price impact, being
the sensitivity of the bid and ask prices to the volume traded. Muranaga et
al [69] then estimate  as the ratio of the price change (based on the differ-
ence between before-trade bid/ask quote and after trade bid/ask quote) to
associated trade volume standardized by the normal market size, defined as
the average daily trading volume. Based on this they arrive at the following
simulation:




























P iBid/Ask → after-trade bid/ask price
g → the historical probability density of 
V i → traded volume of the ith transaction
→ standard, independent, normal variate












Muranaga et al [69] do not backtest their VaR estimates but merely compare
their adjusted model to standard VaR and discuss the differences. They
find that the differences to ordinary VaR become larger as the simulation
becomes more complex. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the
models become more accurate.
Critique
Generally the Muranaga models are easy to implement as they require very
little additional data. However, the models share the common pitfalls of
standard Monte Carlo VaR.
Moreover the simulations themselves seem rather ad hoc and depend in-
ordinately on distributional assumptions. Muranaga et al [69] provide no
theoretical development for their price paths and do not explain why their
models are better at capturing liquidity risk than standard VaR. Although
using VWAP does, to some extent, capture price-related impacts and the
spread-related risk, the model remains quantity-independent. It will thus
always tend to under-estimate true risk.
3. François-Heude and Van Wynendaele, 2002 [44]
François-Heude et al [44] extend the Bangia model in order to account for
some its weaknesses. Specifically they take issue with the correlation as-
sumption inherent to the model and the neglect of endogenous risk.
The Bangia et al model splits risk into market-related risk and exogenous
liquidity risk, as proxied by the spread. This necessitates the separate mod-
elling of the spread and price return and a correlation assumption relating
the 2 models. François-Heude et al [44] try to overcome this by proposing
a VaR based on a “theoretical bid obtained from the mid-price adjusted
by half the average relative spread”. They also include a dynamic factor
that captures how the mid-price moves relative to the effective spread and
account for a endogenous liquidity risk by modelling the spread relative to












In aggregate François-Heude et al [44] arrive at an L-VaR, as shown in
4.18, which applies the VaR methodology to a theoretical bid, adjusted by
half the average relative spread, ¯SpBL . This formulation overcomes both
the incorrect correlation assumption and the structural flaw of the Bangia
model.












(Askt −Bidt)→ the relative spread at time t
¯SpBL → the average relative spread
→ the qth percentile of the mid-return distribution
 → the standard deviation of the mid-return distribution
The above specification ignores price-impacts. In order to account for en-
dogenous liquidity risk, François-Heude et al [44] favour the use of an ad-
justed relative spread Spt(Q), where Q is the quantity to be traded. They
thus arrive at the following L-VaR:








Spt(Q) = Bidt(Q)−Askt(Q)→ the spread at time t adjusted to
the quantity Q
¯SP (Q) → the average over time of the spread adjusted to the
quantity Q
A simple way to implement the above quantity-adjusted model is with the
use of the Average Weighted Spreads (AWS), as discussed in the Le Saout
[60] extension to the Bangia model. This allows one to calculate L-VaR
adjusted to the Normal Market Size (NMS). However, François-Heude et al











They thus propose using the 5 best order limits of the order book. They
argue that these limits are usually sufficient to cover any quantity traded,
thus the prices attached to them can be interpolated to find Q-adjusted
prices. Moreover if the accumulated quantity available for trade at these
limit prices is still insufficient to capture Q then one can use the Average
Weighted Spread as the top bound of the interpolation. In this way the
model captures market depth, breadth and to some extent endogenous liq-
uidity risk.
François-Heude et al [44] have an algorithm for determining Spt(Q). Basi-
cally if Q is less than the quantity available at the bid or ask, then since
the entire quantity can be traded within the spread, BidQ and AskQ is the
Bid and Ask respectively. If, however, Q is larger than this quantity but
remains less than the accumulated quantity available for trade at the 5 best
order limits, then the Bids and Asks associated to Q are obtained by finding
an AWS associated not to the NMS but to the quantity available at each
of these 5 best limit order prices. They thus calculate an AWSAski and
AWSBidi for each of the i=1, 2,. . . 5 limit orders and then interpolate based
on these average-weighted spreads and their associated quantities to arrive
at a spread-adjusted to Q. If, however, Q is greater than the accumulated
quantity available at the 5 best orders, then they interpolate a bid and ask
based on the NMS and the true AWS associated to it.
Model Implementation
François-Heude et al [44] apply their model to a position that corresponds
to NMS/2 and NMS/5 and use 5 days’ worth of data to estimate parame-
ters. In order to test their model, they estimate the Bangia model with 3
different parameter values for , and compare these to their model without
endogenous risk.
They find that their model tends to be generally lower than the Bangia
model, as it models the spread distribution less “aggressively”. Interest-
ingly they find the Bangia model to be extremely sensitive to changes in
, indicating a source of model risk given the volatility of this parameter.
They also compare their quantity-adjusted VaR, to VaR based on the NMS
and find that the Q-adjusted models yield higher VaR estimates. Much of
their implementation centres around proving that spread movements are not
correlated to return movements and that the spread distribution is far from
normal.
While François-Heude et al [44] do compare their model’s time trends to that











highlight accuracy. They do not even quote the number of VaR violations.
Moreover their comparison is only focused on a single, highly liquid stock
for which quoted order book data is readily available on the Paris exchange.
Critique
Overall the François-Heude et al [44] model, at least on the basis of theory, is
a marked improvement on the Bangia model. Certainly the model without
the quantity adjustment seems more realistic and is just as easy to implement
as the original Bangia model. It avoids the overly-simplistic assumptions of
the original model without necessitating drastic model changes.
The endogenous risk model, however, seems to be somewhat ineffective as it
relies on data like the AWS and 5 best order book limits which is not readily
available. Moreover since the order book changes so often, the model could
be inordinately computationally intensive as it requires regular updating to
remain relevant. Indeed Loebnitz [65] argues that even with the quantity-
adjustment, liquidity risk is not really accounted for as price-impacts, as
specified in Chapter 2, are ignored.
The model may also be prone to immense volatility in its forecasts as unlike
other models, it uses the current level of the spread as an input.
4. Angelidis and Benos, 2006 [10]
The Angelidis et al [10] model aims at increasing the accuracy of the Ban-
gia model by incorporating inventory-related spread costs and by indirectly
modelling trade-size dependency. In this way they hope to include both en-
dogenous and exogenous liquidity risk. Their work is more firmly grounded
in market micro-structure theory than any of the preceding models.
The Model
Let Pt denote the transaction price of a security at time t and Xt a trade
direction indicator such that
Xt =
{
1 if a buy











Then if  ≥ 0 represents the cost per share of the market-maker in supply-
ing liquidity on demand,  models the information asymmetry between the
market-maker and traders and t is the expected value of the stock at time
t then one can model Pt as:




t = t−1 + 
√
Vt(Xt − Xt−1) (4.21)
→ reveals whether order handling or inventory costs are more
important
Vt → is the absolute number of shares traded at time t
If now aXt=1 and bXt=−1 are the ask and bid prices associated to the trade
Xt then using the Equations 4.20 and 4.21 with Xt = 1 and Xt = −1:
aXt=1 = t−1 + 
√
Vt(1− E[Xt ∣ Xt−1]) + (+ 
√
Vt) (4.22)
bXt=−1 = t−1 + 
√
Vt(1 + E[Xt ∣ Xt−1])− (+ 
√
Vt) (4.23)
with  = E[Xt ∣ Xt−1]. This specification yields the following model for the
intra-day spread:
aXt=1 − bXt=−1 = 2[
√
Vt( + ) + ] (4.24)
The above implied spread is positively correlated to the volume traded Vt,
the adverse selection component  and the cost component .
The relationship to  depends on its sign, however. Angelidis et al [10]
point out that if  < 0 then the order handling component dominates the
inventory cost and the cost component decreases in Vt. They attribute this
to possible economies of scale in trading. Both equations 4.20 and 4.21 can
be estimated with the use of Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM),
which is discussed briefly in Appendix B.
Now given the parametric spread and the Bangia formulation, Angelidis and















t + ] (4.25)
where V 
′
t is the 
′ quantile of the traded volume distribution.
The model captures exogenous liquidity costs through the spread adjustment
but also accounts for endogenous risk that is implied by Vt:




V̄t−if Vt ≥ V̄t
(4.26)
Model Implementation
The approach in Angelidis et al [10] is an improvement n the François-
Heude and Van Wynendaele model as it explicitly examines the relationship
between the quantity to be liquidated and the costs of trading. Moreover
the model can be implemented with readily available trade data instead of
difficult to obtain order book data.
Angelidis et al [10] apply their model to the Athens Stock Exchange at
half-hour tick intervals, using only Bid and Ask prices over June 2002 to 30
December 2002.
They provide an interesting analysis of the changes in the parameters intra-
day and across longer time periods and implement a 99% and 95% VaR,
comparing them to a standard parametric VaR. They separate their analysis
between large cap Top 20 index stocks and smaller Top 40 stocks. They
also back-test their methodology using the Kupiec conditional coverage test
which is discussed later in Section 5.2.2. This, however, does not encompass
the totality of backtesting analysis.
As expected they find that large cap stocks have a lower % of VaR explained
by liquidity, while the small cap stocks have higher liquidity risks.
The back-testing results provide compelling evidence in favour of L-VaR as
in all cases L-VaR has violations which are closer to the expected percentage.
This is especially true for large cap stocks.
Critique
Overall the Angelidis et al [10] model provides a robust, framework for the











accurate VaR forecasts but as it requires estimation of inventory-related
costs and information asymmetries, it also provides an insightful analysis on
the state of the overall market liquidity. It thus comes closest to the broad
descriptive measures encountered earlier.
Beyond this, unlike earlier models, the Angelidis framework can be rela-
tively easily implemented with readily available data. The model provides
a holistic treatment of liquidity as it indirectly incorporates quantity effects
through the spread-trade relationship.
While Loebnitz [65] largely agree with the above, they point out that the
model crucially depends on a structural inventory framework which is not
easily extended to other markets. If the price-change model fails to hold
then the entire L-VaR model fails.
4.5.2 Parametric-Adjustment Models
1. Al Janabi’s Multi-Liquidation Horizon Model, 2009 [5]
Al Janabi [5], like many of the other models in this section, consider a
statistical adjustment to the mean and variance inputs to parametric VaR
in order to account for liquidity risk. Specifically their adjustment accounts
for the fact that illiquid securities are generally tightly held and traded less
frequently than other securities in a portfolio.
In a method similar to the time-scaling of , Al Janabi propose a methodol-
ogy that adjusts the variance input for each security’s expected trade date.
Unlike the scaling methodology, however, the Al Janabi adjustment does
not assume that all securities are sold at the same time.
The Model
Assume that a position in a security is closed-out linearly over t-days. If
each day’s security returns are independant and identically distributed then
the variance of the t-day loss, 2adj , is merely the sum of the variance of each




2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 2t , where 2i is the variance of the




Now given linear liquidation and assuming that the variance of losses de-

























which can be re-expressed with 2 ≡ f(t) as:



















so that the adjusted L-VaR must be as below for a security and as shown
in 4.30 for a portfolio




> V aR (4.29)
L− V aRPadj =
√
∣ L− V aRadj ∣T ∣  ∣∣ L− V aRadj ∣ (4.30)
Al Janabi [5] hold that L-VaR should reflect residual market risk due to
liquidity. Moreover they propose that t be estimated as the total trading
position size divided by the daily average trading volume in that security.
Although they implement their model on selected Gulf markets, they neither
back-test it nor compare it to different L-VaR models.
Critique
Overall the model is a very weak alternative to the standard time-scaling
technique used to adjust VaR. It maintains the same unnecessary assump-
tions regarding return independence and variance additivity.
At best the model merely provides a method by which one can extend the











may have different times to liquidation. It provides no theoretical argument
supporting the idea that such an adjustment accounts for liquidity risk.
The model ignores price impacts, spread-related risk and even price risk to
some extent. It is expected that the Al Janabi [5] model would substantially
underestimate liquidity risk.
2. Shamroukh’s Covariance Scaling Model [76]
Shamroukh propose a similar but more robust methodology to the Al Janabi
model to account for liquidity risk in VaR. While they also use a scaling
methodology, their scaling adjustment is based on a model of a trader’s
liquidation behaviour.
Shamroukh [76] consider a number of cases, progressing from one asset and
one risk factor (being a standard Brownian motion that models risk) to non-
uniform liquidation across multiple assets and risk factors. At each step the
algebra becomes more complicated but the underlying methodology remains
the same.
The Model
1. One asset and One Risk Factor:
Consider a portfolio of one asset S with an amount of X0 invested in it.
Suppose that S is only impacted by a single risk factor W that is generated
by a standard Weiner process, Z, and define a liquidation schedule as a
vector of trade dates and trade amounts.
Let T be the end of the holding period and Δt = T/n be the number of
uniformly spaced trade dates at each iΔt for i = 1, . . . , n with Si, the price
of S at each trade date.
Assuming uniform liquidation across time, the remaining position at each
time step i is X0(1− in).
Now if Δ ln(Wi) = ΔZi with ΔZi = "
√
Δt for " ∼ N(0, 1), denotes the
change in the underlying risk factor that drives S, then one can derive the
















at each time step a quantity of X0n is sold at a price Si.

















for M = ΔSiΔWi , if we assume that Si changes only in response to changes in
W .
Using the approximation ΔWi ≈W0Δ ln(Wi) then













as Δ ln(Wi) = ΔZi by definition.








which is a function of the covariance matrix of Δ ln(Wi) for i ∼ N(0, 1) and
i = 1, . . . , n.



























This yields an adjusted L-VaR of






which has the property that limn→∞ L− V aR = (13)(Standard VaR).
Without going into the details of the derivation (which is much the same as
the above) for each of the cases, we present the Shamroukh L-VaR in each
case below. The case of non-uniform liquidation over risk factors is left out
given that such a liquidation merely complicates the derivation but adds
little to the analysis.
2. Multiple Assets and Risk Factors







2 (Standard VaR) (4.37)
where Q is a vector of portfolio weights and Σ is the variance-covariance
matrix of the asset returns.
3. Endogenous Liquidity Risk
Assuming that prices are affected by trade size via a function f such that
SL = f(Si, , ,Trade size) denotes the liquidation price of the asset.
Shamroukh [76] assumes the following specification: SL = Sie
+Size where
 captures exogenous liquidity risk,  endogenous liquidity risk and ,  < 0.
This yields an L-VaR of:
L− V aR =
√


















where Z is the m× 1 vector of liquidity cost adjusted VaR maps such that
zj =
∑pj Xi,0Mi,jWj,0e(i+i Xin ).
Here Xi is the holding in the ith asset and pj is the number of assets in the
portfolio with exposure to risk factor Wj for j = 1, . . . ,m. In this setting
different assets are correlated to different risk factors.
Critique
Shamroukh [76] do not implement their model and although it presents a
more robust, statistical adjustment to parametric VaR which remains easy
to implement, it suffers from the same shortcomings as the Al Janabi [5]
model.
Firstly although the model tries to account for liquidity risk, its formulation
of the supply curve and price formation process is overly simplistic and
ignores spread-related risk. The risk factors all follow standard uncorrelated
Brownian motions, which necessarily preclude the idea that in times of stress
risk factors tend to become increasingly correlated and non-normal.
Secondly the model’s assumptions regarding the liquidation process is not
representative of the dynamic trading that actually takes place in the mar-
ket. Indeed the liquidation schedule is completely independent of the trade
price and price impacts are really ignored.
3. Berkowitz’s Price-Elasticity Model, 2000 [16]
Berkowitz [16] der ve a liquidity adjusted distribution from which L-VaR can
be inferred. U like the preceding parametric-adjustment models, however,
it is not based on an assumed liquidation schedule and fixed price process
but on an optimal liquidation schedule that is derived from the price process.
The Model
Let pt be the price of an asset at time t and qt the associated trade size which
is related to pt by pt = pt−1 + xt − qt. Here xt represents an exogenous
market factor and qt represents the price impact related to the trade.


















t qt = Mt where Mt is the total liquidation holding.
In this way the trader tries to maximise trade revenue by changing the
amount traded up to t=T.
The optimal solution to this problem is derived by Bertsimas & Lo [18] under
the assumption that xt represents rational reactions to new information or
preference shocks as: q∗t =
Mt
T . The optimal solution then calls for linear
and constant liquidation from t to T.
Given this, using historical portfolio values and net flows,  can be estimated
from the regression:
pt+1 − pt = + xt+1 − q∗t + "t (4.41)
Moreover the portfolio mean and additional variance due to liquidity can
then be shown to be:
E[yt+1] = Q′t(pt + E[xt+1]− E[q∗t ]) (4.42)
Liquidity Variance = Q′t(Variance(qt))Qt (4.43)
where Qt is the N × 1 vector of portfolio positions, yt is the portfolio value
at time t and xt can be taken to be the return on the market index.
The portfolio liquidity VaR at time t can be derived from the above by
forecasting at time t the t+1 portfolio mean and variance and then using
them in a parametric VaR framework.
Alternatively the entire one-step ahead distribution can be forecasted by
using the fact that ˆyt+1 = Q
′
t(pt + xt+1 − q∗t ) and the inversion formula for





















which can be solved by numerical methods and has the important benefit
that higher-order moment information is preserved in the VaR estimate. If,
however, f is taken from some tractable family of distributions fit to past
data, then the equation can be solved analytically to arrive at a distribution
for y.
Model Implementation
The Berkowitz [16] model is better suited to a portfolio of securities for
which actual net flows and values are recorded through time. Indeed the
model was implemented for 4 different mutual funds: aggressive growth,
growth, growth and income and precious metals.
The model was implemented within a normal parametric framework and
a one-step ahead adjusted distribution function based on the above was
derived from which liquidity VaR was inferred.
Berkowitz [16] find that the L-VaR of the aggressive funds is generally higher
than that of the other mutual funds. No other analysis or discussion is
conducted around the model.
Critique
The Berkowitz model is, within bounds, easy to implement and uses, for
asset managers at least, readily available flow data. The liquidity coefficient
 captures price impacts and spread moves and thus the model captures the
important aspects of liquidity risk.
Solving the distribution equation analytically can be problematic but this
is largely overcome by assuming a normal distribution for portfolio returns.
Overall, however, the model lacks depth and detail. Like the other parametric-
adjustment models, it does not offer a very rich liquidity model and seems
rather simplistically based on a poor optimal liquidity strategy. If the un-
derlying Bertsimas and Lo formulation and assumptions proves false then
the entire VaR framework proves false. In particular the assumption in
Bertsimas & Lo [18] that informed trading is independent of noise trade
is questionable as generally market practitioners cannot easily distinguish
between the two and take both at face value, adjusting their behaviour,











4.5.3 Optimal Liquidation Strategy Models
Unlike the spread-adjustment and parametric-adjustment models, the mod-
els that follow derive their notion of L-VaR by specifying a supply curve
process and a price-impact model and then using both to derive an optimal
liquidation strategy as a reference point for the modelling of transaction
costs.
Optimal liquidation strategy (OLS) models aim at capturing more of the
significant aspects of liquidity risk. As a result they come closer to the
original definition cited earlier and are formulated with the specific aim
of combining both exogenous and endogenous liquidity-related transaction
costs.
All of the OLS models are characterized by their precise modelling of price
impacts and their mathematical tractability. They attempt at uniquely
associating liquidity risk to the liquidation position in a way that includes
general market risk as well.
1. Jarrow & Subramanian’s Liquidity Discount Model, 2001 [55]
The Jarrow & Subramanian liquidity discount model derives an optimal liq-
uidation strategy in order to determine the value-under-liquidation of a given
position. This value-under-liquidation is used to derive liquidity-adjusted
portfolio profits and losses which are then used in the computation of a
liquidity-adjusted VaR. In this way a standard VaR formulation is applied
to a liquidity-adjusted return distribution.
In doing this Jarrow et al [55] assume that traders try to maximise the ex-
pected liquidation value of a position subject to an exogenously determined
investment horizon T, a random permanent market-price impact and an












Given a mid-price, p(t), process of
dp(t) = p(t)(dt+ dW (t)) (4.45)
and a stochastic quantity discount of c(s) then the transaction price for the
sale of si units at ti can be modelled as p(t
+
i ) = c(si)p(ti) for c(si) ∈ [0, 1]
where t+i denotes the time just before the trade is executed.
Let Δ(si) denote the execution lag between the order placement at ti and
execution at ti+Δ(si) and (ti, si) be a trading strategy, a double of transac-
tion quantities and times such that tn = T and
∑
si = S, the total quantity
to be liquidated. Any trader facing such an economy has the problem of






r → the risk free rate
c(si)→ the price impact trade discount
(Δ(si))→ the execution lag process






Both c(si) and Δ(si) can be chosen to be deterministic.
By letting u(p, s, t) denote the value strategy and by solving equation 4.46
as an impulse control problem, Jarrow et al [55] find the optimal trading
strategy for a frictionless economy and for an economy that includes liquidity
risk. u∗(p, s) denotes the optimal proceeds from such an optimal strategy.
In the case of no liquidity risk:
u∗(p, s) =
{
Sp if  ≤ r











Thus when there is no liquidity risk it is most optimal to sell everything
immediately. This supports the discussion in Section 2.3.4.
However for an economy with liquidity risk and assuming what Jarrow et al




Spc(s)e[(−r)Δ(s)] if  ≤ r
Spc(s)e[(−r)(T+Δ(s))] if  > r
In this case the liquidity proceeds are always less than the proceeds from a
frictionless economy which seems highly reasonable.
Using the above, Jarrow et al [55] define p∗ to be the “perfect liquidity
price”. It is the price such that u∗(p∗, s) = u(p, s), that is the expected pro-
ceeds from liquidation in an economy with liquidity risk equals the proceeds
without liquidity frictions when trading at the current market price, p. This
price can be found by noting that:⎧⎨⎩
Sp∗ = Spc(s)e(−r)Δ(s) if  ≤ r
Sp∗c(s)e(−r)T = Spc(s)e(−r)(T+Δ(s)) if  > r
⇔ p∗ = pc(s)e(−r)Δ(s)
p∗, as defined above, is used to value a portfolio instead of p as it captures
the “fair expected liquidation value”. Jarrow et al [55] base their return
distribution from which they infer L-VaR on this theoretical price. They
show that if the mid-price process follows the GBM shown in 4.45 then:
L− V aR = ps ∣ [− 
2
2






∣ std[Δ(s)] + std[ln(c(s))]] ∣ (4.48)
In this L-VaR the expected execution lag, E[Δ(s)], replaces the fixed time
horizon T. Thus the horizon is a fraction of the trade size as larger or-
ders induce longer time horizons. Moreover increases in the expected trade
discount E[ln(c(s))] or return volatility raises the VaR.
4This states that splitting an order into two trades and committing to consecutive












Although Jarrow et al [55] do not implement their model, at least theoreti-
cally, it has strong advantages over preceding models.
The model’s methodological framework, specifically, is more robust and has
a sound mathematical footing as a stochastic impulse control problem. Un-
like the Berkowitz model, which also offers an optimal liquidation schedule,
it specifically accounts for price impacts and even accounts for their random-
ness. The model offers rich detail coupled with a certain degree of conceptual
simplicity.
Despite this, it does have its drawbacks with regard to practicality. Ob-
jective estimation of its input parameters, for instance, like the mean and
standard deviation of the execution lag Δ(s) and the corresponding quan-
tity discount c(s) (although subjective estimates can be used) is difficult,
particularly because these parameters are not observable.
The model also insufficiently accounts for the full spectrum of liquidity risk in
that it only models permanent price impacts and ignores temporary, volume-
related price effects. It also fails to properly account for spread-related costs
and does so only indirectly via the price-impact function, whose form is not
clearly specified.
In addition the economies of scale condition is unrealistic as traders rou-
tinely split their orders to reduce trading costs. The assumption contradicts
the result in Çetin et al [23] that continuous trading of small amounts can
eliminate liquidity costs. The economies of scale condition ignores the op-
portunity costs related to trading and is almost certainly not true of very
large sales.
Nevertheless Loebnitz [65] finds the model laudable given its, at least ten-
tative, price-impact formulation and general rigour. The model is a good
showcase for the elegance of OLS VaR models and their have been several
attempts at extending its application.
Botha [20] for instance aim at extending the standard model to account for
a portfolio of assets. Using an alternative formulation of the model as given
by equation 4.49 and assuming that  ≃ 0, they offer a heuristic derivation
of a portfolio L-VaR.
L−V aRt = ps{(E[Δ(s)]+E[ln(c(s))])−CI(E
√












p→ equity fair-value mid-price
s→ units of equity held
→ average asset return
CI → chosen confidence interval
E → volatility of equity return
E[Δ(s)]→ mean of the liquidity interval
Δ(s) → standard deviation of the liquidity interval
E[ln(c(s))]→ mean of the liquidity discount
ln(c(s)) → standard deviation of the liquidity discount
If now  ≈ 0 then equation 4.49 simplifies to
L− V aRt = psCI[E
√
E[Δ(s)] + ln(c(s))] (4.50)
Now the standard VaR for a portfolio P can be expressed as V aRsimple =
N(T − CIP
√
T ) where p is the variance-covariance matrix of the as-
sets held in the portfolio and CI is the required confidence interval. This
simplifies to V aRsimple = N(CIP
√
T ) under the assumption of small .
Now for standard VaR:























































This leads Botha [20] to hypothesise the following for the Jarrow & Subra-
manian portfolio L-VaR:
L− V aR =
√



















The attractive factor of this formulation is that Botha implements the port-
folio VaR model using realized portfolio trades, profits and losses. He com-
pares a time series of the Jarrow & Subramanian L-VaR against standard
VaR and even back-tests the model.
Botha [20] estimate the expected time to execution, E[Δ(s)], as the simple
average of the time between placing a bid/offer and than having it executed
and the liquidity discount as the difference between the market value of a
trader’s position at the time of the bid/offer and the value under liquidation.
They find that the L-VaR is far more volatile than the standard VaR across
portfolios. In addition in many cases the back-testing results show the L-
VaR to be far more accurate than the standard VaR. Overall they conclude
that while implementing the Jarrow-Subramanian model is not simple, the
portfolio data can be found and the potential for a far more accurate VaR
forecast is great.
2. Almgren & Chriss Value-Under-Liquidation Model, 1999 [6]
Almgren & Chriss [6] provide one of the first complete and robust extensions
of standard VaR to include all the major aspects of liquidity risk.
Using an optimal liquidation strategy framework, Almgren et al [6] derive
the exogenous and endogenous costs involved in liquidation. The framework
accounts for both temporary and permanent endogenous price effects by
using two different price impact functions. Indeed it is the first model to
derive alternate liquidation strategies for a variety of different price impact
specifications.
The Model
Consider a trader with X units of an asset who wishes to trade his entire
position by some exogenously determined date T in a discrete-time setting.
Let  = TN and tk = k ⋅  for k = 0, 1, . . . , N be a discrete set of trading
times. Then Almgren et al [6] define a trading strategy as the collection
{x0, x1, . . . , xN} of units held after trading at each ti such that x0 = X and
xN = 0.
If now k = xk−1 − xk denotes the units traded at each tk time step then















In addition suppose that the price of the security at the kth time step is Sk
such that


















 → volatility of asset returns
 → length of time interval between trade dates
k → a random draw from a N(0, 1) distribution
g()→ permanent price impact function
k
 → average rate of trading over tk − tk−1
Given the difference between the permanent and temporary price impacts,
the actual transaction price of the kth trade is better modelled as S̃ =
Sk−1 − ℎ(k ) where ℎ() is the temporary price impact function.
The idea behind S̃ is that “short-term supply and demand imbalances” due
to trade cause temporary price concessions which disappear once the trade
pressure has eased. This is exactly as mentioned in Section 2.3.4.
Now given these quantity and price trajectories one can derive the total net


















X0S0 → the market value of the initial position

√
k → aggregate effect of return volatility
g(k )→ accumulated permanent price concessions
kℎ(
















between the initial market value and the proceeds from liquidation. This


















If additionally each k ∼ N(0, 1) is independently identically distributed
then the shortfall is also normally distributed with the above mean and
variance.
Using the above specifications, Almgren et al [6] extend their model by
assuming that traders wish to minimize U(x) where U(x) = (E[x]+Var[x]).
 denotes traders’ degree of risk aversion.
The optimization problem amounts to minimizing U(x) by choosing alter-
native trading trajectories subject to the price impact formulations and the
boundary conditions x0 = X and xN = 0. Almgren & Chriss only opti-
mize U(x) for the case of linear price impacts, while they do present a few
non-linear formulations, only the non-linear case provides a neat closed-form
solution to the optimization problem.
Amongst other models, Almgren & Chriss consider the specifications as
shown in Table 4.1.
The estimation of the above parameters is not trivial and depends on intra-
day, high frequency data which can be extremely volatile and changeable.
The dynamic nature of the inputs also means that they should be re-
estimated often to maintain the relevance of the model.
Assuming the linear case, Almgren & Chriss arrive, by direct substitution























Permanent Price Impact g() =  ∣  ∣ g() = 
Temporary Price Impact ℎ() =  ∣  ∣ ℎ(k) = sign(k) +  k
 → a constant that represents the amount by which prices fall or rise, mea-
sured in (currency/unit)/unit. Thus if one sells n units, the price per unit is
depreciated (appreciated) by n regardless of the time of trade.
 → fixed cost of trading, usually half the bid-ask spread, plus commissions
and fees
 → transient, price-impact cost
,  ∈ [0, 1]→ power-law exponents
Table 4.1: Price-Impact Functions [6]
Since E[x] is convex ⇔ ̃ > 0 and since U(x) is convex ⇔  > 0 then U(x)
has a minimum for some x. This minimum can be determined by taking
partial derivatives in x to get:
U
xj
= 2(2xj − ̃
xj−1 − 2xj + xj+1
2
) = 0






















cosℎ((T − tj− 1
2
))X (4.60)
where sinℎ and cosℎ are the hyperbolic sine and cosine functions with tj =
(j − 12) for j = 0, . . . , N.
The L-VaR can now be derived, in a manner similar to the earlier paramet-
ric L-VaR adjustments, by using the standard parametric VaR formulation
together with the adjusted mean and variance calculated using the optimal
trajectory defined in Equations 4.59 and 4.60.
L− V aRp = 
√











The above defines the maximal expected loss for the trading strategy for a
probability p. The parameter  is determined using the inverse cumulative
probability distribution function of the return process such that ℙ(R < ) =
p.
Model Implementation
Almgren & Chriss [6] do not implement their model themselves but Loebnitz
[65] undertakes an examination by comparing model forecasts for different
price-impact function formulations. They also conduct a sensitivity analysis.
Applying the model to assumed parameter inputs and examining the effect
of changes on both expected shortfall and liquidity VaR, Loebnitz [65] find
that the expected shortfall (ES) values are higher than VaR forecasts across
all the price-impact specifications. This is somewhat expected given the fact
that, as discussed earlier, ES more accurately captures low-probability, tail
losses.
In terms of sensitivity, Loebnitz [65] find that at larger holdings, the loss
as forecasted by standard VaR is far lower than the loss forecasted by the
Almgren & Chriss L-VaR. They argue that this is to be expected as when
holdings are large the effect of a block sale, as assumed by standard VaR, is
far more onerous on the liquidation value.
Interestingly, large increases in the exogenous time horizon T, reduces the
differences between the different models, but at small T, the differences
become more apparent. This merely represents the effect of an immediate
block sale versus staggered sales – small T implies a block sale which induces
larger liquidity costs.
While a rigorous back-testing procedure applied to the model’s forecasts
would shed more light on its accuracy, the above results, at least superficially,
indicate the model’s strengths in capturing liquidity risks.
Critique
The Almgren & Chriss formulation requires onerous data warehousing and
parameter estimations, yet its richness and depth lends itself to a far more
accurate model of VaR than any of the previous models.
Unlike the Jarrow & Subramanian model, Almgren et al [6] include both
temporary and permanent price impact functions. These are incorporated











specify the most suitable price impact formulations for the asset at hand. In
this way the model can be implemented for bonds, FOREX, equity markets,
etc. by making minimal changes to its form. This is, however, subject to the
impact functions being amenable to a tractable solution to the optimization
problem. As it stands the model provides very little guidance in terms of
estimating the onerous price impact parameters.
Overall the model neatly balances price risks and liquidity-related price ef-
fects by properly considering the actual trade-off faced by market partic-
ipants in trading. The model can only really be judged, however, by its
accuracy and practicability.
3. Hisata & Yamai Liquidity Risk Model, 2000 [49]
One of the drawbacks of the Almgren et al [6] model is its assumption
of an exogenously determined trading horizon T. Generally traders enter
the market and then re-select their trading horizon in order to minimize
liquidation costs and price uncertainty.
Hisata & Yamai extend the Almgren & Chriss formulation to specifically
account for this by deriving an optimal horizon given sales at a constant rate.
Thus instead of setting Ux = 0 to find the optimal liquidation schedule, they
set UN = 0. In this setting a given sales schedule implied by the constant
rate of trade is assumed.
The Model
As with the previous model, suppose a trader begins with X units of an
asset and wishes to liquidate his position over t0 = 0 to tN = T by selling
at a constant rate over N time periods.
A position is thus sold at each tk = k for k = 0, . . . , N with tN = T = N
and  = TN .
Here N is unknown but at each k an amount of n1, . . . , nN units are sold
with k =
k
 , representing the rate of trade in the kth sub-period.
Similar to Almgren & Chriss, Hisata & Yamai assume a linear price-impact
function so that the market price Sk is given by the arithmetic walk:
















Given this the transaction price of the kth trade is S̃ = Sk − "− k, which
includes the permanent price impact. Thus the total transaction cost of the
trading strategy is




















Given that k ∼ N(0, 1) is independently, identically distributed then the


















Supposing that the trader wishes to choose N so that U = E[C]+rZ
√
V ar[C]
is minimized with Z being the upper 100 percentile of the normal distri-
bution and r his cost of capital. Assuming sales at a constant speed then:
E[C] = −1
2
X(N − 1) + 1
2









































































which can be re-arranged to obtain a 6-degree polynomial in N. This has no
closed-form solution.
However, if  ≈ 0 which is reasonable in the short time space between trades
and assumed in many of the models then:
(N2 − 12)


















whose solution yields an optimal N and optimal T = N .
L-VaR then in the discrete-time setting for optimal N∗ is given by
L− V aR = Z
√
V ar[C] (4.71)
Similar to Almgren & Chriss, Hisata et al [49] also develop a continuous-time
model, which unlike the discrete-time model, has a closed-form solution for
N.
In the continuous-time model, for a standard Brownian motion Z(t) and
stock price path S(t):







































where the term XS(0) follows from the fact that 
∫ T
0 S(0)dt = S(0)T =
S0X as X =
∫ T
0 dt.
Moreover the cost of execution C and its mean and variance are






T 2 − 
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Assuming that the trader wishes to minimize U = E[C]+rZ
√
V ar[C] then,
one arrives at the closed-form solution for T:
U
T







L-VaR in the continuous-time model for linear-deterministic price-impacts
is then







The strongest aspect of the Hisata & Yamai model is that it provides the
scope for a variety of price-impact functions. The fact that the model op-
timizes N which is independent of the price impact instead of the sales
schedule, makes it more amenable to different impact specifications.
In this regard, Hisata et al [49] extend their model by assuming a stochastic
market impact and even a non-linear market impact.
If i = 0 + nZn(t) represents the temporary market impact coefficient at






















motion Zn(t) then by assuming that the transaction price is independent
of this coefficient and following the above derivation, Hisata & Yamai [49]
derive E[C] and Var[C] as disclosed in Figure 4.4.
The non-linear and stochastic price impact forms are especially important
given the empirical findings that impacts are generally concave in trade size.
Hisata & Yamai also include a model that includes correlations between the
price impact and the transaction price. This is particularly useful for the
modelling of liquidity risks during times of stress when, as discussed in
Chapter 2.5, price-impacts tend to vary negatively with executed prices.
Model Implementation
Hisata & Yamai [49] implement their model and compare it to conventional
VaR. They offer no insight, however, into how they estimate their input
parameters.
The results of the comparison indicate that while standard parametric VaR
is linear in position size, their L-VaR increases by a factor of about 22 for a
tenfold increase in the position. This is good proof that their model captures
liquidity costs which are correlated to position size.
Beyond this, they find that if the market-impact increases by a factor of
10 then L-VaR only changes by approximately 2.15. A 25% change in the
impact, either way, induces only a 10% change in the L-VaR. This implies
that the model is not especially sensitive to errors in the estimation of the
market impact.
Loebnitz [65] compare the linear price-impact L-VaR with the stochastic
market-impact model. They find that the effect on L-VaR is small and
almost negligible and attribute this to the fact that transaction costs are
generally dominated by changes in the asset price rather than volatility in
the market price-impact.
Critique
The model presents the most extensive and insightful handling of liquidity
risk in VaR. Not only does it cover all of the major components of liquidity
risk as discussed in Chapter 2, but it allows for interesting extensions that
account for a variety of price-impact functions. All of this is accomplished
while retaining the dependency of VaR on trade size.











more in-depth data and parameter estimation, these additions can be ig-
nored in favour of a simpler, more standard formulation.
4.6 Model Comparisons
The preceding discourse on the technical details of each measure/model and
its strengths and weaknesses ignores the more important qualitative points
regarding whether or not each model adequately captures the definition of
liquidity risk and secondly whether they embody the preferred characteris-
tics of a “good” measure of liquidity risk.
As noted in Chapter 2, liquidity risk should be defined as the “risk of future
loss in value faced . . . due to unforeseen changes in the expected liquidation
value” of an asset. Liquidity risk measures/models must, at minimum cap-
ture some aspect of this variability. Ideally, however, they should capture
this and most of the characteristics noted in Section 3.7, while remaining
compact and tractable.
Taking each measure/model separately one can assess them in terms of these
general yet important features:
1. Spread-Based Measures – As noted earlier, spread-based measures
partly measure the cost associated with reversing a small trade. They
arise because of information asymmetry and inventory effects which
impact on the price formation process. While they do represent one
of the most direct costs associated with the uncertainty in liquidation
value, they also ignore many of the additional costs which impact on
liquidation risk like price risk, price impacts and the opportunity costs
of trading.
Spread-based measures are not useful in OTC markets and become
less effective in times of stress when price-impact concerns gain greater
prominence. They do not measure the variability in actual liquidation
value and are inconsistent with much of the micro-structure theory
and the elements of a good measure noted in Section 4.4. They also
provide no objective gauge of their accuracy and are prone to extreme
volatility which can hinder decision-making.
The measures do, however, provide a quick and easy gauge of mar-












2. Trading-Activity Measures – Volume and Turnover are the most
notable measures in this category with each proxying for market-
related breadth. Similar to the spread-based measures, while these
do provide a market consensus view of liquidity, they tend to ignore
many of the costs directly attributable to liquidation. They thus do
not conform to the definition of liquidity risk nor do they meet many
of the requirements of an ideal measure. They are, however, useful as
a quick and rough gauge of liquidity.
3. Price-Impact Measures – Price-impact measures capture market-
related resiliency and are more internally consistent with the definition
than preceding measures.
Measures like the Amihud-Illiquidity Ratio and the P & S measure
capture the implicit costs associated with trading but ignore many of
the other directly attributable costs like the spread, price risk and op-
portunity costs. They also provide no practical adjustment for market
crises which helps them capture these better.5
The Amihud-Illiquidity Ratio and the P & S measure both have method-
ological drawbacks as both of them make no distinction between tem-
porary and permanent price impacts nor are their price impacts ad-
justed to the amount considered for trade.
Like the preceding measures, these can also be implemented with read-
ily available data and have been shown to co-ordinate well with known
periods of illiquidity. They do seem to capture an aspect of liquidity
risk which is different to the other measures.
In general all of the above measures give a relatively good indication
of the market consensus of liquidity through time. They are not ob-
jectively verifiable, however, nor are they particularly well-adjusted to
a specific trade.
4. Spread-Adjustment Models
All of the spread-adjustment models require relatively little data and
are generally easy to understand. They, however, notoriously ignore
quantity-price effects and concentrate solely on the spread.
∙ Bangia Model – The Bangia et al model is laudable and easy
to understand. With the use of a relatively simple addition to
standard VaR, it easily captures some of the costs associated
with spread-related variability.
Despite this, the model’s central premise that one can completely
separate liquidity risk from price risk contradicts the ideas in












Chapter 2 which points out that price impacts, etc. directly
affect a trader’s price risk. The model is thus incomplete and
ignores many implicit (and explicit) liquidity-related costs and
the price-risk/trade-risk trade-off. Moreover its assumption that
extreme events in the spread occur concurrently with extreme
return events may make the model more inaccurate in times of
stress.
The model does not really come close to capturing the variability
in liquidation value brought about by market frictions. Indeed
even the way it accounts for spread risk is not via the influence
of the spread on end liquidation value. Thus while the model is
simple it does not completely account for the definition of liq-
uidity risk. It also provides no gauge of the market consensus of
liquidity over time.
∙ Ohsawa & Muranaga – The Ohsawa & Muranaga Monte Carlo
L-VaR model seems ad hoc and unsubstantiated by theory. While
the model does come close to capturing price-impacts via its -
adjustment, the addition is not robust and many other liquidity-
related transaction costs are ignored. The model also only in-
directly incorporates spread-related variability with the use of
VWAP, which is not representative of the true spread.
The model only marginally reflects the variability in an asset’s
liquidation value, has no adjustment for times of stress and is
generally inconsistent with market micro-structure theory.
∙ François-Heude & Van Wynendaele – The François-Heude
& Van Wynendaele model overcomes the correlation problem in
the Bangia model, while retaining the model’s original simplicity.
It also extends the original Bangia model to account for volume-
related effects with the use of a quantity-adjusted spread. In this
way the model accounts for the variability in the spread and, to
some extent, endogenous risk as well.
The model, however, ignores true price impacts, temporary vs
permanent price effects, a  -penalty trade-off and explicit costs of
trade. The quantity-adjusted spread is also difficult to implement
as it requires data like the 5 best order book limits which is not
readily available.
In general the François-Heude model, like the Bangia framework,
only indirectly reflects the market consensus of liquidity as it is
based on a theoretical bid price. It also only captures depth and
ignores breadth and resiliency.
∙ Angelidis & Benos – The model is basically the Bangia model
applied to a structural inventory model which mimics the true











modelling of volume-effects on the trade price, it suffers from
many of the same shortcomings as the Bangia model. The use of
the structural inventory framework makes the resulting L-VaR
consistent, but leaves the loss forecasts more open to model-
error and estimation error, as if the underlying inventory model
proves to be inadequate then the entire L-VaR framework fails.
The structural model does, however, allow the model to capture
breadth via the parameter adjustments.
Like the preceding models, quantity impacts which are not ex-
pressed through the spread (like temporary vs permanent effects,
etc.) are ignored. The  -penalty is also ignored and there are no
model adjustments for stress. The model is silent on many of the
implicit liquidity-related transaction costs and provides no view
on market-wide liquidity. Most significantly many of the impor-
tant spread-related aspects like spread volatility and its absolute
level are also left out.
The model does seem to be indicative of the market micro struc-
ture and is both easy to understand and implement.
5. Parametric-Adjustment Models
All of the spread-adjustment models and the models which follow are
based on a parametric VaR framework. They thus suffer from the
same non-liquidity-related drawbacks as standard parametric VaR.
∙ Al Janabi Model – The model is detached from micro-structure
theory and the price formation process. It offers very little more
than standard parametric VaR and in no way captures the defini-
tion of liquidity risk. While the time-scaling adjustment it offers
is easy to implement, it is based on questionable underlying as-
sumptions.
∙ Shamroukh Model – The model has the same drawbacks as the
Al Janabi model as it focuses on a scaling-adjustment to account
for liquidity risk. The Shamroukh model, however, offers a better
development of this adjustment which is more grounded in the
liquidation process.
Although the model’s underlying assumptions are less question-
able than the Al Janabi model, it still assumes that the price
process is independent of the liquidation process. Moreover its
price impact formulation is simplified and very similar to the P &
S Measure, attributing the entire volume-related return-reversal
to the impact of trade. Like many of the models, it assumes lin-
ear trade which is not really representative of true trade. The











not model price risk and has no adjustments for times of stress. It
can, however, be easily implemented with readily available data.
∙ Berkowitz Model – Unlike other L-VaR models, the Berkowitz
Price-Elasticity model requires portfolio cash flow and trade price
data in order to be implemented. Such data is only readily avail-
able if the practitioner maintains a record of internal trades and
flows and is difficult to source by external parties.
Generally the portfolio version of the model is impractical as it
requires numerical modelling to implement. Moreover the model
is based on a structural price-change model and thus shares some
of the drawbacks of the Angelidis & Benos model.
Although the spread is not specifically modelled, the majority of
costs associated with price impacts and many of the other aspects
of liquidity, are accounted for to the extent that these costs are
present in a portfolio’s realized cash flows. Thus while the model
is not completely consistent with theory or the definition, it does
offer a black-box view of the impact of liquidity with a much
lower modelling burden.
6. Optimal Liquidation Strategy Models
OLS models are more complete than the other models. However, they
require much more data and onerous estimation procedures.
∙ Jarrow & Subramanian Model – The model is certainly in-
ternally consistent as it measures a wide spectrum of liquidity-
related costs. While it ignores explicit costs, these can easily be
modelled by a higher stochastic discount.
Since the model is based on a GBM (like many of the OLS mod-
els) there are questions regarding how well it reflects the mar-
ket consensus of liquidity through time. This may prejudice the
model during times of stress as the parameters involved in a GBM
require time to reflect regime changes.
In addition to this the model ignores temporary price impacts,
spread-risk and lacks a  -penalty function. It also ignores depth
and breadth and focuses solely on resiliency whose impact, via
the quantity discount parameter, seems difficult to estimate.
∙ Almgren & Chriss Model – The Almgren & Chriss model is
basically a parametric VaR in which the input mean and variance
are constructed to minimise the costs associated with a specific
trading strategy.
While accurate and robust, the model requires parameter inputs











insights as to how some of the inputs, like  should be estimated.
Data requirements are also relatively onerous.
The model does offer a rich price-impact formulation account-
ing for temporary and permanent price impacts. It, however, ac-
counts for the price-risk/liquidity-risk trade-off only indirectly via
the optimal liquidation strategy which is derived to limit costs.
There is no specific  trade-off as  is assumed to be constant
and exogenous. In addition the model only offers a closed-form,
practicable solution if price-impacts are assumed to be linear and
deterministic – this is unrealistic.
In addition much of the variability in the spread is ignored as only
the spread level is accounted for via the “fixed cost” parameter,
. Unlike the Bangia model depth is only partially explored and
breadth is generally ignored.
The model does go a long way in capturing the notion that liquid-
ity risk arises from the variability in the expected proceeds from
liquidation. This comes at the price of a market-wide consensus
view of liquidity and adjustments for times of stress.
∙ Hisata & Yamai Model – The Hisata & Yamai formulation
is largely similar to the preceding model. However since  is
endogenous here, the model more carefully considers the price-
risk trade-off.
The fact that T is selected so that the liquidity cost function
is minimized also greatly simplifies the optimization and, in the
continuous case at least, provides much greater flexibility in spec-
ifying more realistic price-impact formulations. As shown, in this
framework price-impacts can include stochastic coefficients which
are correlated to asset returns. Such alterations greatly influence
the model’s accuracy, especially in times of stress when correla-
tions become more marked.
In general, however, such added accuracy carries with it addi-
tional data burdens and the model becomes cumbersome as it
becomes more complete and realistic.
Once again the model ignores the variability in the spread.
The general impression gleaned from the above comparison is that models
which tend to accurately account for the spread and its variability tend
to do so at the expense of accurate price-impact modelling, while models
which offer a rich quantity-impact framework tend to ignore the risks posed
by the spread. As noted in Chapter 2, a complete liquidity risk model
must account for the variability in the spread, the absolute level of the











and trade-risk. Almost none of the models completely capture all of these
aspects and very few offer adjustments which make their estimates of loss
more conservative during times of stress.
While the L-VaR models generally come closer to the requirements of Section
3.6 as they offer objectively verifiable estimates and are ostensibly more
complete, they also tend to perform badly in describing the market consensus
of liquidity over time. Contrastingly, while the measures offer important
market-wide information pertaining to particular aspects of liquidity, they
do a bad job of integrating all the effects into one impact.
None of the models or measures come close to completely capturing the
needs of a liquidity risk measure, as through the constraints of modelling,
they inevitably ignore some aspect of liquidity risk in favour of another.
The implication is that liquidity risk can only be measured ith an array
of measures. The Bangia model requires a price-impact measure like the
P & S Measure to capture resiliency. Alternatively the OLS models need
to capture breadth and depth and thus must be monitored in conjunction
with the spread and volume traded. The general idea is that a model which
requires much data modelling should be enriched with a measure/model that
is quick and easy to implement as the data requirements should not be too
onerous so as to make overall implementation intractable.
Given the need to consider data requirements, Tables 4.2 and 4.3 summarise
the Inputs, Outputs and parameters associated with each model. TS denotes
“time series” and VaR, the standard parametric VaR defined in Chapter 3.
As can be seen each of the models, require a range of differing inputs which


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The theoretical comparisons of the measures and the earlier chapters on the
constitution of liquidity risk make it clear that the full extent of liquidity
risk cannot be readily captured by any single measure or model. The most
accurate and complete view of liquidity is brought about by investigating
a set of different measures/models simultaneously. This contention arises
naturally from the theoretical discussion.
Although the theoretical discussion highlights many of the models’ quali-
tative strengths and weaknesses, an empirical analysis is still required to
determine which of the set of measures/models is best suited to the man-
agement of liquidity risk. The models’ accuracy and practicability needs to
be tested to determine whether they are useful or not.
The difficulty lies in designing an approach which tests how well the full
spectrum of measures/models perform at capturing the totality of liquidity
risk.
5.1 Data & Methodology
The analysis and testing of the L-VaR models is made easy by the fact
that VaR models make objectively verifiable estimates of future loss. As a











tested to verify their accuracy. Indeed a number of statistical tests (which
will be discussed later) have been designed to validate VaR-type models.
Such tests determine the accuracy of the VaR model’s forecast of future loss
relative to realized portfolio losses. They do not necessarily determine what
aspect of liquidity risk the models capture. However, to the extent that
liquidity-related costs (as noted in Section 3.5) impact on portfolio loss they
do test how accurately the models account for liquidity-related costs.
The measures, however, do not lend themselves to objective testing. In or-
der to assess them, the literature, as noted in Section 4.4, has taken the
general approach of collating different measures over time and then compar-
ing them by studying their overall time series patterns and characteristics.
This is done with a view to assessing how well their behaviour correlates
with periods of known illiquidity. In this way one can assess whether the
measures actually capture information on liquidity at all.
In addition to this, a few papers have studied the correlations between dif-
ferent measures and have undertaken a principle component analyses. The
goal of both analyses is to determine whether different measures capture
different aspects of liquidity risk. Although the idea behind the analysis is
sound, the implementation in the literature has been done rather blindly
with no regard being given to the possible non-stationarity of the data and
the potential for spurious correlations. The analysis which follows corrects
for this oversight, but still suffers from the same problems of subjectivity as
earlier studies.
The measures, being descriptive, are inherently subjective and thus cannot
be properly tested to determine how well they capture liquidity information.
At best all that can be said with current techniques is that a specific measure
seems to capture a specific aspect of liquidity and is sensitive to liquidity
events.
Given this disparity between the L-VaR models and the liquidity measures,
two analyses are conducted: one for the measures and another one for the
VaR models. All the measures and models are, however, computed from
data on the same stocks.
In order to highlight the differences in the measures/models response to
illiquidity, data on 4 different stocks has been gathered. The chosen stocks
represent 4 differing degrees of liquidity from highly liquid to illiquid. So
that the analysis is not artificially biased towards one measure or another,











insights of experienced equity traders into market liquidity guided the selec-
tion of Anglo American Plc (ANG), Pik n Pay Holdings (PIK), Coronation
Management Company (CML) and Seakay Ltd (SKY). In this way the intu-
itive, well-known aspects of liquidity as experienced by market-practitioners
is evident in the selection.
Of the 4 stocks ANG and PIK represent shares which are generally regarded
as more liquid than the other pair, with ANG being more liquid than PIK.
CML and SKY represent illiquid shares with SKY, a newer listing with a
smaller capitalization, being the most illiquid share of the selection. All of
these stocks are listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s (JSE) main
board.
5.1.1 The JSE
The JSE is the world’s 16th largest stock exchange [13] and contains a wide
diversity of liquid and illiquid stocks. Although it is a fully-electronic, order-
based exchange and thus fairly liquid overall, the market remains far from
frictionless. Its operations are subject to the same discontinuities as other
exchanges.
All trades on the exchange go through the standard LOB market operations
(as discussed in Section 2.1) of order routing, execution and clearing and
settlement. Order routing occurs via a broker who is a regulated “mem-
ber” of the exchange while capture and execution occur via JET (Johannes-
burg Equities Trading). All executed trades are settled via STRATE (Share
Transactions Totally Electronic). Orders can take on any number of condi-
tions like fill or kill, execute or eliminate, good till time, good till auction or
good till cancelled [12].
Trade occurs between 08:30 and 18:00 each working day, with opening and
closing auction periods which precede and end trading. The auctions ensure
that prices in the morning and the evening are not too volatile in response
to information which has either been gathered towards the close of the day
or overnight on the previous day. This facilitates fair price formation and
encourages trade but breaches the requirement of a frictionless market that
all trades be executed at one perfectly competitive price.
Like other LOB markets, the entire order book’s depth is visible [12] to
ensure transparency and liquidity. Since there are no market-makers making
firm quotes, however, trade is never guaranteed and many stocks can go a











automated trading on the basis of time and price, while matches are made
in the auctions based on an algorithm. Unlike the frictionless environment
wherein any order size can be traded, the JSE maintains a minimum of
1 share or a multiple of the Normal Market Size (NMS), depending on
the security being traded. All orders also have maximum sizes which vary
according to the characteristics of the stock [12].
Usually trading is continuous but can be stopped by the exchange if the
JSE’s trustees deem that a fair price formation process cannot be guaranteed
or if additional liquidity needs to be gathered in a particular instrument
[12]. Trade has historically only stopped completely due to technical errors
but many illiquid securities have their automated trading interrupted by
auctions at regular intervals. Volatility auctions may also take place if a
security’s price moves beyond a certain limit. These are used to prevent
abnormal spikes in prices.
Although every effort is made by the exchange’s systems to ensure smooth
and efficient price formation, the totality of the above trade restrictions
render prices liable to discrete jumps. These tend to occur around auctions
and during trade halts, when order flow is restricted. The effect of this is
that liquidity concerns become especially important during these times.
As with all large international markets, traders face standard liquidity issues
like the Bid-Ask spread, price risk (which vary with the order conditions),
opportunity costs and price impacts. Price impacts are a particular problem
with smaller counters.
Overall while the market is well-known for being resilient (in that it adjusts
to order imbalances quickly and prices new information fast), the fact that
it is highly concentrated renders traders open to significant liquidity risks.
Indeed the top 5 counters account for nearly 65% of the total exchange’s
market capitalization. Moreover, as highlighted in Section 3.2, the fact that
the exchange is fairly open to foreign investors and integrated with overseas
markets (particularly the London Stock Exchange) in terms of access to data
and technology, means that price impacts change quickly and often and that
liquidity becomes a critical issue in times of stress.
As noted in Section 3.4, models which ignore liquidity costs and market
frictions can be prone to large errors. Risk models applied to the JSE, of












As a sophisticated and fully-electronic order-based exchange, transaction
data on the JSE is, within limits, not entirely difficult to find. Generally
three large data providers dominate the financial services industry: INET
Bridge, Reuters and Bloomberg. All three are widely used and trusted by
market practitioners with the provision of accurate historical and real-time
data on a range of market variables.
Measures Data
Given that the measures are mainly analysed by studying their time trends,
an effort was made to obtain the longest time series of data possible. Since
many of the measures, like the Amihud ratio and the Pastor & Stambaugh
measure, use daily data in their computation and since their is a difficulty
in finding meaningfully long-term financial data at frequencies higher than
a day, daily data was preferred.
Daily data was sourced directly from INET Bridge over the period April 1994
to September 2009. This covers the bulk of the post-apartheid economy and
captures the major financial events in the JSE’s history. Where a stock like
SKY or CML did not exist as far back as that, data only covering their
history was extracted.
All data excludes non-trade days, mis-pricing and data errors. Moreover
where prices could not be sourced for successive days (due to data storage
issues for example back in 1994), the series was treated as a contiguous data
set. This had no effect on the analysis as all comparable data suffered from
the same problem on the same day.
For the measures daily data on the following market variables was sourced
for each stock: the quoted market close price, the quoted daily bid and offer
1, the daily trade volume and value, the market capitalization and the return
of the FTSE/JSE All Share index (the market index).
The above market variables were then used to create the following measures:
the Bid-Ask spread, the traded Volume, Turnover and their scaled counter-
parts (scaled by market capitalization), the Amihud ratio and the P & S
1The day’s close, bid and offer prices represent the prices quoted for the last trade of
that day prior to the closing auction, these are used widely in South Africa for modelling











measure. The scaled volume and turnover variables were used to prevent
the effect of an escalating company size over time from biasing the results.
Since both the Amihud ratio and the P & S measure use daily data to create
a monthly measure, all the variables were aggregated over each month to
create a monthly time series for comparability.
L-VAR Models Data
The selection of data for the estimation and testing of the L-VAR models
was beset by two problems: firstly acquiring a rich enough frequency so that
all the models could be simultaneously tested and accurately implemented
and secondly ensuring that the data set covered a period long enough to
ensure that the results are not weak.
The implementation of the models require the estimation of parameters
which are not directly observable and depend crucially on the market micro-
structure. For this reason high-frequency tick data was needed as daily or
other data would mask the micro-structure effects of price-impacts, etc. The
problem is choosing a frequency that mitigated the difficulties mentioned
earlier.
Generally tick data is extremely difficult to source over long time periods as
market practitioners do not commonly make use of it. Moreover at extremely
high frequencies (say every 1 minute or so), variables may not be changeable
enough to facilitate proper parameter estimation – for instance if a stock
only trades every 5 minutes, which is common for the illiquid stocks, then
its bid-ask spread will be necessarily zero for much of the estimation period.
This would invalidate its usefulness as a liquidity variable.
In order to balance these needs, half-hour data for a period as long as could
be reasonably sourced was used for all 4 stocks. A data set of 366 trade
points, covering the period 6 May 2009 to 8 September 2009 (125 days) was
acquired from Bloombergs, compromising the following variables: Tp, the
trade price, being the closest preceding transaction price, and its associated














The analysis of the measures begins in much the same as way as previous
papers. Firstly an analysis is conducted into the significant periods of known
illiquidity on the JSE. The measures are then analysed against this to test
how well they hint at such events and whether their behaviour is synchro-
nised with the periods of illiquidity. This helps shed light on whether the
measures capture liquidity information at all.
Secondly the correlations between the measures are examined. The view
put forward in the literature is that if two measures are highly positively
correlated then it is likely that they capture the same aspect of liquidity
risk. Unfortunately with time series data such inferences are not completely
water-tight as financial time series are often non-stationary, meaning that
the correlation coefficient between two variables could merely be measuring
the mutual time drift between them and not the co-variation based on similar
reactions to new information.
Moreover the presence of non-stationarity implies that both standard corre-
lation analysis and the bulk of time series modelling techniques like spectral
analysis, etc. cannot be used. This complicates the analysis of multiple time
series. Generally the literature argues in favour of transforming the original
time series (by differencing or other techniques) until it is stationary and
then conducting an analysis on this transformed series. Alternatively tests
of co-integration can be used to examine the long-term relationship between
non-stationary variables.
In order to correct for the problem of spurious correlation in the analysis,
all the time series were tested for stationarity using the standard Dickey-
Fuller unit root test in Eviews. The test was conducted at various lags
of autocorrelation and included a constant and drift term. At least in this
way the analysis can be appropriately qualified. Non-stationary time series
were also appropriately differenced until they were stationary, the resultant
differenced series were then subjected to a further correlation analysis.
A co-integration approach was not favoured as tests for co-integration merely
indicate whether two series are related in some long-term relationship, not
whether they co-move as suggested when two variables capture the same in-












Finally in order to add some concreteness to the results of the correlation
analysis, the measures were subjected to a principle component factor anal-
ysis. Factor analysis is a statistical analysis technique that tries to explain
the observed variation in a set of variables by extracting factors that account
for the linear-relationship between the variables. Factor analysis attempts
at explaining the co-variation between variables as a function of the factors
with which they are highly correlated. In this way it helps determine the
extent to which different variables capture similar information.
The underlying assumptions of factor analysis are much less rigid than that
of correlation or time series analysis. Factor analysis only requires lim-
ited homoscedasticity and stationarity assumptions and this is not essential.
Moreover variables need not follow any pre-specified distribution for the
results to be significant, although multi-variate normality is required for
hypothesis testing. The crucial assumption is that the variables are not in-
dependent but bear at least some linear relationship to one another. Mild
multi-collinearity also does not bias the results but can raise the standard er-
rors of the factor loadings, making their interpretation difficult. Importantly
factor interpretation must be based on theory and cannot be subjectively
inferred from the data set itself. All of the above makes factor analysis ideal
for the task of uncovering to what extent different liquidity variables capture
similar information on different aspects of liquidity.
Factor analysis was conducted in Statistica using the principle components
methodology for extracting variance. With this technique a factor is ex-
tracted based on its ability to explain the total variation in the original data
set. Successive factors are then extracted based on their ability to explain
the remaining variability in the data set. In this way successive factors are
uncorrelated, making their interpretation easier. Varimax rotation was also
undertaken to facilitate interpretation.
VaR Models
The L-VaR models are tested by comparing the loss forecasts of each model
against one another and against standard, well-known VaR regimes. In order
to add objectivity to the model comparisons, however, all of the models were
backtested against the realized losses of a simulated trading strategy which
specifically accounts for liquidity-related costs. This is crucially different to
previous papers which merely compared the modelling approaches and did
not test forecast accuracy.











ferent, 99% Value-at-Risk models were implemented over the period 7 May
2009 to 8 September 2009. A 99% confidence level was chosen so as to high-
light the effects of ignoring liquidity-related risks at extreme levels of loss.
As argued earlier, at these extreme levels of market stress liquidity plays a
more pivotal role.
The rolling forecast of future loss across the different VaR models was back-
tested against profits and losses from a simulated trading strategy involving
the delta hedging of a portfolio that is long a position in the relevant share,
short a vanilla call option on the same and long an amount of cash. Al-
though half-hour profit and losses from realized trading strategies would be
the most ideal for backtesting, these are extremely difficult to acquire for two
reasons. Firstly in reality market-practitioners do not value their portfolios
every half-hour. Secondly in order to limit transaction costs, practitioners
do not trade every half-hour, nor do they aim for delta neutrality every
half-hour. Traders prefer to re-balance their portfolios on delta daily and
to hedge the gamma of the position for further protection. This means that
trades only generally occur a few times a day.
Delta-hedging, however, does provide a natural and easy-to-understand se-
quence of trades upon which one can test VaR models. The hedging strategy
is a very common exercise amongst traders and frequent hedging has immi-
nent liquidity consequences, even if these are only in the form of exogenous
trading costs. Moreover testing how well VaR models perform in forecast-
ing the loss arising from such a trading strategy is interesting in its own
right. Assessing how well incorporating liquidity-related costs into this fore-
cast and, by extension, understanding to what extent liquidity influences
the ability to hedge provides further interesting information.
The simulated trading strategy is constructed by assuming that a trader
holds 6,000 units of a particular share, be it ANG, PIK, CML or SKY at
time t0 which corresponds to 09:00 on 6 May 2009. At this time the trader
is short 6000/Δ2 call options, all with the same strike price, a time to expiry
of 0.34 years and a volatility of 20%. The strike price is set differently for
each share so as to ensure that the options have non-zero value at t0. The
option contracts are assumed to be written on one share. Thus the net
effect of being long 6,000 shares and short 6000/Δ call options is that if
the share price falls by x% then 6000x/100 would be the loss in the share
position. This would be exactly offset by the increase in the option value of
(60000/Δ)Δx%.
In this way as the stock price changes (based on the half-hour transaction











price) so does the delta of the option, meaning that the trader must re-
balance his position to restore delta neutrality. Since the strategy aims
at simulating actual trading conditions, one cannot assume an unlimited
trade size at each hour, nor can one assume that the trader who aims at
delta-neutrality can trade unlimitedly at the same price. These are the
fundamental assumptions which undermine VaR. In order to account for
this, the following rules are included in the trading strategy: a trade “build-
up” rule and a “price impact” rule.
The trade “build-up” rule operates as follows: if the amount required for
trade at the ith time step, Qi, is positive and there has been no trade
executed at that half-hour or offered, so Tp = 0 and Ap = 0 then no trade
occurs and the amount which would have been traded will be rolled forward
to ti+1, at which time both the “trade backlog” from the previous time step
and the amount necessary to restore Delta neutrality is traded. The same
occurs if the amount required for trade is negative and both Tp = 0 and
Bp = 0. This is done to enforce the idea that trades build-up in times of
illiquidity making further trading more difficult and more costly.
The “price impact” rule exists so as to counter the unrealistic assumption
that trade can occur without moving the price. It captures the endogenous
component of liquidity risk and operates as follows: in a buy transaction,
that is Qi > 0, if the amount to be bought is lower than Tv then it is as-
sumed that the entire transaction goes through at the associated price Tp.
This makes the cost of the purchase Qi ∗ Tp. If, however, the opposite is
true than, we assume that part of the transaction, namely Qi−Tv is traded
at Tp, with the balance traded at gradually worsening prices. First if the
balance can be captured by the ask size Av then it is assumed that trade
occurs at Ap. If, however, the combined amount Av+Tv is still smaller than
Qi then it is assumed that the remainder is traded at Ap ∗ k, where k is a
penalty price-impact factor which increases in the remaining trade size. A
similar procedure occurs for sales. Figure 5.1 illustrates the trading strategy.
Finally in order to account for the exogenous costs associated with trading
in South Africa, all trades are charged at the standard rates charged by
publicly available brokerages. The brokerage costs go through the portfolios
cash account and thus stock need not be sold to meet it. The costs include
a brokerage equal to 0.4% of the transaction value subject to a minimum of
R120, STRATE costs equal to 0.05% of the value traded with a minimum
charge of R10.92 for transactions up to R200 000 and a maximum charge of
R54.59 for transactions exceeding R1m. An investor protection levy (IPL)
is also incurred at 0.0002% of the value traded, VAT is charged at 14% on
























Securities Transfer Tax - purchases only 0.25%
Investor Protection Levy 0.0002%
STRATE Settlement Costs 0.005459%
Minimum 10.92
Maximum if deal > R1m 54.59
VAT - on above only 14%
Table 5.1: Brokerage Costs
of all purchases is also deducted. The details are shown in Table 5.1.
The aim of the trading strategy is to create a series of realized profits and
losses for the backtesting of the forecasted VaR numbers. Although back-
testing of the VaR models has not been undertaken in the literature, it
should be remembered that a simulated trading strategy has its drawbacks
and that the first prize for such testing is realized trade data. The problems
with the simulated strategy are two-fold.
Firstly estimating the potential price impact when there is insufficient mar-
ket depth at a particular time is not foolproof. The approach taken here
is that amounts in excess of that bid or offered are traded at prices whose
discounts are proportional to the excess traded. Since this discount is esti-
mated from the data at hand and thus moves, it is unlikely that the resultant
profits/losses will reflect the experience of traders exactly. All that can be
hoped for is a reasonable margin of error.
Secondly, the trading strategy is based on half-hourly delta-hedging. Since
at least half of the stocks considered are illiquid, Tp, the price upon which
the portfolio’ delta is based, does not exist at every half-hour. This is since
the stocks do no trade at every half-hour. The effect is that for these illiquid
stocks, delta stays the same, meaning that the amount required for trade
at each time step is necessarily less. Since the mark-to-market price hardly
moves, the risk of the portfolio being delta non-neutral for a particular price
change is minimal. The impact is that the illiquid stocks tend to trade less
and in smaller quantities than the more liquid stocks. This makes the effect
of rampant illiquidity on VaR accuracy less transparent.
Fortunately the flaws of the strategy are mimicked across all the stocks,
meaning that the trading strategy is not a control variable. Any discrepan-
cies between the VaR models must thus be accounted for by the differences











is that without realized data, the analysis cannot be used to account for the
behaviour of the models in real-life application.
In total 13 different VaR models – including 8 different L-VaR models are
applied to the half-hour tick data and used to calculate a 99% half-hour
forecast of future loss based solely on the long stock position. The VaR
models applied and the method of application are discussed briefly below:
1. Parametric VaR
A standard parametric VaR, based on Normal distribution assump-
tions, as in Section 3.11, is calculated as a benchmark for comparing
the other VaR models. This is the most widely used formulation of
VaR and thus showcasing it is important. The inputs to 3.11 are esti-
mated with maximum likelihood methods based on half-hour returns.
In order to highlight the divergence in loss estimates when VaR is
based on different mark-to-market regimes, a parametric VaR is cal-
culated based on Tp, Ap, Bp and the mid-price, Mp. These are in turn
compared to realized portfolio profits and losses when the portfolio is
marked-to-market at each of the trade, ask, bid or mid-prices.
The parametric VaR is deliberately not based on historical portfolio
returns but rather pure price returns so as to highlight its differences
with the Historical VaR. Using portfolio returns as an input remains
a valid modelling choice, however.
2. Parametric EWMA VaR
A parametric VaR is applied wherein the estimate of return volatility
is based on an EWMA regime with  = 94%. This figure was selected
as it is the choice of RiskMetricsTM when they initially published the
methodology [73].
Although the parametric VaR also uses a rolling estimate of  and 
as an input, the estimate for  does not update in a way that down-
weights old information relative to new.
3. Parametric GARCH VaR
Similar to the EWMA VaR, a GARCH(1,1) methodology was applied
to adjust the estimate of  in the parametric VaR. The parameters












A historical VaR is applied using Excel’s built-in Percentile function.
The inputs are the confidence level and a rolling return window of
realized portfolio returns.
5. Monte Carlo VaR
In order to complete the analysis of the standard VaR methodologies,
a Monte Carlo VaR is calculated. Using 10 000 simulations of returns,
a simulated return distribution is created. The VaR is calculated from
this simulated distribution using Excel’s percentile function. The VBA
code for the simulation is presented in Appendix D.
The returns are generated with a Geometric Brownian motion SDE.
6. Bangia L-VaR
The standard Bangia model, as specified in 4.8, is applied to the data
set. Preference was given to this model over the adjusted Bangia model
so as to highlight the original intent of the model.
As with the parametric VaR,  and , were estimated using a rolling
return window based on price returns. The relative spread parameters
were estimated in the same way, with the critical value, ̃, estimated
using Excel’s percentile function. This is in keeping with the discussion
in Section 4.5.
In order to account for the possibility of fat tails,  was estimated us-
ing the empirical kurtosis, , and  = 0.4. Although strictly speaking,
 must be estimated by regressing the results of the historical VaR
against the specification in 4.8, it was felt that using the original esti-
mate provided by Bangia for a 99% VaR would be satisfactory as the
VaR estimate seems quite robust to changes in this parameter.
7. Heude and Van Wynendaele L-VaR
The Heude and Wynendaele model that is not adjusted to the spread is
applied in order to arrive at a liquidity-adjusted estimate of loss. The
model as specified in 4.18 is applied, without the quantity-adjustment.
The quantity-adjustment was ignored as data on the 5 best order book
limits is not readily available, making its application intractable.
8. Angelidis and Benos L-VaR
The Angelidis and Benos L-VaR model is applied by estimating the
parameters in 4.20 and 4.21 and then using them as inputs into the











The input set (, , ) is estimated by regressing the half-hourly price
change Pt − Pt−1 on traded volume and the trade sign indicator, Xt.
9. Al Janabi L-VaR
The Al Janabi model is relatively uncomplicated to implement as it
essentially involves scaling the standard parametric VaR by a factor
that represents the weighted-time to liquidation, t. The resultant VaR
equation is specified in 4.29.
As stated earlier this input is not commonly available as most traders
do not generally have a specified time by which they expect all of their
holdings to be liquidated. However, in the case of delta-hedging this
is made easier as by the time an option expires or is exercised, the
corresponding stock holdings need to be sold.
10. Shamroukh L-VaR
The Shamroukh model also merely involves a scaling of the standard
parametric VaR equation. The specification in 4.36 is implemented.
11. Berkowitz L-VaR
The Berkowitz model is implemented by finding an estimate for 
using the regression form in 4.41. This is then used in the calculation
a portfolio mean and variance as specified in 4.42 and 4.43.
In this way the underlying price-change assumption of Bertsimas and
Lo is transported directly into a parametric VaR framework. This
methodology is much less computationally intensive and arguably just
as accurate as forecasting the entire one-step ahead return distribution
with the inversion formula for characteristic functions.
12. Almgren & Chriss L-VaR
The Almgren and Chriss model is implemented by assuming linear
permanent and temporary price impact functions, as specified in 4.57.
This requires the estimation of the following parameters: (, , ").
Since " represents the fixed costs associated with trading, it is esti-
mated as the sum of the relative spread and the average historical cost
of trade like brokerage, etc.  and  are however, estimated from the
following regression equation:














Estimating price impacts, even from a simple regression equation as
above is extremely difficult, particularly for illiquid stocks. Generally
since illiquid stocks trade infrequently their price and volume series
remain zero for a long period, implying that when a trade actually
does go through, the impacts associated with it tend to be extremely
large. The effect of this is that the expected costs of liquidation in
4.55 are large and the resulting VaR estimate is unrealistic.
The unusually high volatility of price impacts makes it necessary to
assess the parameter estimates for reasonability. Estimating these pa-
rameters requires a mixture of market experience and an accurate
estimation procedure. The fact that the literature provides so little
guidance regarding their estimation further complicates this task.
Despite this, the parameter estimates were made more reasonable by
analysing the regression results and then replacing unusually large
outputs by the average of the preceding series. In this way the series
was normalized relative to its history.
13. Hisata & Yamai Model
The Hisata & Yamai model, at least in its continuous-time form, pro-
vides a much more elegant and easy-to-implement L-VaR formulation
than the Almgren & Chriss counterpart. The model is implemented
with the same price-impact parameters as the preceding model and
the specification in 4.78.
Significantly if  ≈ 0 then the L-VaR estimate here is also close to 0.
This highlights the sensitivity of both the Almgren & Chriss and this
formulation to price-impact estimates.
Of the 18 VaR models discussed initially in Chapter 4, only 13 were imple-
mented and while the above list covers the bulk of VaR methodologies, a
mention must be made of the VaR models which were not applied.
From the standard VaR models, only the extreme value theory and the
Kernel-estimator VaR models were not applied. These were not tested pri-
marily because they are extremely computationally intensive. Both of these
methodologies require fairly complicated transformations and have a host
of additions and adjustments. They are a separate research avenue in their
own right. Although it would be interesting to determine if adjusting for
extreme tail-events eliminates the need for liquidity adjustments, the theory
and application of these models falls beyond the scope of this thesis.
Only the Ohsawa-Muranaga VaR model and the Jarrow-Subramanian mod-











Muranaga formulation is ignored, as the model has no robust theoretical
basis for its distributional adjustments. Its adjustments seem ad hoc and
inconsistent with the development put forth in other papers. Moreover, as
the model depends on a Monte Carlo simulation of returns, and since such a
VaR is already implemented, its implementation seemed redundant as it is
doubtful that the Ohsawa model would yield interesting results. The same
holds for the Jarrow-Subramanian model, since the other optimal liquidation
strategy models are more robust and extensive than it; its implementation
seemed unnecessary.
Although for completeness, all the models discussed should be implemented,
the goal of this thesis is to discuss and test the practical management of
liquidity risk. If a model thus fails to be easy-to-implement or seems to
mimic another model, then there seems little sense in implementing it.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Measures Analysis
As specified the measures are analysed primarily by investigating how sen-
sitive they are to known periods of market-wide illiquidity. In this regard,
their analysis begins with a brief investigation into the JSE’s important
illiquidity episodes.
Figure 5.2 shows the daily cumulative growth in the FTSE/JSE All Share
Index over the period April 1994 to September 2009. As can be seen the
market has undergone a general upward trend spurred on by growing com-
pany earnings and positive economic growth which has been interrupted by
major downward spells driven by crises.
Table 5.2 which follows details the events surrounding each of the major
market crises and gives a brief account of their triggers and the associated
maximal loss. As noted, many of the crises, with the exception of E, were
caused by a sudden loss of investor confidence and subsequent flight from
risky assets. Most of the bear markets were characterized by precipitous and
sudden downfalls. This is indicative of the knock-on sale effect discussed in
Section 3.2: downturns are triggered by unexpected events which promote
illiquidity and exaggerate the price impacts of stock sales. Such periods are
fertile ground for the testing of liquidity measures.











Key Market Event Reason for Crash Market Loss
A 1997 Asian Fi-
nancial Crises
Run on Thai Bhat from imminent bankruptcy led to a contagion
effect that saw many of the Asian developed countries experienc-
ing large currency shocks and devaluing asset prices. The crises
resulted in large scale losses and loss of confidence in developed






Asian crises led to wholescale contraction in commodity prices
and a severe disinvestment in Emerging Markets. Countries, like
Russia, which were heavily commodity driven were thus severely
hit. This coupled with a political crises, unstable exchange rate
policy and mounting debt burdens led to the country defaulting
on some of its debt. The knock-on effect of the crises was felt
primarily by LTCM which had bet heavily on Russian spreads
narrowing further. LTCM’s collapse and the subsequent FED bail-




Speculative bubble driven on primarily by the market’s irrational
belief that the internet’s offering of new technology would lead
to unending new growth. Many investors invested in technology
firms on the blind belief that they could turn future profits and





Following attacks in New York, most large exchanges closed. The
US FED also provided additional liquidity to banks to ensure fi-
nancial stability. Investors wary of wide-scale insurance losses fled




An outbreak of accounting scandals and the knock-on effect of the
Internet bubble led to a prolonged correction in asset valuations
and a cyclical bear market on all global exchanges. Not really a




Growing awareness that the credit cycle had peaked and increased
market nervousness around the impressive boom in commodity
prices led to increased volatility. The collapse of 2 of Bear Sterns




Unprecedented liquidity window offered by ECB to banks fol-
lowing mortgage security collapse signals start of credit crunch.
Widespread illiquidity leads to many funds collapsing. The high
profile collapse and bankruptcy of Bear Sterns makes it clear that




As markets adjust to scope of the crises and a slight recovery is
evident, news of Lehmans Brothers collapse and the collapse of
other large-scale US insurers sends markets reeling.
-46%











Figure 5.2: FTSE/JSE All Share Index
volumes and turnovers would initially rise as selling increases but would then
drop sharply as investors do not return to risky assets. Bid-Ask spreads
should widen as uncertainty and asymmetric information problems gather
pace, encouraging investors to demand more to meet the other side of a
trade. Volume-related return reversals should also spike upwards as in a
shallow market smaller trades encounter larger price impacts. This implies
that both the Amihud ratio and the P&S measure should show upward and
downward trends respectively.
The graphs which follow represent the monthly level series of the liquidity
measures considered across all the 4 stocks chosen. As expected volume,
value and turnover show relatively similar trends over time, moving almost
in sync over the period charted. The same is evident for the Amihud ratio
and P&S Measure which show almost exactly opposing troughs and peaks.
Although changes in a measure for a single counter can be explained by both
stock specific corporate actions and economy-wide events, it seems safe to
infer that if a single measure shows the same behaviour across all stocks at












The graphs for the most liquid share, AGL, show a strikingly coordinated
response to periods of illiquidity. As can be seen in Figures 5.3 to 5.5,
episodes of illiquidity are borne out nicely in the local minima and maxima
of the trading activity measures. Generally while liquidity in the share has
increased over time, widespread liquidity crises have affected the general
trading activity of the shares. While the share has other liquidity turning
points which cannot be explained by market-wide liquidity events, the coor-
dinated response of the variables makes it clear that they do shed light on
liquidity, even if this information is only made available after the fact.
Figure 5.3: AGL Liquidity Measures - Trading Activity Variables
Overall spikes in the trading activity measures are not accompanied by a
severe widening of the spread, as shown in Figure 5.4. In general the re-
lationship seems to be lagged, which is somewhat expected – the spread
is a pre-trade measure while volume is post-trade. If prices drive ex post
volumes then it seems reasonable to conclude that spreads should widen in
response to a liquidity event prior to falling volumes.
Finally, as shown in Figure 5.5, volume-related return reversals tend to be
sudden and tend to reverse fairly quickly. This is in keeping with the ear-
lier discussion regarding the speed with which a liquidity crises can take











series. This is further evidence that price impacts tend to be severely change-
able. Fortunately return-reversals tend to increase dramatically almost at
the same time as a crises indicating that they could be useful predictive
measures. Since they are also stationary (as discussed later) they could be
subject to interesting predictive time series analysis. Generally trends in the
one variable are more noticeable than trends in the other, implying that it
is useful to monitor both of the measures in order to keep track of a stock’s
market liquidity.
As is made more evident by Figure 5.6, the relationship between stock
turnover and the other measures like volume can be close but is subject
to some severe and interesting interruptions. This is evident for all the two
large and liquid stocks AGL and PIK. Possibly – unless the liquidity con-
ditions are severe – since these are more liquid and have more shares in
issue, a large change in value or volume traded need not influence the stock
turnover too much.
Once more as for AGL, the relationship between the B/A-spread and volume
seems slightly lagged and negative. Interestingly the Amihud ratio for PIK,
although seemingly highly flat as shown in Figure 5.8, is subject to a great











deal of volatility. Fluctuations in this measure are well coordinated with
that of the P&S Measure and with known liquidity crises, although there
are turning points which seem largely unrelated to economy-wide events.
The graphs which follow show the measures for the 2 less liquid shares: CML
and SKY.
As can be seen, for both of these shares the B/A-spread seems to play a
more pivotal role in the overall liquidity of the stock than for PIK and
AGL. Moreover the negative relationship between volume and the spread
seems stronger and more marked.
Unfortunately the measures for these shares seem highly variable and are
subject to large up and down swings from their mean. This is largely ex-
pected – as these shares trade so infrequently, any trade should have larger
impacts than expected. This implies that for illiquid shares, none of the
measures can be trusted as a source of pending illiquidity. Illiquidity events
affect these stocks too often to gauge whether or not there are drastic shifts
in their state. As these are also fairly new stocks, a longer history may shed
more light on the behaviour of the measures in this case.











Interestingly volume-related return reversals seem to be less variable than
for the liquid shares. This is somewhat unexpected as illiquid stocks should
have larger potential price reversals. However since these shares do not trade
that often, the Amihud and P&S Measure may continue being stable for a
long time until a new trade comes through. The fact that these measures
do not indicate potential trade impacts but rather realized ones can be seen
as a drawback for these measures.
Tables 5.3 to 5.6 show the descriptive statistics for the measures considered.
Generally it is expected that, other things equal, the B/A-spread for the
most liquid share be lower than that for the least liquid share. Moreover
trading activity measures should decrease with greater illiquidity and vice
versa with the return-reversal measures.
The results are different however. Over the data considered the mean spread
for the more liquid shares, AGL and PIK, is significantly higher than that
of the illiquid shares. It is also more variable. Although volume seems to
decline with illiquidity, this relationship does not seem to be guaranteed as
the volume for SKY is higher than that of CML. The same can be said
of share turnover. Indeed value traded and the return-reversal measures











seem to be the only variables which increase and decrease as expected by
theory. The variability of these measures also seems to be higher for the
illiquid shares, reflecting the greater impact of any single trade on the stock’s
liquidity when the market is shallow.
The anomalous behaviour of the spread and volume cannot easily be ex-
plained. It could be caused by stock-specific events which are unrelated to
liquidity. AGL for example could simply have had more sellers than buy-
ers over the period considered, implying that liquidity for the stock may
not be symmetric. Interestingly the above results remain true even when
the descriptive statistics are compared across stocks over exactly the same
time period. This implies that the behaviour is not sensitive to changes in
regime and is endemic to the unique features of the market for each stock
considered.
Although the reasons for the deviations from what is expected may be di-
verse, the effect does highlight the severe drawbacks in relying solely on
one measure for the risk management of liquidity. At times expectations
may not be met. A stock may, for example, have a very tight spread and
yet incur deep price impacts which could cost a trader dearly. The fact











that the important return-reversal measures, which bear on the most sig-
nificant component of liquidity risk, endogenous risk, follow expectations is
noteworthy.
As discussed earlier, undertaking a correlation analysis on non-stationary
data presents several problems, the principle of which is that the conclu-
sions drawn from the analysis is not trustworthy. In order to account for
this potential problem all time series were tested for stationarity using the
widely-used Dickey-Fuller test. The results of the test are presented in Ta-
bles 5.7 and 5.8 together with the test’s critical values. As is visible, all of
the series are stationary after 1st-differencing and the bulk of them are level
stationary.
Armed with the above information and adequately differenced time series,
the results of the correlation analysis in Table 5.9 can be safely interpreted.
Correlations which are marked are significant with p-values under 0.5%.
The results are not overwhelmingly surprising. They indicate that, generally,
the trading-activity measures tend to be closely positively correlated. As
supported by the long-term graphs, these measures seem to form a natural











Figure 5.9: PIK Liquidity Measures - Price Impact Variables
AGL Bid-Ask Spread Volume Turnover (1000s) Value (Rm) Amihud Ratio  P & S Measure
Mean 48.10 2,593,514 1.83 51,267,569 0.00000114% 0.00000005%
Standard Error 2.08 104,892 0.08 3,413,892 0.00000008% 0.00000004%
Median 44.67 2,546,783 1.72 39,853,717 0.00000082% 0.00000001%
Mode 22.25 – – – – –
Standard Deviation 25.07 1,263,072 0.91 41,108,700 0.00000098% 0.00000047%
Sample Variance 628.64 1.60E+12 0.82 1.69E+15 0.00000000% 0.00000000%
Kurtosis 1.70 2 2.77 0 11.83 43.66
Skewness 1.20 1 1.35 1 3.07 5.13
Range 129.63 7,353,622 5.34 179,819,375 0.00000678% 0.00000510%
Minimum 15.75 430,424 0.46 2,033,471 0.00000035% -0.00000088%
Maximum 145.38 7,784,045 5.80 181,852,846 0.00000713% 0.00000421%
Sum 6,974.17 376,059,517 265.34 7,433,797,519 0.00016505% 0.00000790%
Count 145.00 145 145.00 145 145.00 145.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 4.12 207,328 0.15 6,747,813 0.00000016% 0.00000008%











Figure 5.10: CML Liquidity Measures - Trading Activity Variables
PIK Bid-Ask Spread Volume Turnover (1000s) Value (Rm) Amihud Ratio  P & S Measure
Mean 18.97 639,183 14.19 1,440,822 0.00002172% -0.00000006%
Standard Error 0.70 27,738 0.50 103,611 0.00000608% 0.00000013%
Median 17.17 613,188 13.40 930,059 0.00000346% -0.00000005%
Mode 10.50 – – – – –
Standard Deviation 8.40 334,014 5.97 1,247,644 0.00007324% 0.00000151%
Sample Variance 70.63 1.12E+11 35.70 1.56E+12 0.00000000% 0.00000000%
Kurtosis 2.64 0 0.32 -0 74.06 12.84
Skewness 1.35 0 0.65 1 7.84 -1.15
Range 47.24 1,764,614 33.56 5,296,154 0.00076104% 0.00001429%
Minimum 7.09 29,668 1.90 26,308 0.00000077% -0.00000803%
Maximum 54.33 1,794,282 35.45 5,322,463 0.00076181% 0.00000626%
Sum 2,751.33 92,681,472 2,058.04 208,919,204 0.00314993% -0.00000898%
Count 145.00 145 145.00 145 145.00 145.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 1.38 54,827 0.98 204,795 0.00001202% 0.00000025%











Figure 5.11: CML Liquidity Measures - B/A Spread & Scaled Volume
CML Bid-Ask Spread Volume Turnover (1000s) Value (Rm) Amihud Ratio  P & S Measure
Mean 11.44 382,095 1.08 217,859 0.00005663% -0.00000052%
Standard Error 0.39 38,837 0.11 27,942 0.00001179% 0.00000022%
Median 10.96 278,696 0.74 148,629 0.00002224% -0.00000003%
Mode 10.81 – – – – –
Standard Deviation 3.41 338,571 0.96 243,597 0.00010282% 0.00000189%
Sample Variance 11.64 1.15E+11 0.92 5.93E+10 0.00000000% 0.00000000%
Kurtosis 0.43 6 5.75 13 10.31 9.68
Skewness 0.58 2 2.27 3 3.24 -2.31
Range 15.31 1,706,285 4.85 1,467,616 0.00053431% 0.00001385%
Minimum 4.74 65,320 0.17 26,025 0.00000261% -0.00001030%
Maximum 20.05 1,771,605 5.02 1,493,640 0.00053692% 0.00000354%
Sum 869.78 29,039,191 82.06 16,557,251 0.00430394% -0.00003948%
Count 76.00 76 76.00 76 76.00 76.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 0.78 77,367 0.22 55,664 0.00002349% 0.00000043%











Figure 5.12: CML Liquidity Measures - Price Impact Variables
SKY Bid-Ask Spread Volume Turnover (1000s) Value (Rm) Amihud Ratio  P & S Measure
Mean 6.90 868,210 1.80 144,933 0.00010287% -0.00000027%
Standard Error 0.75 178,442 0.37 35,261 0.00003534% 0.00000022%
Median 6.25 598,848 1.24 80,779 0.00002229% -0.00000008%
Mode – – – – – –
Standard Deviation 3.82 909,881 1.90 179,797 0.00018019% 0.00000110%
Sample Variance 14.59 8.28E+11 3.63 3.23E+10 0.00000000% 0.00000000%
Kurtosis 5.57 12 11.80 11 7.57 2.20
Skewness 2.28 3 3.02 3 2.72 -1.21
Range 16.30 4,553,613 9.54 878,776 0.00076730% 0.00000507%
Minimum 2.35 73,614 0.15 4,553 0.00000182% -0.00000321%
Maximum 18.65 4,627,227 9.69 883,329 0.00076912% 0.00000187%
Sum 179.46 22,573,465 46.89 3,768,259 0.00267454% -0.00000689%
Count 26.00 26 26.00 26 26.00 26.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 1.54 367,509 0.77 72,621 0.00007278% 0.00000044%











Figure 5.13: SKY Liquidity Measures - Trading Activity Variables
Testing Lags 4 lags 4 lags 2 lags 1 lag
ADF Test Statistic AGL PIK CML SKY
P&S Measure -2.836679 -4.547355 -5.880174 -4.68718
Amihud Ratio -6.649882 -9.535022 -5.195272 -2.194317
Scaled Volume -3.982878 -3.230956 -5.552362 -3.468753
Value -2.333942 -3.058404 -4.569437 -3.273936
Bid/Ask Spread -0.8812 -3.59896 -5.244469 -3.030987
Scaled Value -2.333942 -3.058404 -4.569437 -3.273936
Turnover -3.920962 -3.595455 -5.562699 -3.456711
Volume -3.982878 -3.230956 -5.552362 -3.468753
1% Critical Value -4.0268
5% Critical Value -3.4428
10% Critical Value -3.1458
Table 5.7: Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test Results
ADF Test Statistic AGL PIK CML SKY
ADF Test Statistic AGL PIK CML SKY
P&S Measure 1st Difference Level Level Level
Amihud Ratio Level Level Level 1st Difference
Scaled Volume Level Level Level Level
Value 1st Difference 1st Difference Level Level
Bid/Ask Spread 1st Difference Level Level 1st Difference
Scaled Value 1st Difference 1st Difference Level Level
Turnover Level Level Level Level
Volume Level Level Level Level











AGL dP&S dValue dBidAsk dScalVal Volume Turnover Amihud ScalVol
dP&SMeasure 1 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03
dValue -0.01 1 -0.2 1 0.26 0.26 -0.07 0.26
dBidAsk -0.03 -0.2 1 -0.2 -0.07 -0.08 0.05 -0.07
dScalVal -0.01 1 -0.2 1 0.26 0.26 -0.07 0.26
Volume 0.03 0.26 -0.07 0.26 1 0.98 -0.55 1
Turnover 0.04 0.26 -0.08 0.26 0.98 1 -0.45 0.98
Amihud Ratio 0.07 -0.07 0.05 -0.07 -0.55 -0.45 1 -0.55
Scaled Volume 0.03 0.26 -0.07 0.26 1 0.98 -0.55 1
PIK dValue dScalVal Bid-Ask Volume Turnover Amihud P&S ScalVol
dValue 1 1 -0.09 0.35 0.4 -0.01 0 0.35
dScalVal 1 1 -0.09 0.35 0.4 -0.01 0 0.35
Bid-Ask -0.09 -0.09 1 0.3 0.26 -0.07 0.05 0.3
Volume 0.35 0.35 0.3 1 0.87 -0.37 0.07 1
Turnover 0.4 0.4 0.26 0.87 1 -0.23 0.01 0.87
Amihud Ratio -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.37 -0.23 1 -0.02 -0.37
P&S Measure 0 0 0.05 0.07 0.01 -0.02 1 0.07
Scaled Volume 0.35 0.35 0.3 1 0.87 -0.37 0.07 1
CML Bid-Ask Volume Turnover Value Amihud P&S ScalVol ScalVal
Bid-Ask 1 -0.21 -0.16 -0.08 0.21 -0.26 -0.21 -0.08
Volume -0.21 1 0.99 0.94 -0.22 0.21 1 0.94
Turnover -0.16 0.99 1 0.94 -0.22 0.21 0.99 0.94
Value -0.08 0.94 0.94 1 -0.22 0.16 0.94 1
Amihud Ratio 0.21 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 1 0 -0.22 -0.22
P&S Measure -0.26 0.21 0.21 0.16 0 1 0.21 0.16
Scaled Volume -0.21 1 0.99 0.94 -0.22 0.21 1 0.94
Scaled Value -0.08 0.94 0.94 1 -0.22 0.16 0.94 1
SKY dBidAsk dAmihud Volume Turnover Value P&S ScalVol ScalVal
dBidAsk 1 0.4 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.29 0.02 -0.01
dAmihud 0.4 1 0.24 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.24 0.09
Volume 0.02 0.24 1 1 0.85 0.37 1 0.85
Turnover 0.02 0.23 1 1 0.86 0.37 1 0.86
Value -0.01 0.09 0.85 0.86 1 0.3 0.85 1
P&S Measure 0.29 0.11 0.37 0.37 0.3 1 0.37 0.3
Scaled Volume 0.02 0.24 1 1 0.85 0.37 1 0.85
Scaled Value -0.01 0.09 0.85 0.86 1 0.3 0.85 1











grouping and carry similar information on liquidity. The relationship is
stronger for the illiquid shares.
Overall the Bid-Ask spread has a very low correlation with the other mea-
sures. Its correlations are also not stable across the stocks, changing from
positive in some cases to negative. This is tentative support for the idea
that it measures a different aspect of liquidity, one related specifically to
exogenous risk.
The price-impact measures have very low correlations across the board, with
the P&S measure bearing the lowest cross-correlation to any of the variables.
The Amihud ratio, however, tends to be negatively related to measures of
trading activity. This makes intuitive sense – as markets deepen, price
impacts linked to return-reversals should fall.
While in general the correlations between the same variables is not stable
across different stocks, it seems safe to conclude that liquidity measures do
indeed fall into separate groupings, with each group pertaining to a partic-
ular aspect of liquidity. While the measures are not substitutable, at the
same time they do not seem to be exhaustive in that they do not account











for the totality of liquidity risk.
The results of the Factor Analysis give some credence to the above conclu-
sion. In all cases, the four factors extracted by way of a principle component
methodology, account for over 96% of the total variability in the original data
set. Combined, the factors account for on average 97% of the variation in
the individual variables as well 3. The factors are thus variables which very
closely represent the information of the original variables.
As shown in Table 5.10, a similar pattern is exhibited across all the stocks:
Factor 1, which accounts for the largest variability, has the highest loading
on trading activity measures; Factor 2, with one exception, has the highest
loading on the P & S Measure, while Factor 3 is most correlated to the
price-impact measures and Factor 4 is generally positively correlated to the
spread.
If the total variability in the set of original variables is thought to capture
the aggregate variability in a stock’s liquidity then this implies that trading
activity accounts for the bulk of aggregate change in a share’s liquidity,
3This is indicated by each variable’s communality












Factor Loadings Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Bid-Ask Spread 0.054458 0.953602 0.108234 0.164052
Turnover 0.970146 0.074962 0.037495 0.174484
Amihud Ratio -0.299446 -0.173785 -0.030816 -0.935547
P&S Measure -0.049615 -0.087293 -0.994242 -0.027073
Scaled Volume 0.938227 0.103809 0.054264 0.284962
Scaled Value 0.667937 0.655899 0.022727 0.102592
Expl.Var 2.362687 1.393777 1.006048 1.025068
Prp.Totl 0.393781 0.232296 0.167675 0.170845
AGL Eigenvalue % Total Variance Cumulative Eigenvalue Cumulative %
Factor 1 3.165354 52.755899 3.165354 52.755899
Factor 2 1.108342 18.47237 4.273696 71.228269
Factor 3 0.878057 14.63429 5.151754 85.862559
Factor 4 0.635826 10.597105 5.78758 96.459664
PIK
Factor Loadings Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Bid-Ask Spread 0.189255 0.023437 0.015593 0.975006
Turnover 0.948134 -0.010617 0.050906 0.051236
Amihud Ratio -0.171933 -0.007804 -0.983844 -0.019929
P&S Measure 0.019736 0.999458 0.007754 0.022095
Scaled Volume 0.939164 0.039552 0.222328 0.122804
Scaled Value 0.851678 0.024355 0.13325 0.392408
Expl.Var 2.572111 1.001797 1.03803 1.123212
Prp.Totl 0.428685 0.166966 0.173005 0.187202
PIK Eigenvalue % Total Variance Cumulative Eigenvalue Cumulative %
Factor 1 3.003342 50.055698 3.003342 50.055698
Factor 2 1.005569 16.759484 4.008911 66.815182
Factor 3 0.952024 15.867067 4.960935 82.682249
Factor 4 0.774215 12.903591 5.73515 95.58584
CML
Factor Loadings Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Bid-Ask Spread -0.076938 -0.129524 0.101368 -0.983065
Turnover 0.982594 0.093305 -0.08922 0.067531
Amihud Ratio -0.130648 0.012939 0.986261 -0.100205
P&S Measure 0.115034 0.984918 0.013061 0.128508
Scaled Volume 0.977484 0.088192 -0.086898 0.120752
Scaled Value 0.970699 0.0555 -0.092946 -0.019169
Expl.Var 2.899441 1.006571 1.007307 1.01248
Prp.Totl 0.48324 0.167762 0.167884 0.168747
CML Eigenvalue % Total Variance Cumulative Eigenvalue Cumulative %
Factor 1 3.097685 51.628076 3.097685 51.628076
Factor 2 1.182857 19.714283 4.280542 71.342359
Factor 3 0.991174 16.519568 5.271716 87.861927
Factor 4 0.654084 10.901398 5.925799 98.763325
SKY
Factor Loadings Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Bid-Ask Spread -0.040239 0.119698 -0.113685 0.985449
Turnover 0.992361 0.066808 0.055795 -0.029636
Amihud Ratio -0.134473 -0.01584 -0.983849 0.114797
P&S Measure 0.084371 0.989229 0.015683 0.118377
Scaled Volume 0.991732 0.06828 0.052043 -0.029772
Scaled Value 0.967364 0.031523 0.174384 -0.023287
Expl.Var 2.930928 1.003271 1.01736 1.000607
Prp.Totl 0.488488 0.167212 0.16956 0.166768
SKY Eigenvalue % Total Variance Cumulative Eigenvalue Cumulative %
Factor 1 3.056331 50.938852 3.056331 50.938852
Factor 2 1.301299 21.688313 4.35763 72.627165
Factor 3 0.928925 15.482086 5.286555 88.10925
Factor 4 0.665612 11.093525 5.952167 99.202776











followed by the price-impacts and then the spread. This seems counter-
intuitive given the little attention that the trading-activity measures have
received in the literature.
Generally each Factor, for a particular stock, is only related to a specific type
of variable. There are no cases where a factor is both significantly related,
for example, to the spread and a trading activity measure. This is also true
of AGL where factor loadings are most different to the other stocks – here
Factor 4 seems to be a price-impact measure while Factor 2 accounts for
spread-based risk. Thus even though the signs of the correlations between
a measure and a particular Factor is not stable and changes across the
different stocks, the fact that different measures capture different liquidity
information is clear.
Although the robustness of the above analysis is not guaranteed and, as
stated earlier, the analysis is in no way an objective test of the measures’
capability, the over-arching conclusion which can be drawn is that the liq-
uidity measures considered are sensitive to changes in market-wide liquidity
and thus do capture liquidity-related information. Moreover the different
measures proxy for different aspects of liquidity risk. No single descriptive
measure seems to capture the totality of these aspects. This complicates
the management and forecasting of liquidity risk and makes it imperative
to use either an accurate, fully integrated liquidity risk measure or an array
of specialised measures.
5.2.2 L-VaR Analysis
L-VaR presents the opportunity to holistically measure market-risk and liq-
uidity risk in a single integrated measure. While the L-VaR models put
forward in the literature differ in their scope and complexity, the theory be-
hind all of them and their respective derivations indicate that they all share
a latent ability to capture the totality of liquidity risk. The model deriva-
tions display great detail and elegance in addressing the array of aspects
which affect liquidity risk.
Despite this detail, the literature has not thoroughly tested any of the mod-
els. The verdict as to whether these integrated measures are actually more
accurate and complete has thus not yet been finalised. This makes the
backtesting analysis presented below more significant.
The analysis which follows begins with a cursory overview of the market











Summary Liquidity Statistics AGL PIK CML SKY
Number of Trade Days 125 125 125 125
Trade points - Half-Hour 366 366 366 366
Average Trade Price 23,759 3,491 259 15
Average Trade Volume 126,58 32,048 11,112 18,584
Average Bid 25,001 3,511 312 16
Average Bid Volume 168,1507 358,416 21,500 37,532
Average Ask 24,973 3,523 307 13
Average Ask Volume 1,432,191 429,641 29,654 14,934
Number of Zero Trade Price points 18 18 231 294
Number of Zero Bid trade points 0 15 204 286
Number of Zero Ask trade points 0 15 209 304
Total Volume Traded 46,329,630 11,729,532 4,011,364 6,764,620
Total Volume Bid 615,431,749 131,180,264 7,761,600 13,661,893
Total Volume Ask 524,182,003 157,248,455 10,704,933 5,435,978
Price change over Period 3.49% 3.27% 8.96% -9.71%
Table 5.11: Summary Micro-Structure Statistics
graphs. This is concluded with an assessment of each model’s accuracy using
well-known backtesting tests and a sensitivity analysis for the key inputs
of each model. The sensitivity analysis helps in determining each model’s
critical vulnerability and source of estimation risk.
Table 5.11 highlights the preliminary features of the market micro-structure
for each of the stocks using the half-hour tick data discussed earlier. As
is clear, average volumes tend to decrease as shares become more illiquid.
The exception is SKY which has marginally higher trade volumes than CML
over the period considered. Generally the price pressure over the 125 days
is positive, except for SKY where prices fell.
As is common in an order-based market like the JSE, transaction, bid and
ask prices also seem to decrease with illiquidity indicating that illiquid shares
have lower demand and thus trade at “lower” absolute levels. This is echoed
in the number of zero trade, bid and ask points, which represent the number
of half-hour ticks at which the market quoted no firm price to buy or sell
or executed no trade. The larger number of zero data points for the illiquid
shares is significant as it makes their data set more discontinuous, thereby
making parameter estimation more volatile and difficult. It points to the
fact that measuring risk for illiquid stocks is complicated by a lack of data
to make accurate and up-to-date estimates.
The graphs which follow display the various L-VaR estimates over time
against the realised profits and losses borne off the delta-hedging trading
strategy. Models are loosely grouped together in a single graph based on











against the realized portfolio profits and losses which are scatter plots and
a black line representing its 2-point moving average (henceforth referred to
as the 2-point MA).
Standard VaR Models
Figure 5.16 displays the backtesting results of the standard, non-liquidity
adjusted VaR models for AGL. What is immediately apparent from the
graph is that the GARCH VaR is far more volatile than any of the other
models. This trend is true across all the stocks and arises primarily because
the GARCH estimate of return volatility is far more changeable than the
standard volatility estimate or indeed the EWMA volatility. The GARCH
VaR forecast is also far more responsive to changes in the realized profit and
loss, as shown by the marked co-movement between it and the 2-point MA
which rise and fall simultaneously.
Figure 5.16: AGL Standard VaR Models
Unlike the GARCH model, the EWMA VaR series displays a much more
smooth estimate of loss than any of the other models, changing gradually to
match changes in the realized portfolio return. This is consistent with the











more volatile series. Similarly, a higher choice of  in the GARCH regime
would have resulted in a VAR estimate which would be less responsive to
changes in the portfolio return series.
As shown, the Monte Carlo VaR and standard parametric VaR almost co-
incide and are difficult to distinguish. This is principally because they are
both based on the same normal distributional return assumptions. Both of
the models offer forecasts which are more stable than either of the other
models but exhibit marked step-like behaviour. This is indicative of the
non-gradual up-take of new information to these models which generally
only change in response to significant changes in the return input.
As with Historical VaR, estimates of the interior P & L distribution in
these models tend to be clustered together and are prone to sudden changes
as return inputs roll out of the base from which parameter estimates are
computed. Volatility clustering is a well-known feature of high-frequency
return data and would impart the observed step-like behaviour to the models
over time. The fact that most of the models, show such remarkable trend
similarity to the Historical VaR remains interesting however.
Overall the models displayed in Figure 5.16 display relatively good cover-
age of the realized profit and loss distribution. The EWMA VaR seems
the least conservative and while the GARCH VaR is more sensitive to new
information, it tends to overreact, making its forecasts more conservative
than required.
The graph displayed in Figure 5.17, shows the same VaR models as discussed
above for PIK. The most striking feature of the graph is the greater volatility
and absolute levels of the Monte Carlo VaR series which is plotted against
the right-hand, secondary axis. It is both larger than the same model for
AGL and far larger than the other PIK VaR forecasts.
Generally, however, all of the trends displayed for AGL forecasts are pre-
served. Indeed the close co-movement between Historical VaR and the stan-
dard parametric VaR is even more apparent. Both clearly exhibit step-like
properties. As with AGL, the EWMA VaR is subject to sharp declines from
which it smoothly recovers upwards.
For both AGL and PIK, the GARCH VaR tends to provide larger estimates
of loss even when the profit and loss tends to spike upwards. Thus para-
doxically when the portfolio displays greater upwards volatility, the VaR
estimate of loss becomes larger. This is something which the Historical VaR











Figures 5.18 and 5.19 display the same models as applied to CML and SKY.
Generally the trends between the VaR models are preserved but as these
are illiquid stocks there are some caveats relating to the VaR models’ level
and volatility.
As noted in the discussion of Table 5.11, CML and SKY, being illiquid tend
to have more zero trade data points than the other stocks. The standard
practice in financial firms in cases where a security’s price cannot be found
after a sufficiently small period has elapsed from a known price is to assume
that the security’s return over that period is zero as the price is assumed to
be constant.
For illiquid shares like CML and SKY were Pt may not change for 10 half-
hour ticks or more at a time, the effect is that VaR can be zero as  ≈ 0
for a lengthy period. This is not altogether inaccurate for as long as the
portfolio is marked-to-market in the same way, then its return should also
be zero for a similar period, meaning that the VaR estimate of loss would
be close to the realized loss.
The effect of the above, however, is that when a trade actually does occur











it tends of reflect the accumulated build up of price-sensitive information
over the period and thus tends to be significantly different from the preced-
ing price, rendering the return series and the resulting VaR estimate more
volatile. This volatility tends to remain until the “anomalous” return has
rolled out of the base.
The consequence of this volatility is seen clearly in the backtesting graphs
of CML and SKY where the VaR estimate of loss is small but tends to
peak abruptly and remain peaked for periods at a time. For these shares,
the input parameters need a shorter memory and thus the GARCH model
performs better.
As shown, the GARCH model as applied to CML and SKY displays much
higher spikes than for PIK and AGL primarily because of the additional
volatility in its estimate of . Figure 5.19, displays the slow update of the
EWMA VaR more clearly than any of the previous graphs.
In general the standard VaR models do not match the realized P & L as
closely as they do with PIK and AGL. This stems from the fact that these
models do not address the special needs of illiquid stocks with their added











return volatility and sudden price moves. All that they can do is to respond
to changes in returns and retain these changes for different lengths of time.
This seems largely inadequate for a measure which aims at forecasting loss
and not merely perpetuating realized losses.
Figure 5.19: SKY Standard VaR Models
Spread-Adjustment VaR Models
Of course, the standard VaR models cannot be discarded before they are
more thoroughly compared against the alternatives. The graphs displayed in
Figures 5.20, 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23 show the results of the spread-adjustment
models.
As shown the spread-adjustment models seem more conservative than the
standard VaR models. This is probably due to the addition of half the
average relative spread which leaves the VaR estimate more negative and
a function of both spread and return volatility. The VaR forecasts are,
however, more stable and less sensitive to changes in the realized P & L
than, for instance, the GARCH model. This is probably due to the muting
effect brought about by the addition of the relative spread volatility. They











Similar to the standard VaR models, the spread-adjustment models respond
to upward return volatility as well as downward volatility, meaning that
VaR estimates tend to peak after large positive returns. The VaR models
thus imply that returns have a higher probability of exhibiting losses after
a period of positive returns.
Figure 5.20: AGL Spread-Adjustment VaR Models
As is clear from Figure 5.20, the Bangia and the Angelidis models follow
surprisingly similar trends. Indeed apart from the absolute difference in
their levels they appear almost synchronized. This is somewhat surprising
given the fact that their respective derivations are so dissimilar. Indeed the
fact that the Angelidis model, based as it is on a structural model of the
spread, comes so close to the Bangia model which uses the realized spread
lends some validity to the structural model.
Based on the similarity of their derivation, a closer relationship between the
François-Heude and Van Wynendaele and the Bangia model would have been
expected. The backtesting results, however, make it clear that the attempt
by François-Heude et al to model the spread without a pre-specified distri-
bution and without the correlation assumption is ineffective. The François-
Heude model is woefully inadequate at forecasting loss and displays poor











The reason for the failure seems to stem from the fact that the François-
Heude model does not use standard parametric VaR as its focal point. Unlike
the Bangia framework which appends a spread-adjustment to the parametric
VaR to make it more conservative, thereby retaining the assumption that
returns are normal, François-Heude et al apply the VaR methodology to a
theoretical bid-price which is adjusted by half-the average relative spread.
It assumes that the portfolio is marked-to-market at this theoretical bid
price and bases its VaR on this assumption. Unfortunately in basing their
VaR on this theoretical Bid they use the qtℎ percentile of the mid-return
distribution to get a q% coverage for the V aR(q, V ).
Since the qtℎ percentile of the mid-return distribution is itself a return, it
is much lower than the corresponding qtℎ percentile of the standard normal
distribution used in the Bangia model and parametric VaR. The overriding
effect is that the resulting VaR is far lower than standard parametric VaR.
Thus while the François-Heude estimate of loss is more representative of
the “standard” tick-to-tick loss experienced by the portfolio, it tends to be
too low to provide sufficient coverage for the extreme losses which are not
necessarily represented in the return set from which it derives its percentile.
This is easily verified by observing the time trend of the François-Heude











estimate in the backtesting graphs.
The François-Heude model does not really use the spread distribution at
all. In contrast, the Angelidis model, like the Bangia model, retains the
basic parametric VaR formulation and merely adjusts it for risks which are
“ignored”. Hence their similarity to the standard VaR models and surprising
accuracy.
Figure 5.22: CML Spread-Adjustment VaR Models
A beneficial side effect of the use of the empirical mid-return distribution
is that it tends to make the VaR estimate of loss much more sensitive to
changes in the return. The VaR thus becomes more reactive and follows
the change in the return distribution more closely. This is evident when
comparing the François-Heude VaR series to the 2-point MA in Figures 5.20
and 5.21.
Apart from the Angelidis model, however, the remaining two spread-adjustment
models do not seem to perform well in the case of the illiquid stocks. As
is evident in Figures 5.22 and 5.23, the François-Heude VaR series displays
volatility which clearly limits its usefulness, while the Bangia VaR’s esti-
mate of loss is unduly large relative to the realized profit and loss. Indeed











down completely with the illiquid stocks. This is primarily caused by the
dependence of these two models on the relative effective spread.
Since CML and SKY are illiquid stocks their relative effective spread is
subject to sudden upward spikes brought about by the arrival of a Bid or Ask
where previously there was none. Thus for many time ticks there are cases
where At = 0 or Bt = 0 thereby raising the mid price, Mt, and inadvertently
creating a relative spread series which is liable to sudden spikes. This renders
VaR models which are heavily dependant on the spread more volatile and
higher in absolute value.
Of course, the fact that only one side of a trade can be met at the time,
implies that the stock is indeed illiquid so that the L-VaR should be made
higher. However, it must be made higher in a way that remains realistic and
sensible.
Figures 5.24 and 5.25 show the relative effective spread for CML and SKY
against the relevant spread-adjustment models and the 30-point realized
relative spread moving average. It clearly shows that the reason for the
François-Heude VaR’s inaccuracy is its inordinate dependence on the spread.











Similarly the Bangia VaR, driven as it is by an average relative spread which
is made higher by sudden upward spikes, produces higher than necessary
estimates of likely loss.
The Angelidis VaR model produces estimates of loss based on a spread-
based structural model which achieves the needs of being more conservative
than standard parametric VaR while remaining stable and practical. In
this model, the addition of the liquidity element is seamless and although
the liquidity-component of the total VaR is small (in the region of only 1%
difference to standard parametric VaR but certainly bigger for the illiquid
stocks) it does have an impact. The fact that this impact occurs without
rendering the model too dependant on changes in the relative effective spread
is significant.
Figure 5.24: CML Spread and VaR models
Parametric-Adjustment VaR Models
Although the Angelidis L-VaR manages to incorporate the spread-based
aspects of liquidity risk without causing too many difficulties, the fact that
even the Bangia model may be too dependant on changes in the spread begs











using a parametric adjustment would be easier. Figures 5.26, 5.27, 5.28 and
5.29 showcase the parametric adjustment models which aim at achieving
just this.
In all of the figures, the Al Janabi VaR series is far higher than any of
the other models. It is plotted against the right, secondary axis for greater
clarity as its estimate of loss is approximately 6 times larger than the other
VaR models. This inordinate conservatism stems from the scaling adjust-
ment implicit to the Al Janabi model. As noted in Section 4.5.2, the Al
Janabi scales parametric VaR by a factor such that
√
(2t+1)(t+1)
6t → ∞ as
t→∞.
The model effectively assumes then that as the time to liquidation of a
position increases, the risks associated with it increases multiplicatively in-
dependent of the position size or the trading strategy. This is clearly not
sensible. The simple example of a long equity position for instance is a case
in point 4. The backtesting graphs validate the fact that the model is not
4A long equity position, no matter how large, always has its maximal loss limited to its
current market value or initial cost. From the investor’s perspective loss cannot increase
without bound











robust and show that its use for capital adequacy purposes would lead to a
prohibitively high cost of capital.
Apart from the failing of the Al Janabi model, however, the parametric-
adjustment models fair quite well. They display good coverage of the realized
P & L distribution and seem to adjust well to changes in a share’s liquidity,
exhibiting none of the added volatility that the spread-adjustment models
do in the case of CML and SKY. This is displayed in Figures 5.28 and 5.29.
All of the models, with the exception of Berkowitz, display the same step-
functionality that is indicative of the parametric VaR models. The Berkowitz
VaR series displays a far more smooth trend with localised peaks which
seems unrelated to the other VaR models. This probably arises as a con-
sequence of the models use of actual portfolio flow data as opposed to mid
returns. The use of flow data incubates the model to some extent from
the added mid-return and spread volatility which is characteristic of illiquid
shares.











Optimal Liquidation Strategy VaR Models
The OLS models represent the most theoretically complete and rigorous
liquidity risk metrics. They aim at capturing the totality of liquidity risk
and many of the models, like the Hisata & Yamai model, do so very elegantly
with very neat formulations.
The cost, unfortunately, of this added sophistication is that the models
are difficult to implement and require the estimation of parameters which
are extremely changeable and largely nebulous. This complicates their im-
plementation and makes their widespread use particularly sensitive to the
model’s accuracy – the additional modelling burden must be compensated
by forecasts which are more accurate.
As shown by the backtesting graphs in Figures 5.30, 5.31, 5.32 and 5.33
this is not necessarily achieved. Based on the graphs it does not seem clear
that the additional rigour inherent to these models leads to more accurate
estimates. While the loss forecasts are most certainly more conservative
than many of the preceding VaR models, they are also alot more volatile,
exhibiting extreme changes which are not alw ys associated with changes in











the realized portfolio loss. This becomes more problematic with the illiquid
stocks.
With AGL for instance, the VaR series seems to follow the moves in the
2-point MA closely but with some degree of overreaction to large changes
in the realized profit or loss. The estimates of loss are somewhat indicative
of the losses experienced by the portfolio. However as shown in Figures
5.31, 5.32 and 5.33, this does not remain true. As the stocks become more
illiquid, the model’s estimate of loss becomes more conservative relative to
the realized loss. This is particularly true of the Almgren & Chriss model
which displays the most drastic trends and forecasts.
Both the Almgren & Chriss and the Hisata & Yamai models are highly
dependant on the estimate of the expected proceeds from liquidation, E(x).
Increases in E(x) translate into direct increases in the VaR forecast. Thus
any sensitivity which E(x) has to changes in the parameter set (, , ")
carries over directly into the VaR model. This is particularly problematic
given the difficulty in estimating these parameters and the lack of guidance
given by the literature into their estimation.











By their very nature, the price impact parameters are highly dependant
on prices and associated traded volumes and are prone to extreme changes.
This limits the length of time that any particular estimate can be considered
accurate, further complicating their estimation.
Moreover since no particular form, as shown in Figure 4.4, is known to be the
most accurate for their estimation, trying to come close to the parameters’
true value is an onerous task, which compounds the model risk inherent to
OLS VaR.
The importance which the price impacts play in the OLS models warrants
some analysis into their levels. Figure 5.34 shows the average and standard
deviation of the various price impact parameters used in the models. The
values for  are plotted on the right axis.
What is clear from Figure 5.34 is that both the permanent price impact, as
measured by , and the temporary price impact, , is more volatile and, on
average, takes on marginally higher values for the liquid stocks.
The additional volatility of the liquid stocks’ price impacts may be due to the











fact that liquid stocks respond more quickly to changes in trade which are
perceived to carry price-sensitive information. This seems reasonable given
the fact that these stocks tend to be the most highly traded and thus closely
watched. Expectations tend to be more homogeneous for the liquid stocks
over time, making their price discovery process more supportive. Thus as
trades enter the market, other traders quickly adjust to the new order flow
in a way which would reduce their risk. This has the effect of increasing
both forms of price impacts and rendering the impacts more volatile.
Interestingly, in line with the behaviour of the spread-adjustment models, "
is on average higher for the illiquid stocks than for the liquid stocks.
Since the Hisata & Yamai model is so directly dependant on , much of
its variability then stems from changes in this parameter. This is also the
reason behind the VaR model’s higher estimate of loss for the liquid stocks.
Unfortunately no similar reason can be given for the Almgren & Chriss VaR
forecasts which do not bear as simple a relationship to the price impact
parameters.
Overall the OLS models yield inordinately high forecasts of loss which ex-











hibit very conservative coverage of the P & L distribution. Although this
is not as bad as the Al Janabi model, the additional sophistication of these
models had created hopes that they would be far more accurate. The back-
testing graphs, however, belie the fact that these models cannot be easily
implemented and that the additional accuracy gained in fitting a compli-
cated liquidity VaR model is often completely offset by the inaccuracy re-
sulting from a lack of sufficient data to estimate parameters properly. This
is particularly true of the illiquid stocks where data is scarce and often dis-
continuous.
Model Comparisons
The VaR models must be compared not only within their groups but across
groups so as to highlight the differences in their estimates for differences in
liquidity. Figures 5.35, 5.36, 5.37 and 5.38, display the promising L-VaR
models for each of the stocks considered.
The Figures make it clear that while no single VaR model provides a con-
sistently higher forecast of loss, the standard parametric VaR’s forecast is











generally higher than that of the other models. This is true for most of the
stocks but changes in the case of the illiquid shares where the Bangia VaR
and the Hisata & Yamai models provide more extreme forecasts.
As shown in Figure 5.35, generally many of the VaR models follow similar
trends but with different outlier behaviour. This is expected as many of the
L-VaR models take standard parametric VaR as their base. The models also
display similar coverage of the P & L distribution with the parametric VaR
and the Berkowitz models showing the greatest conservatism. This changes,
however, once more illiquid shares are considered.
In the case of the illiquid shares, it is the Hisata & Yamai and the Bangia
models which dominate, producing estimates of loss which are characterized
by larger spikes and far higher levels than the other models. Figures 5.36,
5.37 and 5.38 make this self-evident, showing the stark difference between
the models’ behaviour for AGL.
Although both of the models must be admonished for being somewhat too
sensitive to decreases in liquidity, to its credit, the Hisata model’s forecasts
remain reasonable and sensitive to changes in realized profits and losses.











The Bangia model’s dependence, however, on the relative effective spread
and the problems this poses for illiquid stocks (as discussed earlier) renders
its forecasts prohibitively inaccurate.
The Hisata & Yamai and Bangia models are easy scapegoats, however. Since
their forecasts as so inordinately high in the case of the illiquid stocks, they
seem to be more inaccurate. Closer examination of the trends across the
graphs show that really all of the models provide forecasts which become
less indicative of the actual portfolio loss as liquidity decreases. As shown
in Figure 5.38, while the portfolio loss is never more than a few hundred
Rand, the VaR models provide forecasts of loss which are in the order of
thousands of Rands. This, of course, raises questions regarding the models’
representativeness in times of stress when liquidity losses become even more
prominent.
Overall, however, the Berkowitz VaR and the Historical VaR models seem to
be the most flexible in terms of adjusting to changes in liquidity. While their
absolute accuracy cannot be guaranteed until the models undergo statistical
testing, at least on the basis of the trends in backtesting graphs they seem
to produce forecasts which are both representative of realized loss and not











subject to unnecessary swings.
Although the VaR models cannot be completely described by their means
and variances, the examination of these descriptive statistics does impart
some useful, general information on the differences between the models.
Figures 5.39 and 5.41 display the average and variance of the forecast val-
ues assumed by each of the VaR models for each of the stocks considered.
Given the wide range which these values assume between the liquid and
illiquid stocks, Figures 5.40 displays the average for CML and SKY alone.
The average of the realized loss is displayed on the right-hand axis and is
represented by the scatter point in each graph.
Generally the average and variance graphs support the points made earlier
regarding the relative size and volatility of the VaR models. As shown the
Al Janabi model provides by far the most conservative estimate of loss in the
case of the liquid stocks, but in the case of CML and SKY where the relative
effective spread assumes greater significance, it is somewhat eclipsed by the
Bangia and François-Heude VaR models. Both of these models have the
property of becoming far more conservative when liquidity is constrained.











They also become more volatile on a relative basis in this instance.
The other spread-adjustment model, the Angelidis model, does not share
this property and remains relatively stable despite changes in liquidity. It
provides forecasts which are far less volatile than any of the other models
and which comes closest on average to the values assumed by the parametric
VaR and Monte Carlo VaR models.
Similarly, the Shamroukh and the Berkowitz models provide much less
volatile forecasts, which are on average closer to the average forecast across
the models. The Berkowitz VaR does, however, display anomalous behaviour
in the case of AGL where its average is made higher by a few sudden spikes.
The Figures give support for the conclusion that models which account for
price impacts like the Hisata & Yamai VaR, and even the Almgren & Chriss
VaR, respond to changes in liquidity more reasonably than the simplistic
Bangia Var and the François-Heude variation. This is particularly evident
for the illiquid shares where both spread-adjustment models display undue
volatility. Although the volatility associated with the VaR forecasts are ex-
treme given that they are based on highly volatile, half-hour tick returns, the











differences in the models are what is important and highlight the potential
behaviour of the models if instruments were indeed as volatile as presented.
Overall, however, Figure 5.39 gives no way of consistently ranking the models
across differing levels of liquidity. The models tend to respond to changes in
a stock’s liquidity in a way which is not obvious and is masked by the lower
absolute level of cash flows attributable to the illiquid stocks.
Despite this, a trend does at least emerge regarding the difference in the
parametric VaR when based on the bid, ask, mid or trade price. Parametric
VaR forecasts based on the Bid and the Ask tend to produce more volatile
and higher forecasts of loss than those based on the trade or mid prices.
Generally, forecasts based on the Bid are higher than those based on the
Ask (but not always more volatile).
The difference in the standard VaR for differences in the valuation price
highlights the importance which different mark-to-market regimes can have
on portfolio risk. It hints at the quote which opens Chapter 1 – at times
when the market is particularly illiquid, standard valuations and risk model
estimates can be driven so completely off sync that different underlying











valuations are needed to assess risk. In certain grave circumstances neither
the Bid nor the Ask nor the Mid price are adequate representations of what
an investor could get upon liquidation. Risk models must account for this.
Sensitivity Analysis
As discussed in Section 3.6, models need to be relatively insensitive to
changes in any single parameter so as to prevent estimation error from de-
tracting from the model’s performance.
Analysing a model’s sensitivity to its parameters is an important component
of model analysis and identifies the key risk areas inherent to the model’s
design. Unless identified prior to a model’s implementation, undue sensitiv-
ities to any particular parameter can confound existing weaknesses in the
model and leave forecasts vulnerable to extreme error.
Sensitivity analysis also helps in scenario analysis as it allows users to quickly
gauge the effect of a particular change in market conditions or portfolio
composition on total portfolio risk.











Figure 5.38: SKY VaR Model Comparison
Although many of the L-VaR models implemented do not share input pa-
rameters, it remains useful to compare the models’ sensitivity in one table.
Tables 5.12 and 5.13 display the % change in the L-VaR estimate of loss for

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As can be seen, all of the models, with the exception of the Berkowitz
VaR, are sensitive to changes in the mid return . Similar changes in the
parameter tend to induce similar effects across the models, with all of them
generally increasing by 5% for a 100% decrease in . All of the models also
seem to react symmetrically to changes in the parameter, exhibiting the
same increase/decrease in absolute value for a 100% decrease/increase in .
Interestingly, the VaR models are far more sensitive to changes in the return
volatility  then perhaps any of their other input parameters. With the
exception of the François-Heude, EWMA and GARCH models, increases in
 lead to direct increases in the VaR number. This is particularly true of the
spread-adjustment and price-impact models where return volatility seems to
play an extremely important role.
The great sensitivity which the models have to changes in  supports the
trend in the literature to improve VaR by improving the estimates of volatil-
ity. It could be possible, based on the sensitivity analysis, then to drastically
improve the forecasts of some of the less accurate models like the price-
impact models, the Bangia model, etc. with the use of better volatility
estimates. To the extent that volatility accounts for illiquidity because of
the discontinuous “jumps” evident in the prices of illiquid stocks, such an
adjustment could improve the L-VaR models. This, of course, needs further
research.
Introducing a EWMA or GARCH methodology into the  estimation of the
other L-VaR models may be a step in this direction but would also leave the
models dependant on the additional parameters. Although RiskMetricsTM
advises a figure of  = 94% for their EWMA VaR, it is evident that the VaR
is quite sensitive to changes in the parameter in ways which are difficult to
predict. While a 100% increase in  induces only a 7% decrease in the VaR
number, a similar 100% decrease induces a much larger 77% increase in the
VaR. The sensitivity also seems to change depending on the base level of 
used in the VaR calculation.
Changes in  are directly offset by changes in  and vice versa, leaving the
GARCH VaR independent to changes in these parameters. Changes in  do
have a small impact, however.
Given the differences in their methodologies, the various spread-adjustment
models share very few inputs with the Angelidis model, based as it is on
a structural model of the spread, which requires the most inputs. Luck-
ily, however, many of these parameters are easy to estimate and remain











changes in these unique parameters – the sensitivities are mostly 0 – greatly
reduces model risk.
The Francoise-Heude model displays an inordinately high sensitivity to changes
in the relative effective spread. Changes in this market variable translate
almost directly into changes in the VaR number with some additional scal-
ing. The sensitivity table provides firm evidence for the earlier argument
that the reason behind the model’s undue volatility in the case of the illiquid
stocks was the great variability in their spread.
The Bangia VaR’s reduced accuracy in the case of the illiquid stocks cannot,
however, be explained by increased spread volatility. As shown, the model’s
sensitivity to both the average spread and the current spread is very small.
The model, however, does display large changes in response to changes in
its fat tail factor . This makes the use of the number as estimated in the
original paper questionable. In order to fulfil the Bangia model’s potential,
it seems necessary to estimate  accurately, irrespective of the difficulty
involved in doing this. The likely reason behind the failure of the Bangia
model with CML and SKY is an inappropriate fat-tail correction.
The parametric-adjustment models like Shamroukh and Al Janabi offer little
in the way of a sensitivity investigation. Although they are sensitive to
changes in the investment horizon t and the number of trade points n, these
parameters are pre-determined and hardly change. They thus offer little
modelling risk.
The Berkowitz VaR, like the Angelidis model, displays greater accuracy (as
shown by the backtesting graphs) and very low sensitivity to changes in its
parameter inputs. These are desirable qualities in a model.
As expected, the price-impact models display large sensitivities to changes
in their parameter inputs. While the models are relatively insensitive to
changes in the endogenous fixed cost variable (which echoes the discussion
in Section 2.1 that exogenous price impacts are roughly only one third of
the total liquidity cost), ", their forecasts are prone to large changes in
response to changes in the endogenous price impact variables. The Almgren
& Chriss model, in particular seems highly dependant on both  and  while
the Hisata & Yamai model, having  as its only significant variable, is only
sensitive to .
The high sensitivity of the complex price-impact models to changes in their
inputs highlights an essential problem – while more sophisticated and com-
plete models may seem, on the basis of theory, to be more accurate they











models are laudably complete, more research into their practical implemen-
tation is crucial if the models are to gain wider use. Not only must more
work be done into the price impact estimation process but the nature of the
relationship between the models and their price impact parameters needs
to be investigated. This will go a long way to making the models more
practicable.
Statistical Backtesting
Although the above analysis of the VaR model’s time trends and general
behaviour provides important comparative information, the ultimate test of
a VaR model lies in determining how closely its forecasts match realized loss.
This is the preserve of VaR Backtesting techniques which aim at assessing
how accurate a specific VaR model is at forecasting.
The general idea behind backtesting techniques is that on average a portfolio
V should display losses which breach its VaR, V aR(, V ), only 1 − %
of the time for the VaR methodology to be considered accurate. A VaR
model can thus easily be assessed by counting the percentage of “breaches”.
Specific VaR-related hypothesis tests do, however, exist to make testing
more thorough. The details of these are supplied in Appendix C.
While the backtesting of VaR has received a great deal of attention over
time and a plethora of methodologies have been put forward by the litera-
ture to make backtesting more accurate, only the main statistical tests for
Conditional Coverage and Independence are applied in this analysis.
Figure 5.42 shows the percentage of realized portfolio losses which fall below
the VaR estimate of loss over time. Since all the VaR models are imple-
mented at a 99% level, all of the models should display coverage close to
this threshold, represented by the dotted black line.
The coverage graph makes the failure of the François-Heude VaR for the
liquid stocks immediately apparent. The model seems woefully inadequate
and systematically underestimates portfolio loss for stocks where the spread
is less volatile and a smaller component of aggregate liquidity risk. For AGL
and PIK this model only captures on average 65% of the realized portfolio
losses. This improves to 95% for CML and SKY.
Interestingly, Figure 5.42 shows that while the parametric models are rela-
tively good for the liquid stocks, as liquidity declines they become gradually











prices. Only the parametric VaR based on the mid price remains consis-
tently accurate, while the EWMA and GARCH regimes seem to trail off
severely.
Contrastingly the Historical VaR and the Monte Carlo VaR models provide
stable and accurate forecasts with coverage levels which remain around 97%.
Generally the Monte Carlo VaR seems to be more conservative than either
the parametric Mid VaR or the Historical VaR. While the Historic VaR does
not perform too poorly, its coverage levels are not exactly at the threshold.
This implies that the model may have too many breaches to be consistently
accurate, particularly during trend-breaking market moves.
The coverage table hides the fact that some of the models, like Al Janabi,
consistently over-estimate portfolio loss. The Al Janabi, Bangia, Angelidis,
Monte Carlo and even the parametric Mid VaR have cases where they are
higher than all of the portfolio’s realized losses. While this makes the models
more conservative and prudent, it does not make them more accurate.
The Shamroukh, Berkowitz and Angelidis models provide the most stable
coverage which is consistently close to the 99% threshold.











Disappointingly, despite the lauded sophistication and rigour of the Hisata &
Yamai and Almgren & Chriss models, they display coverage which averages
around 95%. The models seem to underestimate loss. This is surprising
given the dominant upward swings shown in the backtesting graphs.
Due to scale effects, the backtesting graphs emphasise the large swings in the
models’ forecasts and hide the fact that their estimates of loss are accurate.
Overall the models provide forecasts which are close to the actual portfolio
loss but which are prone to exaggerated swings in response to changes in
their input parameters. These swings occur at the incorrect time thus the
forecasts seem too small in response to large realized losses and too large
when they exhibit an exaggerate response. Closer examination of Figures
5.37 and 5.38 support this – the models produce estimates which are on
average only slightly larger than the other models (Figure 5.39 supports
this too) but which display inaccuracies at specific localities.
Although the reason for this behaviour may be diverse, it most probably lies
with the fact that parameter estimation for these sophisticated price-impact
models is complicated by the data “holes” that characterize the illiquid
stocks. It echoes the earlier discussion that the additional accuracy offered
by these models can be largely offset by estimation error and lack of data.
As noted, the coverage test only highlights a model’s flaws if it tends to
underestimate portfolio risk. It gives no indication really if a portfolio tends
to overestimate risk. Although a model which underestimates risk is more
troubling than a model which is too prudent, where capital adequacy issues
play a role both issues need to be considered.
In addition to this, the coverage table offers no clear definition of “good
enough” coverage. Based on the table alone it is unclear whether a model
with 95% coverage is just as good as a model with 92% coverage. A more
robust hypothesis test is needed to complete the picture.
Fortunately VaR backtesting techniques have found ways to address both
of these issues. While the specific theoretical underpinnings of the tests are
discussed in Appendix C, the literature largely applies two tests in assessing
a VaR model: the Kupiec Conditional Coverage test and the Christoffersen
Independence test.
The first test provides a framework with which to judge whether a model
provides “good enough” coverage of the realized losses it tries to forecast,
while the second test determines if a VaR model systematically under or
over-estimates risk. The tests are combined in a joint test of conditional











Stock Statistic Param VaR Param VaR Ask Param VaR Bid Param VaR Mid EWMA VaR GARCH VaR
AGL % of P&L Coverage 98.51% 98.21% 98.81% 98.81% 97.32% 97.32%
AGL Unconditional Cov Stat - LRuc 0.7 1.7 0.12 0.12 6.55 6.55
AGL Independence Stat - LRind -3.15 2.32 1.34 1.54 -2.58 -2.88
AGL Joint Test - LRuc + LRind -2.45 4.02 1.45 1.66 3.97 3.67
PIK % of P&L Coverage 99.11% 98.81% 99.4% 99.11% 97.32% 94.35%
PIK Unconditional Cov Stat - LRuc 0.04 0.12 0.65 0.04 6.55 35.3
PIK Independence Stat - LRind 0.23 1.52 0.19 0.28 1.22 -9.13
PIK Joint Test - LRuc + LRind 0.27 1.64 0.84 0.32 7.77 26.18
CML % of P&L Coverage 96.68% 97.28% 96.98% 100% 95.47% 88.22%
CML Unconditional Cov Stat - LRuc 11.22 6.72 8.87 6.65 22.38 125.05
CML Independence Stat - LRind 4.33 -10.8 -8.84 0 -6.58 -19.97
CML Joint Test - LRuc + LRind 15.55 -4.07 0.03 6.65 15.79 105.08
SKY % of P&L Coverage 91.62% 91.02% 91.92% 99.1% 94.31% 92.81%
SKY Unconditional Cov Stat - LRuc 71.64 80.6 67.27 0.04 35.5 54.66
SKY Independence Stat - LRind -22.79 -6.49 -2.73 -2.94 -8.63 -7.83
SKY Joint Test - LRuc + LRind 48.84 74.11 64.54 -2.9 26.86 46.83
Table 5.14: Statistical Backtesting Results 1
Stock Statistic Historical VaR Monte Carlo VaR Bangia VaR Heude-Wyn Ang-Benos Al Janabi
AGL % of P&L Coverage 97.32% 98.81% 99.7% 60.42% 98.81% 100%
AGL Unconditional Cov Stat - LRuc 6.55 0.12 2.31 777.95 0.12 6.75
AGL Independence Stat - LRind 3.5 1.54 0.11 -78.86 1.54 FAIL
AGL Joint Test - LRuc + LRind 10.05 1.66 2.43 699.1 1.66 FAIL
PIK % of P&L Coverage 97.02% 99.7% 99.4% 69.35% 99.11% 100%
PIK Unconditional Cov Stat - LRuc 8.67 2.31 0.65 539.19 0.04 6.75
PIK Independence Stat - LRind 3.49 0.14 0.75 -68.02 0.28 FAIL
PIK Joint Test - LRuc + LRind 12.15 2.46 1.4 471.16 0.32 FAIL
CML % of P&L Coverage 96.68% 100% 100% 98.19% 100% 100%
CML Unconditional Cov Stat - LRuc 11.22 6.65 6.65 1.78 6.65 6.65
CML Independence Stat - LRind 3.81 0 0 1.51 0 FAIL
CML Joint Test - LRuc + LRind 15.03 6.65 6.65 3.29 6.65 FAIL
SKY % of P&L Coverage 97.6% 99.1% 100% 98.8% 99.1% 99.1%
SKY Unconditional Cov Stat - LRuc 2.95 0.04 6.71 0.12 0.04 0.04
SKY Independence Stat - LRind 2.53 -2.94 FAIL -3.05 -2.94 -2.94
SKY Joint Test - LRuc + LRind 5.47 -2.9 FAIL -2.93 -2.9 -2.9
Table 5.15: Statistical Backtesting Results 2
All of the above statistical tests are applied to the VaR and realized profit
and loss series. The independence test is implemented with the assistance
of VBA code which is displayed in Appendix D.
Tables 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16 display the results of both the separate and the
joint hypothesis tests. Where the relevant test statistic is greater than its 1%
critical, the test statistic is highlighted. In this case the null hypothesis that
the VaR model is accurate (where accuracy is defined by the test itself) can
be rejected at the 1% level. In certain instances, the models have displayed
such poor results that the test statistic fails. These models are severely
inadequate and are indicated by “FAIL”.
The testing tables reflect the earlier contention that standard parametric
VaR models perform very well for the liquid stocks but tend to become
progressively worse as liquidity falls. Generally all of them, including the
EWMA and GARCH methodologies, fail in the case of CML and SKY. Only
the parametric VaR based on the Mid, the Historic VaR and the Monte











Stock Statistic Shanroukh Berkowitz Almgren-Chriss Hisata-Yamai
AGL % of P&L Coverage 97.32% 98.81% 89.29% 92.86%
AGL Unconditional Cov Stat - LRuc 6.55 0.12 108.79 54.4
AGL Independence Stat - LRind -2.58 1.54 -36.61 -22.41
AGL Joint Test - LRuc + LRind 3.97 1.66 72.17 31.99
PIK % of P&L Coverage 96.73% 98.21% 98.81% 99.11%
PIK Unconditional Cov Stat - LRuc 10.99 1.7 0.12 0.04
PIK Independence Stat - LRind 3.84 1.71 1.43 1.03
PIK Joint Test - LRuc + LRind 14.83 3.41 1.55 1.07
CML % of P&L Coverage 99.09% 97.58% 99.09% 89.43%
CML Unconditional Cov Stat - LRuc 0.03 4.81 0.03 104.88
CML Independence Stat - LRind 0.17 -2.96 0.7 -19.87
CML Joint Test - LRuc + LRind 0.2 1.84 0.73 85
SKY % of P&L Coverage 99.1% 98.2% 100% 96.11%
SKY Unconditional Cov Stat - LRuc 0.04 1.73 6.71 16.3
SKY Independence Stat - LRind -2.94 -3.08 FAIL -11.67
SKY Joint Test - LRuc + LRind -2.9 -1.35 FAIL 4.63
Table 5.16: Statistical Backtesting Results 3
which the standard VaR models have with illiquidity and raises concerns
regarding their ability to perform in times of stress when liquidation costs
become more grave.
Two trends are evident for the spread-adjustment models: the Bangia model
becomes less accurate as liquidity declines (failing on the basis of its 100%
coverage in the case of CML and lack of independence in the case of SKY)
while the François-Heude model becomes more accurate. As expected, the
Angelidis model is fairly stable, only failing the conditional coverage test in
the case of CML due to forecasts which, although reasonable, are always
higher than the realized loss.
Sadly the promising Almgren & Chriss and Hisata & Yamai models per-
form badly. While they both perform well for PIK, they provide inaccurate
forecasts in the case of both liquid and illiquid stocks. For the liquid stock,
AGL, they fail on the basis of underestimation of risk while for the illiquids
it seems that they overestimate risk. This is in keeping with the earlier
contention that the models generally provide low forecasts which are prone
to severe spikes that occur at the incorrect moments.
The existence of serial over and underestimation of risk points to the fact
that the models’ inputs are not being estimated accurately and that data
“holes” are biasing their results, creating alternate runs of over-conservative
and under-conservative forecasts. Given the sophistication and sensitivity
of these models to their inputs, data inadequacy and poor estimation is a
grave concern.
Overall, while the Al Janabi model performs the worst from all the models
considered, the Shamroukh, Berkowitz, Angelidis, Monte Carlo and Para-











Berkowitz model, they all only fail once as a consequence of poor coverage.
The Berkowitz model stands out as the only model which remains accurate
irrespective of the stock to which it is applied.
5.2.3 Synopsis
The aim of the above analysis was to assess the accuracy with which the
different measures/models capture liquidity risk and to shed light on their
practicability. As an addition, the model’s behaviour over time was also
analysed so as to understand their comparative weaknesses and drivers.
Judging the accuracy of the measures was made difficult by the fact that
they are observable market variables which provide no objectively verifiable
liquidity forecasts. Thus their accuracy could only be assessed by examining
to what extent expected changes in their behaviour over time correlate to
known periods of illiquidity.
Based on such an examination, it was shown that while the measures do
not provide extremely clear trend-changes in response to changes in market-
wide liquidity, there is evidence of some degree of sensitivity. The long-term
graphical analysis provides tentative support for the idea that the measures
do indeed capture ex post information regarding liquidity. There is, however,
very little support for their ability as predictive liquidity metrics.
Of course, given the many different aspects which contribute to liquidity
risk, it was important to determine whether the different measures provide
different insights into liquidity. Although the theoretical discussion pro-
vided clear demarcations for each of the measures, these needed empirical
verification.
The results of the factor analysis and the correlation analysis support the
theoretical groupings of the different measures and provide evidence that
different measures, do indeed capture information relating to distinct aspects
of liquidity risk. While the inter-relationships between the measures and the
priority which they assume in accounting for the totality of liquidity risk
remains unstable across stocks, it seems undeniable that liquidity risk can
only be measured by a new integrated measure or by monitoring a host of
measures simultaneously.
Together the measures, however, do not offer an exhaustive or very accurate
description of liquidity. Indeed they ignore many of the additional aspects of











or model which provides a realistic and complete gauge of liquidity risk as
represented by the transaction-cost based definition in Chapter 2.
Unfortunately the bulk of the current, integrated L-VaR models do not pro-
vide estimates of loss which are inherently more accurate than standard VaR
models. Their estimates are generally prone to large and unrealistic upward
spikes and exhibit volatility which is not reflected in realized portfolio losses.
This brings the usefulness of their liquidity adjustments into question.
While a few of the L-VaR models like the Angelidis, Shamroukh and Berkowitz
models provide more conservative estimates of loss which are stable across
differing degrees of liquidity and more representative of realized portfolio
losses, their estimates are just as accurate as those offered by the paramet-
ric Mid and Monte Carlo VaR models. The exception is the Berkowitz model
which provides realistically stable and accurate estimates of loss even when
the standard VaR models fail.
The key problem with the bulk of the L-VaR models is the excessive con-
servatism and undue volatility of their estimates. Both of these conditions
lead them to systematically overestimate portfolio loss. This is even true
of the theoretically impressive price-impact models, whose rigour and scope
made them seem highly promising.
As noted in Section 3.6, a good model/measure of liquidity must offer a
fair reflection of reality and should capture the bulk of the aspects which
together characterize market-related liquidity risk. Unfortunately practical
implementation has shown that many of the models which offer rich descrip-
tions of liquidity provide estimates which are also the most unrealistic.
Although the reasons for each of the L-VaR model’s failure are diverse, in
aggregate it stems from a difficulty in estimating parameter inputs which
are too important to the model’s forecasts. This is true of the Bangia and
the Francoise-Heude model which are too sensitive to the relative effective
spread but especially true of the price impact models which, as shown by
the sensitivity analysis, are highly sensitive to changes in parameters which
are not easy to estimate. In this way the added complexity of the models
becomes a drawback and simpler models, like Berkowitz, gain prominence.
Overall the Berkowitz model, does not specifically model the spread or price-
impacts or any particular aspect of liquidity risk. All of these are subsumed
in the realized change in the portfolio’s value and cash flows which are used
to estimate a liquidity-adjusted portfolio mean and variance.











problems in objectively modelling the different aspects of liquidity risk sep-
arately. While more accurate, this method does offer a very closed-box view
of liquidity risk and how its different aspects affect a portfolio’s risk. This
could prove problematic in times of stress when portfolio trends break with
realized history.
The closed-box view offered by the Berkowitz model highlights the tension
in modelling between being accurate, complete and descriptive. While the
Berkowitz model is accurate, it is not descriptive and while the price-impact
models are descriptive and complete in that they offer insights into price-
impacts, they are not accurate. The only real solution lies in using a host
of measures/models simultaneously.
Based on the results presented above, it seems that the Berkowitz and/or
the Angelidis L-VaR models should be used to provide a more accurate and
conservative VaR forecast. In this way the major aspects of liquidity risk,
the spread and the realized price impacts, are accounted for in VaR. These
should be supplemented by monitoring the return-reversal measures and the
Bid-Ask spread over time.
In the absence of an accurate, complete and practicable integrated measure
of liquidity risk, a more complete and accurate view of liquidity can not be













The most-recent financial recession, spurred on as it has been by market-
related illiquidity with endemic effects, has undoubtedly highlighted the
escalating importance of liquidity risk management in an increasingly in-
tegrated global financial system. This is evidenced by the attempts in the
latest version of the Basel Accord, Basel III, to account for liquidity risk.
Although the financial literature has developed an array of measures/models
which offer different, yet compelling approaches to the management of liq-
uidity risk, such approaches have not yet gained traction in practice. This
may be attributed to the fragmented approach taken by the literature in
arriving at a definition of liquidity risk and a lack of awareness, on the part
of market practitioners, of the importance and mechanics of liquidity risk.
The aim of this thesis is to stem some of this confusion by providing a
comprehensive view of liquidity risk in terms of its many aspects, its effects
and the approaches taken by the literature for its management. This is
achieved by distilling a complete and robust definition of liquidity risk and by
assessing a few of the liquidity-risk approaches put forward in the literature.
Unlike previous papers which have only concentrated on a theoretical dis-
course, the model assessment was implemented by examining the models’
ability to capture the totality of the aspects which contribute to liquidity
risk and by empirically testing their accuracy.
The result of the analysis shows that neither the measures nor the complex
L-VaR models provide a complete and accurate view of liquidity risk.











liquidity over time, they are not objective or exhaustive. Thus even if all the
measures were used simultaneously, certain important aspects of liquidity
risk like the price-risk/trade-risk trade-off, the opportunity costs associated
with trade, many of the exogenous liquidity costs and the depth of price
impacts, would be ignored.
The fact that empirical tests show that different measures seem to specialise
in different aspects of liquidity risk complicates their use in risk management.
This is compounded by the evidence that the measures are not entirely
accurate in terms of their sensitivity to changes in market-wide liquidity
events. Although it is clear that they do respond in line with expectations
when aggregate liquidity falls, they do not seem to offer accurate, predictive
information which could be used in decision-making.
The hopes presented with the development of the integrated L-VaR models
was that finally a complete measure of both market and liquidity risk had
been found which would provide accurate predictive information for decision-
making. Unfortunately the realities are somewhat different and while many
of the L-VaR models are indeed predictive and incorporate many of the
aspects which contribute to liquidity risk, no single model captures all of
these aspects.
Generally specific L-VaR models seem to specialise in modelling a particular
aspect of liquidity risk, like the spread or price impacts, while ignoring other
aspects. Thus while the models seem more comprehensive in that they have
a more detailed derivation than the measures, they do not offer a complete
description.
No single model covers everything and significantly no model offers adjust-
ments which make them adaptable to times of stress when parameter esti-
mation must change and the internal relationships between price-risk and
spread-risk are modified. This is also true of the measures.
In terms of accurately forecasting portfolio losses in the face of liquidity
concerns, many of the models, especially the complex ones, perform just as
well as two of the standard VaR models: the parametric VaR based on the
mid-price and its statistical counterpart, the Monte Carlo VaR. With the
exception of the Berkowitz L-VaR, all the models perform just as well or
worse than standard VaR. This casts doubts on the efficacy of their liquidity
adjustments.
While many of the L-VaR models are certainly more conservative than stan-
dard VaR, they are not necessarily more representative of realized portfolio











models caused by spikes in their parameter estimates which are easily in-
fluenced by data deficiencies. This is compounded by the severe sensitivity
which some of the models display to changes in their inputs.
Future models of liquidity risk must account for this unintended volatility
and sensitivity in order to become more accurate. They should address
the problems surrounding the estimation of parameter inputs and should
account for the fact that data deficiencies with illiquid instruments could
skew the models’ estimates of loss. The models need to be made more
robust to changes in their inputs brought about by data deficiencies.
The success which the Berkowitz model displays in statistical backtesting,
highlights one of the possibilities by which future L-VaR models could be-
come more accurate. The Berkowitz model uses realized portfolio data and
no specific modelling of the different aspects of liquidity. Other models, in
contrast, separate the modelling of price impacts, spread v latility, etc., in-
corporating them individually into their VaR estimate of loss. This leaves
them more vulnerable to data deficiencies and estimation error but makes
them more transparent.
In order to realize the benefits of the Berkowitz model’s accuracy while
retaining transparency, many of the models could be calibrated on realized
portfolio data. For the OLS models, this would mean estimating the price
impacts from realized trade volumes and prices relative to the market’s
Bid and Ask, while for the spread-adjustment models it would mean using
the realized spread faced through actual trading rather than the standard
relative effective spread.
Such an approach could leave the OLS models with more accurate price-
impacts, while making the Bangia and François-Heude models less vulner-
able to random changes in the relative effective spread brought about by a
lack of Bids or Asks. Testing whether this would work is certainly an avenue
for future research.
Of course many of the model’s weaknesses cannot be resolved by changing
the data upon which they are calibrated. Most of the L-VaR models display
a marked difference in their modelling in that models which focus on the
spread, tend to ignore price impacts and vice versa. Finding a model which
incorporates both aspects and which does so, unlike the François-Heude
model, with readily available data may prove rewarding.
Similarly investigating the estimation of price impacts and finding ways to
make them more accurate would most certainly enhance the OLS models.











of price impacts and this area is worthy of further independent research.
Finding closed-form L-VaR solutions in the face of alternate price-impact
formulations could also be promising.
An important question, which is not addressed in this thesis, is whether
accounting for extreme-tail risk effectively accounts for liquidity-related risk.
As noted the implementation of many of the Extreme Value Theory models
is onerous. This, however, does not detract from the fact that comparing
these models against the L-VaR models may prove insightful.
As it stands a great deal of work needs to be done in order to make the
L-VaR models more representative of portfolio losses in the face of liquidity-
related costs. Such work would ideally provide a more complete description
of liquidity while providing greater accuracy.
Failing the existence of a truly integrated and accurate model of market-
related liquidity risk, market-practitioners must persist with using an array
of measures/models simultaneously. Hopefully the analysis provided in this
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[70] Pástor, L. and Stambaugh, R. F., (2003), Liquidity and Expected
Stock Returns, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 111, No. 3,
642-685, June 2003
[71] Patel, B., (2001), Measurement of Transaction Costs in Equity Trad-
ing, Transaction Costs, Institutional Investor Investment Guides, 49-
54, Spring in Loebnitz, K. (2006)
[72] Porter, R. B., (2003), Measuring Market Liquidity, University of
Florida, Florida, Working Paper, October 2003
[73] Refenes, A. P. N., Skiadopoulos, G. and Skintzi, V. D., (2005), Journal
of Alternative Investments, Vol. 7, No. 4, 66-82, 2005
[74] Rogachev, A., (2002), The Value-at-risk concept by Swiss private
banks, The Journal of Risk Finance, Vol. 8, No. 1, 72-78, 2007
[75] Shah, A. and Thomas, S., (2007), Measuring Liquidity [Online], Avail-












[76] Shamroukh, N., (2000), Modelling liquidity risk in VaR models, Algo-
rithmics, UK, Working Paper, 2000
[77] Stigler, G.J., (1964), Publuc Regulation of Securities Market, Journal
of Business, Vol. 37, No. 2, 117-142, April 1964
[78] Ting, C. and Warachka, M., (2003), A New Methodology for Measur-
ing Liquidity-induced Transaction Costs, School of Business Working
Paper, Singapore Management University, Singapore, 2003
[79] Upper, C., (2000), Measuring Liquidity Under Stress, Bank for Inter-














The AWS at time t depends on the average-weighted bid and ask prices
at time t. These represent the expected cost/gain from trading an amount
equal to the NMS at time t.
If the NMS of an asset is 15 000 securities and at time t the order book looks
as below in Figure A.1 then the AWS is found by calculating the weighted-
average bid/ask price, assuming that 15 000 units must be bought/sold. For
the order book below, this translates into a weighted-average bid of 627 and
ask of 631, implying a AWS of 631− 627.













The Angelidis et al [10] model requires estimation of (, , ) using only
intra-day trade prices Pt, associated volumes Vt and trade directions Xt.
They propose that GMM estimation be used to find these estimates as it re-
quires weaker distributional assumptions than maximum likelihood methods
or ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. While OLS regression remains
valid, they prefer GMM estimation.
GMM is based loosely on the sample method of moments estimation proce-
dure.
The Sample Method of Moments












This can be used to estimate any theoretical relationship between a param-











the parameter a by using:
̄′r = M(a) (B.3)
where M is the theoretical relationship between a and ′r, the true moment.
Generalized Method of Moments
GMM generalizes the above simple method by assuming that based on the-
ory or specification a function f(Xt, ) exists such that E[f(Xt, )] = 0 for
some unknown parameter value .
GMM assumes that the best estimate of  is the one that sets this expecta-
tion to zero. Here f is a known function of the random variable X and  is a
parameter of the distribution of X. The goal of GMM is to find f based on
theory such that E[f(Xt, )] = 0.
The GMM estimator of , the parameter vector, for realizations Xi and










Generally C takes the form of an inverse matrix based on some initial esti-






f(Xi, ˆint) ⋅ f(Xi, ˆint)t)−1 (B.5)
Now in the Angelidis et al [10] model the estimation equation is based on






















































The Basel accord allows banks and other regulated entities to develop their
own internal models for the management of risk. Thus while the accord
specifically recommends the use of Value-at-Risk models and provides special
attention to the statistical backtesting of VaR in its Supervisory Framework
[11], users have tended to follow their own specifications in backtesting their
risk models. This has had the effect of creating a plethora of, at times,
inconsistent methodologies for the backtesting of VaR.
Despite this array of methodologies, the literature agrees that backtesting
of Value-at-Risk should, at the very least, amount to testing two hypothesis
regarding the “hit rate” 1 of a VaR model [54]:
1. The unconditional coverage hypothesis which points out that a %
VaR should be breached close to 1− % of the time by realized port-
folio losses. The VaR model should thus not systematically under or
overestimate risk.
2. The independence hypothesis which argues that violations of the VaR
forecast should over time be independent and not autocorrelated. Thus
the occurrence or non-occurrence of a violation should bear no infor-
mation on future violations. If this is true then the VaR model should
not have difficulty in forecasting changes in the profit and loss distri-
bution.












The above criteria can be expressed mathematically. Let Rt be the return
on a portfolio at time t. Then the VaR of the portfolio using a % coverage
level at time t, V aRt∣t−1(), and adapted to an information set Ωt−1 is such
that
ℙ(Rt < V aRt∣t−1()) =  (C.1)
Let now It() be an ex− post indicator variable such that
It() =
{
1 if Rt < V aRt∣t−1()
0 else
then (I())t∈T is called the hit series associated to the VaR and defines
whether or not the realized loss is larger than that forecasted by the VaR
model [54].
In this setting the problem of evaluating V aRt∣t−1() in terms of the initial
criteria reduces to the task of determining if the hit series has the following
properties:
1. The conditional coverage hypothesis – ℙ(It = 1) = E(It()) = 1 − 
so the probability of an ex − post violation must exactly equal the
model’s coverage rate.
2. The independence hypothesis – It() must be independent of It−k()
for any k ∕= 0.
While a number of tests, using a range of insights, have been developed to
make the testing of these hypothesis tractable, the most widely used tests
are the Kupiec Binomial test for conditional coverage and the Christoffersen
joint independence test [21].
The Kupiec test is based on the idea that if the hit series represents the
realization of independent identically distributed random variables and if
the VaR model is accurate then the number of violations should follow a
binomial distribution with probability . The probability then of arriving







The above can be used to accept or reject the null hypothesis of model ac-
curacy by calculating the probability of achieving more than some empirical











The Kupiec test, however, assumes independence as a precondition for the
test. The breakthrough which Christoffersen had was to realized that the
two hypothesis can be tested for separately and jointly. Arguing that the
two conditions imply that (I())t∈T is i.i.d Binomial with mean of , he
shows that if (I())t∈T is a first-order Markov process then its one-step






where ij = ℙ(It() = j ∣ It−1() = i).
Modelling (I())t∈T in this way amounts to assuming that a violation one
time-step ago bears no information on a violation in the next time step. The
test then tests for the existence of “an order one memory process” [54].
The test is actually a joint test of independence and conditional coverage
with H0 taking the form:





The test statistic of this test, like the test itself, can be split into two parts:
LRUC and LRIND both of which are distributed 
2(1) and have the follow-
ing form:







LRIND = −2 ln[(1− ̂2)n00+n11 ̂2n01+n11 ]











using nij from the empirical hit series itself. nij here represents the number
of times that event j has occurred consecutively after the observance of
event i in the sample. Generally calculating this value for a long series is
not easy and is best done with code. The VBA code for finding these values











Now since both LRIND ∼ 2(1) and LRUC ∼ 2(1) then the joint test
LRCC = LRIND + LRUC is distributed 
2(2) [54].
Overall the joint test is easy to determine and, although it only tests for
serial dependencies of order 1, is widely used by most VaR practitioners in













The VBA Sub Monte Carlo implements a simulation of 10 000 returns based
on a Geometric Brownian motion for the calculation of the standard Monte
Carlo VaR discussed in Section 5.1.3. The code can be easily applied in a
different VBA module by changing the sheet references from which input
means and variances are drawn.
The VBA Function Joint(ProL, V ARn, k,m) is used to calculate the num-
ber km states in a VaR model’s hit series as discussed in Appendix C. The
function reads in a range of realized Profits & Losses and a range of VaR es-
timates of loss and then calculates the number of incidences of state m after
state k is observed. It references the function StateCount which actually
counts the number of km states.
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